


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JPRS Report

China

Military Leadership Profiles

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The following are translations of selected articles from CHUNG-KUNG CHUN-FANG CHANG-LING [CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY LEADERS], Volume 4, published by the Wide Angle [KUANG CHIAO CHING] Press in Hong Kong in April 1993.

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[Article: "Zhang Zhen's Military Roots Are Deep"]

[Text] Zhang Zhen's Military Connections Receive
Attention From all Sides

Seventy-eight year-old General Zhang Zhen, who resigned from the Central Advisory Commission at the Chinese Communist National Congress in 1985, at the 14th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 1992, once again joined the Central Committee and was elected vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Central Military Commission. Everyone is wondering to a degree: Why did he return to the front rank? What are his military connections?

General Zhang Zhen, born in October 1914, is from Pingjiang County, Hunan Province. His original name was Zhang Jiansheng [6015 3932]. He also was called Zhang Zhongtian [0022 1131] and Zhang Zushou [4371 1108]. He joined the revolution in 1926 in the first nationalist-communist joint revolutionary period as deputy commander of the Pingjiang County Worker Children's Regiment.

Zhang Zhen Was an Old Subordinate of Peng Dehuai

In July 1928, when the communists and the nationalists split and the Chinese Communists carried out the Agrarian Revolution, the nationalist army regiment [tuan] led by Peng Dehuai and Teng Daiyuan rebelled in Pingjiang and formed the Fifth Red Army; Peng Dehuai was appointed army commander and Teng Daiyuan was appointed party representative. Before long, the Fifth Red Army went up to Jinggang Shan and joined forces with the Fourth Red Army led by Zhu De and Mao Zedong. In 1929 the Fourth Red Army shifted its activity to the western Min and southern Gan and the Fifth Red Army was soon after deployed back in the Xiang-E-Gan area and part of it was expanded to form the Eighth Red Army (He Zhanggong was army commander). In May 1930, Zhang Zhen was in the Fifth Red Army that captured Changshou Street in Pingjiang County. In April of that year, he had enrolled in the Communist Youth League. In June, the Fifth Red Army and the Eighth Red Army combined to form a Third Red Army Regiment with Peng Dehuai as regimental commander and Teng Daiyuan as party commissar. Zhang Zhen was a propagandist in the special battalion [tewu dadui] of the Second Column of the Fifth Red Army. In July he joined the Chinese Communist Party and was named commander of the propaganda element of the Second Column of the Fifth Red Army and participated in the battle to occupy Changsha. In August the Fifth Red Army abolished the column and reorganized it as a division, and Zhang was appointed a company political commissar in that force's First Division, First Regiment.

Li Shihang, commander of that First Division, was killed two years later in Xingguo, Jiangxi. Peng Shaohui, commander of the First Regiment, later became one of the 51 to be ranked as generals upon the first implementation of military ranks following liberation. Shortly after Li Shihang's death, Zhang Zhen was transferred to the post of copy clerk in the First Division headquarters and participated in a succession of anti-"encirclement" battles.

From Jiangxi He Took Part in the 2,500-Li Long March to Shaanbei

In June 1933, the Fifth Red Army was abolished and its first, second, and third divisions were reduced and reorganized into the Fourth Division of the Third Red Army Group. The division commander, Zhang Xilong, was killed at Lichuan, Jiangxi in December of that year. The division political commissar was Peng Xuefeng. Zhang Zhen was named communications director of the Tenth Regiment of the Fourth Division. After the fifth anti-"encirclement" began, Zhang Zhen was transferred to battalion commander of the Tenth Regiment's Third Battalion (the commander of that Tenth Regiment, He Dequan, was later selected as a lieutenant general in 1955 and has acted as deputy commander of the Hunan Military District). In October 1934, Zhang Zhen began his participation in the Long March. En route he was named chief of staff of the Third Red Army Group's Twelfth Regiment and chief of staff of the Twelfth Battalion [dadui] of the Shaan-Gan Detachment. After the Long March reached Shaanbei, due to the preceding loss of forces on the march, in November 1935 the Third Red Army Group designation was abolished and the group was incorporated into the First Red Army Group as the Fourth Division of the First Red Army Group. The commander of the Fourth Division, Chen Guang, had taken part in the Xiangnan Rebellion of the old Red Army. Later, he was named acting commander of the First Red Army Group and acting commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and together with Luo Rongheng, he built the anti-Japanese base camp behind enemy lines in Shandong. During the War of Liberation, he was deputy chief of staff of the Fourth Field Army. He died at Wuhan in June 1954. During his lifetime, Chen was always at odds with Lin Biao. The political commissar of the Fourth Division, Peng Xuefeng, was Zhang Zhen's former political commissar. Zhang Zhen was named to the Fourth Division staff and took part in such campaigns as the First Red Army Group's eastern and western expeditions.

In Shanxi and Shaanxi, He Devoted Himself to United Front Work

In the fall of 1936, at the invitation of Yan Xishan, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee sent Peng Xuefeng to Taiyuan, Shanxi as plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Shanxi provincial authorities concerning the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front. Zhang Zhen also was transferred to Xi'an a little later to engage in united front work and was assigned to the Red

Army staff stationed in Xi'an. In 1937 he changed his name to Zhang Zhongtian [1728 0022 1131] and went back and forth between Shanxi and Shandong devoting himself to united front military liaison matters. After the July 7 Incident, Peng Xuefeng was put in charge of the Eighth Route Army office stationed in Shanxi, and Zhang Zhen went to Taiyuan and was assigned to the staff of that office and was put in charge of the general affairs section. When Taiyuan fell in November of that same year, the office of the Eighth Route Army stationed in Shanxi moved to Linfen for a while, and in February 1938, the office was formally abolished.

Establishing the New Fourth Army Guerrilla Detachment

After February 1938, Zhang Zhen and more than sixty people followed Peng Xuefeng to Zhugou Town, Queshan County in southern Henan. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, this was a Red Army guerrilla base. When the nationalists and the communists again worked together, the New Fourth Army established a rear office at Zhugou. This also was where the Chinese Communist Central Plains' Office headed by Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Communist Henan provincial party committee headed by Zhu Lizhi were located. At that time, the Japanese army made a major advance. The nationalist army, several tens of thousand strong, withdrew to the south; such places as Zhengzhou and Kaifeng came in imminent danger, and the Central Plains' situation was serious. Peng Xuefeng was named the Chinese Communist Henan provincial party committee military department head and Zhang Zhen was named concurrent Henan provincial party committee military department chief of staff and Zhugou rear office chief of staff, assisting Peng Xuefeng in organizing and training the anti-Japanese armed forces and reforming bandits to make preparations for pushing forward with the eastern Henan anti-Japanese warfare. At that time, in the name of the Zhugou office, they developed three companies and established good relations with the neighboring nationalist army and local forces. In October 1938, Peng Xuefeng led 382 guerrillas from Zhugou to Dugang in Xihua County and joined forces with Xiao Wangdong and Wu Zhipu's eastern Henan guerrillas, forming the New Fourth Army guerrilla detachment. Peng Xuefeng was named commander, Wu Zhipu deputy commander, Zhang Zhen chief of staff, and Xiao Wangdong director of the political department. At the end of 1938, the "guerrilla detachment" made an initial breakthrough in the eastern Henan region. In the spring and summer of 1939, the "guerrilla detachment" open

The Huaibei War of Resistance Led by Zhang Aiping

In June 1940, the Sixth Detachment of the New Fourth Army and the main force Second Column of the Eighth Route Army to the south in central China, formed the Fourth Column of the Eighth Route Army. Peng Xuefeng was named commander, Huang Kecheng political commissar, Zhang Zheng chief of staff, and Xiao Wangdong director of the political department. Huang Kecheng was Zhang Zhen's senior officer during the Red Army period. Beginning in 1932, Huang was named in succession to such posts as director of the political department of the Fifth Red Army and acting director of the political department of the Third Red Army Group. In January 1941, after the Wannan Incident, the designation of the Fourth Column of the Eighth Route Army was changed to the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army. Peng Xuefeng was division commander (and concurrent political commissar, before Deng Zihui was named political commissar). Zhang Zhen was chief of staff and Xiao Wangdong was named director of the political department. In November of the same year, the Huaibei Military District was established and the Fourth Division also served as the military district organ. In the 1943 streamlining, Zhang Zhen was named commander of the 11th Brigade of the Fourth Division and concurrently commander of the Second Subdistrict west of Huaibei Road. Leading the forces in persevering in anti-"mop up," anti-"nibbling," and anti-"suppression" strengthened and developed the Huaibei anti-Japanese base area. On 11 September 1944, in a battle to block the invasion of the nationalist army, Peng Xuefeng himself came to the front line to take command and was killed on the battlefield. Zhang Zhen's old comrades during the Red Army period, Zhang Aiping and Wei Guoqing, were named commander and deputy commander, respectively, of the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army. During the period of the Long March, Zhang Aiping was political commissar of the 12th Regiment of the Third Red Army Group and Zhang Zhen was the chief of staff of that regiment. Ten years later, the comrades were once again working together. In August 1945, on the eve of the victory in the War of Resistance, the Huaibei base area was expanded to a total of 28 county areas in Henan, Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shandong provinces.

From Su-Wan to Shandong, He Was Led by Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi

After the end of the War of Resistance, in October 1945, the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army was divided in two. The Ninth Brigade that Zhang Zhen

commissar. In May 1946, he also was named commander and political commissar of the Huaibei Military District and participated in the command of the Subei Campaign.

In January 1947, the CCFA led by Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin went north and joined forces with the Shandong Field Army led by Chen Yi. The designation of New Fourth Army was officially abolished and the forces of the two field armies were formed into the East China Field Army [ECFA]. Chen Yi was the commander and political commissar, Su Yu was the deputy commander, Tan Zhenlin was the assistant political commissar, Chen Shiju was the chief of staff, and Tang Liang was director of the political department. At that time, the Ninth Column of the CCFA was combined with the Second Column of the Shandong Field Army to form the Second Column of the ECFA. The commander and political commissar was Wei Guoqing, the deputy commander was Zhang Zhen, the assistant political commissar was Tang Zhiqiang, the chief of staff was Zhan Huayu, and the director of the political department was Deng Yifan. At that time, the supreme command of the nationalist army formulated the Lunan Joint Campaign Plan. Chiang Kaishek himself deployed to Xuzhou and sent Ch'en Ch'eng, his chief of staff, to the front lines to oversee the war. A concentration of 23 reorganized divisions and 53 brigades totaling more than 310,000 people split onto southern and northern routes to attack the ECFA from both sides in the Linyi-Mengyin region. Ch'en Ch'eng said, "The success or the failure of the party and the nation all depend on the Lunan Campaign. We can only win, we cannot lose." The ECFA massed nine columns including the Second Column, and from 20 to 23 February 1947, launched the Laiwu Campaign attempting to wipe out Li Xianzhou's nationalist group army deep in Xintai and Laiwu. In that campaign, the ECFA wiped out 56,805 nationalist troops, and captured alive the Second Suijing Region deputy commander, Lieutenant General Li Xianzhou, 73rd [Division] military commander, Han Jun, and others, uniting the three Shandong liberated areas of Youhai, Luzhong, and Jiaodong. Later in May, Zhang Zhen participated in the command of the Menglianggu Campaign. In that campaign, the ECFA took 12,180 casualties in completely annihilating the 74th Reorganized Division—one of "five major main forces"—and the 83rd Reorganized Division with a total of 32,676 troops, killing the commander of the 74th Reorganized Division, Major General Chang Ling-fu. Chiang Kaishek lamented that the annihilation of that division was a "most distressing, most sorrowful incident."

Commanding the Western Line: From Corps Chief of Staff to Field Army CoS

In August 1947, to implement the strategic policy of the Chinese Communist Central Committee and Central Military Commission [CMC] for extending the war into Kuomintang areas, coordinated with the drive of the Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping led Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Southern Expeditionary Field Army into Dabie Mountain and the

advance of the Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi led Taiyue forces into western Henan, the ECFA decided to organize an East China western line corps (the Chen Su main force). This corps was organized from the Sixth Column and special main force column of the Chen Yi and Su Yu-led ECFA; the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth columns of the ECFA led by Chen Shiju and Tang Liang that had arrived earlier in the southwestern Shandong region; and the 11th Column of the Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu Field Army that had returned to the command of the ECFA to conduct war on the outer lines. Zhang Zhen at this time was transferred to the Western Line Corps as chief of staff and took part in the drive into southwestern Shandong and the advance into the Yu-Wan-Su border region. He participated in the command of the Shatuji Campaign (August 1947) and the campaign to destroy the Longhai Road (November 1947). By December 1947, the ECFA Western Line Corps had wiped out more than 70,000 of the enemy, and together with the Liu and Deng and the Chen and Xie forces, had restored and expanded the Central Plains liberated area and had destroyed all of the nationalist army's defense systems on the Central Plains battlefield.

Taking Part in Command of the Huaihai Campaign and in Seizing the Region North of the Chang Jiang

In March 1948, the designation of the East China Western Line Corps was changed to the East China First Corps. Su Yu was concurrently the commander and political commissar, Ye Fei was concurrently the first deputy commander and first assistant political commissar, and Zhang Zhen served as chief of staff. In August of the same year, he was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the ECFA and took part in the Jinan Campaign (September 1948). In that campaign the communist forces paid a price of 26,991 casualties to wipe out 104,296 nationalist forces and liberate Jinan. In November of the same year, Zhang Zhen was appointed chief of staff of the ECFA and participated in the command of the world famous Huaihai Campaign (Xubeng Engagement). That campaign was one of the three major campaigns in the War of Liberation; it lasted the longest, was on the greatest scale, and resulted in the most enemy casualties ever. In 66 days of warfare, the East China and the Central Plains Field Armies took 135,167 casualties in winning a great victory and wiping out 555,570 of the enemy, liberating the extensive region north of the Chang Jiang, and putting Nanjing under the direct threat of the Liberation Army.

Participating in the River Crossing Campaign, the Shanghai Campaign, the Fuzhou Campaign, and the Zhang-Xia Campaign

In February 1949, all of the East China forces conducted a unifying reorganization. The designation of the ECFA was changed to the Third Field Army. Chen Yi was appointed concurrent commander and political commissar, Su Yu was appointed deputy commander and third assistant political commissar, Tan Zhenlin was appointed first assistant political commissar, Zhang

Zhen was appointed chief of staff, and Tang Liang was appointed director of the political department. Zhang Zhen participated in the command of the River Crossing Campaign (April 1949), the Shanghai Campaign (May 1949), the Fuzhou Campaign (August 1949), the Zhang-Xia Campaign (September-October 1949), and the battle to liberate Zhoushan Archipelago (August 1949).

Liberating the Zhoushan Archipelago, Commander and Political Commissar of the 24th Army in the Korean War

In January 1950, the Third Field Army combined with the East China Military Region and Zhang Zhen was appointed chief of staff of the field army and the military region. In May of the same year, the designation of the Third Field Army and its subordinate forces was abolished. All of the forces of the Third Field Army were enrolled in the order of battle of the East China Military Region. Zhang Zhen was named chief of staff of the East China Military Region. In April 1952, Zhang Zhen was appointed head of the operations department of the general staff department and served for five years. During that time, in January 1953, he went to Korea and was also acting commander and political commissar of the 24th Army of the Ninth Corps of the Volunteer Army. The 24th Army was originally organized in January 1947 as the Sixth Column of the ECFA and made outstanding accomplishments in the Menglianggu Campaign and became a main force unit in East China. In September 1952, it entered the Korean War (the original commander and political commissar was Pi Dingjun). During the time that Zhang Zhen was the acting commander and political commissar, the forces that he commanded participated in the 1953 spring anti-landing campaign and the summer advance campaign, and the Kumsong counterattack campaign. In July 1953, on the eve of the armistice, in the battle to attack the Tongnamsan region, a footnote to the counterattack on Kumsong, the 24th Army broke through four kilometers of the South Korean Army's defensive front and penetrated five kilometers deep into the enemy ranks, recovered 15 square kilometers of territory, and wiped out 3,510 of the enemy. At the end of the Korean War, Zhang Zhen received the First Class National Flag Medal and the First Class Friendship Medal from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 1954 he returned home and went to Nanjing to enroll in the Liberation Army Military Academy for advanced studies. In September 1955, when military ranks were first implemented, Zhang Zhen received the rank of lieutenant general and was awarded the Second Class August First Medal, the Second Class Independence and Freedom Medal, and the First Class Liberation Medal.

President of the Nanjing Military Academy

In 1957, after Zhang Zhen graduated from the campaign department of the Liberation Army Academy, arrangements were made for him to stay on as vice president of the academy. The Liberation Army Military Academy was established in January 1951 based on the former

North China and East China military political universities. The academy was located in Nanjing, so it was also called the Nanjing Military Academy. The first president and political commissar appointed was Liu Bocheng. Beginning in 1957, based on the campaign and military history departments of this academy, another university-level Liberation Army military academy was established in Beijing. Based on the original navy, air force, artillery, and armored force departments, the aforementioned service and arm academies were established. Then a new military academy was established in Nanjing based on the basic, intelligence, and anti-chemical warfare departments of the original military academy. Lieutenant General Liao Hansheng and Lieutenant General Liu Haotian were successive academy presidents and General Zhong Qiguang and General Wang Ping were successive academy political commissars. In September 1962, Zhang Zhen relieved Liu Haotian as academy president and Liu Haotian was transferred to political commissar of the Navy East Sea Fleet. Zhang Zhen also served concurrently as the second secretary of the academy's party committee.

Wang Ping, the Nanjing Military Academy's first party committee secretary and commissar, was seven years Zhang Zhen's senior. After 1931, the two served together in the Third Red Army Group. When Zhang Zhen was a battalion commander in the Tenth Regiment of the Fourth Division of the army group, Wang Ping was the political commissar of the 11th Regiment of the Fourth Division. After the Long March, Zhang Zhen was on the staff of the Fourth Division of the First Red Army Group and Wang Ping was the director of the political department of the Fourth Division. Wang Ping was the last political commissar to be named to the Volunteers, and on 25 October 1958, not long after the last group of volunteers returned home from Korea, he was assigned as political commissar of the military academy. In 1966, after the "Cultural Revolution" began, Zhang Zhen and Wang Ping both were labeled as "rebels" by the military and were attacked by the Lin Biao clique and sent down to the Wuhan Steel Company to work. On 19 February 1969, the military academy was again forced to close down by the Lin Biao clique. It was again restored on 5 January 1978, after the downfall of the Gang of Four, and reestablished at Beijing. Xiao Ke was named president and first political commissar. After that, Wang Ping was named to the Central Advisory Commission until he retired when the 14th Congress abolished the Central Advisory Commission.

From Deputy Commander of the Wuhan MR to Director of the GLD

In 1970 Zhang Zhen was returned to work and appointed first deputy commander of the Wuhan Military Region [MR] and political commissar of the headquarters of the Gezhouba Water Conservancy Project. At that time, Zeng Siyu was commander of the Wuhan Military Region. Three years later, when the eight military region

commanders were switched, he went to the Jinan Military Region and Yang Dezhi was transferred to commander of the Wuhan Military Region. In August 1975, Zhang Zhen was named first deputy director of the General Logistics Department [GLD]. In August 1977, at the 11th Chinese Communist Congress, he was elected alternate member of the Chinese Communist Central Committee and elected to the Chinese Communist CMC, and together with Yang Yong and Liang Biye, was on the standing committee of the CMC. On 22 February 1978, the Chinese Communist CMC named Zhang Zhen the director of the GLD. Two months before this, his old comrade-in-arms, Wang Ping, was appointed political commissar of the General Logistics Department. So, they were once again paired up as commander and commissar. That year, they also were elected together to the Fifth National People's Congress.

Yang Dezhi, Previous Chief of Staff, Was Zhang Zhen's Old Comrade-in-Arms

In February 1982, Zhang Zhen was transferred to the General Staff Department [GSD] as first deputy chief of staff and second assistant director of the National People's Air Defense Committee. Yang Dezhi, the chief of the general staff, was four years Zhang Zhen's senior. In 1936 during the Shaanbei period, he was Zhang Zhen's old comrade-in-arms. Yang was appointed deputy division commander of the First Division and division commander of the Second Division of the First Red Army Group; Zhang was appointed to the staff of the Fourth Division of the First Red Army Group. Beginning in December 1973, the two also served together for two years in the Wuhan MR. Yang was commander and Zhang was first deputy commander. In September of the same year, at the 12th Chinese Communist Congress, Zhang Zhen was elected to the Chinese Communist Central Committee.

For a long time after joining the army, Zhang Zhen devoted himself to staff work. He served successively as regimental, detachment, corps, and field army chief of staff and gained abundant experience on the general staff. He also held such commands as battalion commander, brigade commander, and army commander, and engaged in military education. It could be said that he joined theory with practice and engaged in rather well-rounded military activities. In September 1985, at the Chinese Communist National Congress, he voluntarily withdrew to the second line, was appointed to the Central Advisory Commission, and resigned his post on the Chinese Communist Central Committee.

In Charge of the Highest Institution of Military Learning; Students Hail From All Over the Military

In 1985 the Chinese government decided to cut the military by 1 million. An expanded meeting of the CMC determined to make a strategic change in the guiding thought for military development to truly change from a condition of war preparation to a path of peaceful development. By the beginning of September 1995, the

three general departments and all the services and military regions will have completed their reorganization and adjustment of their leadership. Based on the merger of the Liberation Army Academy, the Political Academy, and the Logistics Academy, the Chinese People's Liberation Army National Defense University [NDU] was established at Beijing on 24 December 1985. Zhang Zhen was named president and Li Desheng was named political commissar. The NDU is China's highest institution of military learning.

In October 1987 at the 13th Chinese Communist Party Congress, Zhang Zhen was reelected to the Central Advisory Commission and named first assistant director of the military editorial committee of the Unabridged Chinese Encyclopedia and second assistant director of the editorial committee of the Chinese Military Encyclopedia. In September 1988, when the Chinese Communists once again implemented military ranks, Zhang Zhen was made a general. After May 1990, Zhang Zhen was named concurrent president and political commissar of the National Defense University as well as the school's party secretary and a high level advisor to the Chinese Military Science Society. Li Desheng at that point retired from military service.

After the "14th Congress," at the Ripe Age of 78, Returned to the Front Line

At the 14th CPC Congress, Zhang Zhen was again elected to the Chinese Communist Central Committee, and at the First Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee, he was also elected the vice chairman of the new CMC. He and Liu Huaqing from the old Red Army of Dabie Shan are directing the day to day work of the Military Commission, taking the place of Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing. All of the members of the new Military Commission except Jiang Zemin are professional military people. Liu Huaqing originally belonged to the Fourth Red Army Front. Later, he belonged to the Second Field Army. Zhang Zhen originally belonged to the First Red Army Front. Later, he belonged to the Third Field Army. Zhang Wannian and Yu Yongbo joined the armed forces in the War of Resistance and the War of Liberation, respectively. Both of these men came from the Fourth Field Army and Fu Quanyou, the director of the General Logistics Department, came from the First Field Army that was commanded by Marshal Peng Dehuai. The previous Military Commission had Zhao Nanqi, a Korean. This Military Commission also has a minority group military man, that is Yu Yongbo (a Manchu).

Zhang Zhen Article on Huaihai Campaign

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[Article by Zhang Zhen (1728 7201): "The Decisive Huaihai Battle"]

[Text] On Receiving Mao Zedong's Order To Go Into Battle, the East China Field Army Moved South and Organized for the Huaihai Campaign

The autumn of 1948 was an unusual season; it was then that Mao Zedong gave the order to achieve nationwide victory and issued his directive of decisive significance in that respect. At that time, people in the liberated areas in North China were jubilantly working under the leadership of the CPC for production in support of the front. The People's Liberation Army [PLA] was much encouraged by news of victories on all battle fronts and was in a heightened fighting spirit; it was in fact eagerly awaiting the order to extend military activities to the south. Just at that time, Mao Zedong's advance order for battle was issued. He directed the East China Field Army [ECFA] to deal rapidly with the aftermath of the battle around Jinan, and thereafter to proceed immediately to the south. He also made specific suggestions for the next stage of the campaign, and wanted our army to move south and organize for the Huaihai campaign. Everybody rejoiced and said: "Excellent, there will be another great battle to fight!"

Troops Moving South in Separate Groups on Countless Different Routes

Our troops rushed south along many different routes, like a powerful steamroller, with motors roaring and battle-steeds neighing.

On 3 October 1948, we had already reached the Sishui River, north of Qufu in Shandong Province. The flooded state of the mountain torrents was an added difficulty for the advance of our troops, and one vehicle behind me actually fell into the water. It made me immediately think of an incident after the battle of Menglianggang, when our first column and fourth column attacked southwestern Shandong and found themselves in the dilemma of flood waters in front and the pursuing enemy in the rear. If it would not have been the people's army, we would then have suffered grievous losses, the consequences of which are dreadful to contemplate. However, we overcame the difficulties. Commander Chen Yi [7115 3015] used to say: "You can get the better of the mountains, but not of the water," which is really like the common Chinese saying, "Separation by mountains poses no difficulty, but separation by water does." This is so because overcoming the obstacle of water requires certain materials to be available, and is also only possible with persons of a high degree of political consciousness.

On that day, we reached Qufu. The people, who in the past had suffered all kinds of hardships, enthusiastically welcomed us. They had put up lanterns and colored streamers as decorations and were beating drums and gongs.

The ECFA Called an Enlarged Front Line Conference at Qufu To Transmit the September Resolution of the CPC Central Committee

We had arrived in Qufu at that time on the crest of our victories certainly not to pay our respects to the "Most

Sage Master" [Confucius] and not to visit the Confucius Temple and the Confucius Forest like tourists, but rather because the front party committees of the ECFA were to hold their enlarged conference here to transmit the September resolution of the CPC Central Committee, a resolution of decisive significance.

The enlarged conference of the front party committees of the ECFA officially opened on 5 October 1948. All front party committees and the leading party commissars of the various formations, battle-weary but buoyed by victory, participated in the conference. As I think back today, the core content of that conference was mainly succinctly and precisely expressed by Mao Zedong in his poem: "With the army advancing, with production growing by just one inch, with enhanced discipline, victory in the revolution is certain." The main theme in it was the need to strengthen discipline. All participants at the conference enthusiastically engaged in studies and discussions, and also conducted criticism and self-criticism.

Autumn Offensives Breaking Down Key Defenses of the Kuomintang

To extend the revolutionary war and carry it deep into Kuomintang-controlled areas, the PLA at that time launched autumn offensives simultaneously at all fronts throughout the country, and achieved brilliant victories. The so-called core defense plan of the KMT was soon smashed to smithereens, and no front line remained intact between north and south. Especially during the first four months of the war's third year, our army annihilated a total of over one million enemies. The enemy's strength dwindled to about 2.9 million, while ours rose to over 3 million. That means that by that time our armies had not only qualitative superiority, but also numerical superiority.

At the same time, we also won a great political victory. In large parts of the old and more recently liberated areas, land reform was completed, and the CPC had also adopted a correct policy applicable to the new territories; the entire party had greatly gained in political maturity. Great achievements were also scored by the CPC in its work in the KMT areas. The people's organizations stood on the side of the Communist Party. It was diametrically the opposite case with the Chiang Kai-shek clique, since their exchanges of national interests for "American aid" not only did not add strength to the Chiang Kai-shek clique, but rather had them bogged down in an ever more serious political crisis. Chiang Kai-shek's regime and the regime of the KMT was about to come crashing down, as it was there and then already hovering on the brink of complete collapse.

These circumstances compelled Chiang Kai-shek to adopt a strategy of withdrawal to a new holding position by drawing back his troops in all the various separate sectors. In the Xuzhou area, under the command of Liu Chih, he deployed the four army groups of Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, Li Mi, Huang Po-t'ao, and Sun Yuen-liang. The

two pacification district armies of Liu Ju-ming and Li Yen-nien were deployed along the Longhai Railway to guard the two flanks of the Xuzhou front, which stretched from Haizhou in the east to Shangqiu in the west. The 59th Division of the third pacification district under Feng Chih-an and the 77th Division were deployed northeast of Xuzhou in the Lincheng-Yixian-Pixian area. These forces were stretched out there like a wounded snake hugging the Longhai railroad with the intention of blocking the southward advance of our forces.

Unit by Unit Destruction of the Enemy at Xuzhou, Pushing on Across the Chang Jiang

With the fundamental change in the comparative strength of the enemy and of our own forces, and the campaign throughout the country having taken a favorable turn, the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong promptly seized the overall strategic opportunity for the decisive fight and signalled our forces to resolutely advance, so as to quickly wipe out the KMT regime. They also ordered all troops and people in the central plains and in East China to engage in a strategically decisive battle, to destroy the enemy in the Xuzhou area unit by unit, and not to allow the enemy's main force to withdraw and hold on to the territory south of the Chang Jiang, so as to join up all fraternal field armies for the impending task of crossing the Chang Jiang and liberating the entire country. On 11 October 1948, Mao Zedong issued the final battle plan for the Huaihai campaign.

To enable "armies to advance," there had to be "production growing by just an inch," because only an increase in production could improve the living standard of the people in the liberated areas, and could increase support for the war, and could furthermore accelerate progress toward victory. The September conference had proposed: "Rehabilitation and development of industrial and agricultural production in the liberated areas is to be the primary consideration in the interest of supporting the war and overcoming the KMT reactionary clique." On the other hand, it was of course still necessary for us during the victorious advance of the PLA into the KMT area to draw on the manpower and material resources available from the KMT and available in the KMT area, to provide the necessities for the continuation of the war. Mao Zedong said: "We shall not encourage dependence on the war industry that we are establishing ourselves. Our basic policy is to depend on the war industry of imperialism and of our domestic enemies. We are able to utilize the arsenals of London and Hanyang, and furthermore are having the enemy's transport corps deliver the materials to us. This is the truth and not merely a joke." It was in fact like this. During the war of resistance against Japan, our arsenal was in Tokyo; and during the war of liberation our arsenal was in Washington. The chief of this huge transport corps, Chiang Kai-shek, delivered to us shipment after shipment of all kinds of weapons. Things have of course changed by now, and for the modernization of

our national defenses and effective protection of our national security, we must rely on and organize extensive efforts by our own people to develop production, engage in arduous struggle, fight against waste, and practice strict economy. "In short, we must be self-reliant and thereby maintain an invincible position, completely the opposite of what Chiang Kai-shek is doing, namely completely relying on foreign countries."

However, the core principle in "having the army advance and having production grow by just an inch" is the idea of strengthening discipline. "Only by strengthening discipline can we ensure identity of politics, ideology, organization, and action throughout the entire party and throughout the entire armed forces. Only then can we also count on greater unity within the entire party and among all armed forces, and ensure victory for the revolution." As the revolutionary situation had turned victorious, we were then soon to win victory throughout the whole country and our party was about to become a great party leading all of China, our armed forces were increasing, and the scope of the war was expanding. In a large-scale war operation, it is necessary to mutually cooperate and coordinate. If discipline would have broken down, our armed forces would have suffered an immense loss, and the entire war effort would have ended in defeat. We must therefore demand that the CPC exert the greatest efforts to overcome some undisciplined and anarchistic situations, overcome regionalism and guerrilla-warfare mentality, and that all powers that can and must be concentrated be concentrated in the hands of the CPC Central Committee and its representative organs. As things are today, the idea of strengthening discipline is of primary and important significance.

Because they had all become thoroughly acquainted with the great significance of Mao Zedong's strategic principle, none of the participants at the conference had become vainglorious or complacent due to our victories in the fighting at Jinan. Rather, they all sought out deficiencies in this victory and formed resolutions such as to definitely ensure that our troops would correctly implement the Central Committee's directives and policies; to resolutely pursue the favorable war against the enemy in its decisive stage; to strengthen discipline, obey orders and listen to directives, always taking the whole into account and closely cooperating; and when dealing with major questions always to adhere to the system of asking for instructions and submitting reports. Moreover, we determined to further strengthen the ideological buildup of the troops. When total nationwide victory was about to be achieved, it was also necessary to thoroughly realize the major significance of forever maintaining the high quality of the people's army and the excellent tradition of our armed forces.

After having established unified thinking concerning the present conflict, we followed the directive: "The core concern during the first stage of this battle is to concentrate military strength on the annihilation of the Huang Po-t'ao Army Group, by achieving a breakthrough at the

center, occupying Xinanzhen and the Grand Canal railway station...." According to the principle "attack Jinan and repulse reinforcements," we first attacked with a concentration of seven columns the Huang Po-t'ao Army Group in the Xinanzhen-Ahu area, while we had three columns attack from the opposite north-to-south direction the Grand Canal railway station to cut connections between the Huang Po-t'ao Army Group and the Li Mi Army Group. With three columns we attacked and captured Hanzhuang and Taierzhuang, and persuaded Feng Chih-an's Army Group to come over to our side. Thereafter we followed the Longhai railroad to block the advance of enemy relief forces coming east from Xuzhou. In two columns from two sides we then attacked Xuzhou.

At the same time the main force of the Central Plains Field Army [CPFA] attacked the Xuzhou-Bengbu section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, occupied Suxian and cutting the enemy's connection from Xuzhou to the south, isolating Xuzhou, and ensuring victory in the initial phase of the battle.

The enlarged conference of our front party committees lasted 20 days. Participants at this conference had conducted a study of and discussions on the September resolution of the CPC Central Committee and of its strategy and battle plan. They also studied and discussed the directives given by deputy commander Su Yu [4725 5940] and deputy political commissar Tan Zhenlin [6223 7201 2651]. All this further enhanced political unity and further unified guiding ideology for the impending battle, and raised fighting spirit. Mao Zedong's military thoughts laid the firm ideological foundation for gaining victory in the Huaihai Battle and beyond that for nationwide victory. As to the logistic support, Zhou Enlai, political commissar and vice chairman, assigned Yang Lisan [2799 4539 0005] to be in centralized charge of logistics. In this way everything was well prepared, also in respect to material requirements.

After the conference, the various sectors quickly transmitted the gist of the conference decisions and conducted military and political training. All east China party and government organizations and the broad masses of the people also made comprehensive preparations in support of the front. Everybody impatiently awaited early arrival of Mao Zedong's order to attack, so as to resolutely enter the strategically decisive battle with Chiang Kai-shek.

On 6 October 1948 the order came, and the various units of the ECFA uninterruptedly poured forth side by side on several different routes from the Linyi-Zouxian line in an advance toward the south, in accordance with their predetermined tasks. All the valiant fighters in the various columns carried out the directives of the CPC Central Committee and of Mao Zedong to "have the army advance," and they rushed on day and night with the force of a thunderbolt.

That day, the headquarters of the ECFA was in Linyi. Enemy planes occasionally came over, strafing the area. The enemy might look at Linyi from afar, but would never again regain possession of Linyi, a city which had only recently been returned to the hands of the people. I remember February of 1947, when the enemy occupied the main cities in the Jiangsu-Anhui border region and staged a large-scale invasion of the Shandong liberated area. At that time, the KMT chief-of-staff Ch'en Ch'eng [7115 6134] and the head of the Xuzhou "pacification office" Hsueh Yueh [5641 1471] figured that we would firmly hold on to Linyi, and he therefore executed a pincer movement with superior forces from north and south with the intention of forcing a decisive battle with us at Linyi. Finally, they concentrated their main force on the southern front and steadily pressed forward, while Wang Yao-wu [3769 5069 2976] on the northern front took advantage of our unprotected rear and ordered the Li Hsien-chou [2621 0103 3166] Army Group to advance south at double speed. Their intention was to force us to accept the decisive battle while in control of the Yimeng mountain range, a situation that was unfavorable for us. At that time, I turned the faulty assumption of the enemy to good use. Since the main objective of the war was to annihilate the enemy's effective strength, and not to preserve or gain territory, I decided to give up Linyi. While leaving a small force to delay the enemy, I had our main force move north. In the Xintai-Laiwu region we later managed to completely annihilated two army corps and seven divisions of the Li Hsien-chou Army Group, about 50,000 men. We thereby established an example of how the East China Army Group, in the course of mobile action, could quickly, thoroughly, and completely wipe out a strong contingent of the enemy. We fully proved the particular superiority of our troops in mobile warfare, and dealt a grievous blow to the enemy's "all-out attack."

With Complete Destruction of Local Rascals, the Nationalist Army Lost Its Information Facility

The day came when we not only had recovered Linyi, but when we were about to liberate all the vast land north of the Chang Jiang, and when we prepared for the crossing of the Chang Jiang to liberate all of China. This was a reason for great rejoicing!

To wipe out small pockets of local resistance and facilitate the advance of the main force, the Central-South Shandong Column of our army seized Tancheng in southern Shandong on the eighth. They completely annihilated the local evil rascals and informants—Wang Hung-chiu's [Wang Hongqiu] over 5,000 Shandong Security Corps. This left the Nationalist Army without sources of information. As the first battle was won and the surrounding countryside was cleaned up, the long-held determination of our officers and men to kill off the enemy had initially been realized. Everyone's fighting spirit was at a high pitch and so was also morale in general. The masses called out such slogans as "Welcoming the ECFA on their Glorious Southern Campaign," "Wishing the ECFA Many More Victories," and "Long

Live Chairman Mao," as the troops resumed their vigorous southward advance, forging ahead, together with the other fraternal army groups, and going from victory to victory.

By that time the enemy was already terrified and panicky. When they found that our ECFA was closing in on the Dangshan-Lincheng-Tancheng line, and the CPFA moved about freely in the areas between the Jinpu, Longhai, and the Pinghan railway lines, they were indeed in a precarious indefensible position and frightened out of their senses, much as expressed in the common saying "birds startled by the mere twang of a bow-string."

Internal Strife in the KMT; Not Fighting for the Xuzhou-Haizhou Sector Means Being Prepared for the Loss of Nanjing and Shanghai

Before all this happened, Chiang Kai-shek had had the intention of giving command over north China to Fu Tso-i [Fu Zuoyi], command over Wuhan and Xuzhou to Pai Ch'ung-hsi [Bai Chongxi], while withdrawing the most trusted troops under his personal command to south of the Chang Jiang to strengthen the Chang Jiang defense line, to preserve the strength of his own trusted troops, and to gain a breathing spell. However, internal factional conflicts, struggles for power and interests, mutual feuds and disagreements, in particular because Chiang Kai-shek was considering withdrawing from all of the area north of the Chang Jiang; all this led to general confusion. At the same time, Li Tsung-jen [Li Zongren] and Pai Ch'ung-hsi pressured Chiang Kai-shek to relinquish his position, which caused him to be torn by conflicting thoughts and be undecided about what move to make next. Finally, the Ministry of Defense proposed a plan along the lines of "holding the Chang Jiang line makes it imperative to first hold the Huai River line." Others discussed the possibility that Nanjing and Shanghai would fall, and that the government would then have to move to Guangzhou. They therefore suggested "adjustments in the deployment" on the various battlefields (actually amounting to flight). What a really brilliant idea! Not fighting for the Xuzhou-Haizhou sector would mean being prepared for the loss of Nanjing and Shanghai. That had to be what Chiang Kai-shek's advisors in the highest military command must have been pondering.

On the one hand, it was also at that time that factional conflicts within the KMT became more acute and much panic and confusion reigned among the command structure. As the attacks by our armies rapidly developed, advancing on various routes, they further added to the panic and confusion in the ranks of the KMT. Chiang Kai-shek finally did decide to gather up whatever forces he could muster and deploy them in the Xuzhou area, preparing for an all-out decisive battle with our forces as a last-ditch struggle to survive.

Xuzhou borders on the four provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, Shandong, and Henan. It is like an outpost for Nanjing and Shanghai, both to the south. To the north it connects

with Hebei and Shandong and is a communications hub between north and central China. Militarily it has been a strategically important place since ancient times. Because of its important location, its seizure or loss has in the past often decided the fate of the whole area between the Chang Jiang, Huai River, Yellow River, and Han River, and it has therefore always been "a place contested by all strategists." In the present people's war of liberation, Xuzhou again became the gate to Nanjing, and the KMT converted it into a huge military base for the pursuit of the civil war. Security or danger for all of the land north and south of the Chang Jiang was therefore closely bound up with the possession or loss of Xuzhou. In the first week of November of 1948, Chiang Kai-shek specially sent commander-in-chief of the army and chief-of-staff Ku chu-t'ung [Gu Zhutong] to Xuzhou to deploy the troops for battle. At that time, Liu Chih's intentions were to not only take measures against the threat by our forces to the Xuzhou-Bengbu area, but also to take precautions against a possible revolt and crossing-over to our side of Feng Chih-an and Sun Liang-ch'eng. He also believed that Liu Ju-ming could not be fully trusted, because he was of the same group of northwestern military men as Feng Chih-an. Even the internal situation among the military men under Chiang Kai-shek's personal control was not altogether free from contradictions. There were many malcontents in Liu Chih's outfit; there was especially the rivalry between Huang Po-t'ao and the conceited and arrogant Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan. In this situation, full of mutual suspicion, jealousy, and mutual feuding, Chiang Kai-shek decided on the oft-defeated general Liu Chih to head the "Bandit Suppression Headquarters" and to garrison and defend the center of Xuzhou. West of Xuzhou, the Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan and Sun Yuen-liang Army Groups were to give up Shangqiu and Dangshan to withdraw to the area of Huangkou, with concentration on Xuzhou, and the army groups to the east of Xuzhou were to give up Haizhou and Xinanzhen to withdraw to west of the Grand Canal. It was also intended to have the army groups of Feng Chih-an, Li Mi, Huang Po-t'ao, and Sun Liang-ch'eng take Xuzhou as the central point in a half-moon defensive formation for an unyielding resistance from Lincheng to south of Yaowan, along the Grand Canal. Li Yen-nien was to organize a new army group at Bengbu, Liu Ju-ming was to move south to "pacify" the area around Bengbu, and in addition the Huang Wei [7806 4850] Army Group of the Wuhan area was moved its concentration to Queshan and Zhumadian on the Pinghan railway line, in preparation for deployment in the Xuzhou-Bengbu area. In this way, the enemy lines formed a cross with the two railways, the Jinpu and the Longhai lines, intersecting at Xuzhou, which was then the center. The total military deployment, including the later reinforcements, comprised about 800,000 men. The strategy that was intentionally followed here brings to mind the saying "a hooligan is apt to gamble recklessly," staking everything on one chance, in this case to control Xuzhou, consolidate positions on the Chang Jiang and Huai River, and shield Nanjing. However, on our side we had the leadership of Mao Zedong and the support of

the broad masses of the people. Chiang Kai-shek had always underestimated all that and always overestimated his own strength. Political failure cannot be remedied by temporary military advantages. In that respect he also completely miscalculated. On the surface he appeared as cautious and careful, going ahead steadily and striking sure blows, but actually he was like the old teacher in the classical Peking opera *Da-Yu Sha-Jia* [Killing off a Fisherman's Family], who gave himself the air of a brave, strong man, but was inwardly weak, and therefore had to suffer a beating.

As the battle situation rapidly developed, the enemy concentrated his main force at Xuzhou, whereupon Mao Zedong issued the directive that in the first battle we would strive by every means to annihilate the 21 to 22 divisions of Huang Po-t'ao and Li Mi. If this task could be accomplished, "the entire situation would change," and the ECFA and the CPFA will then be able to close in on the Xuzhou-Bengbu line. If the enemy did not withdraw his forces in Xuzhou and surrounding districts to south of Bengbu, we would fight the second battle to annihilate Huang Wei and Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, thereby completely isolating the enemy in Xuzhou. As circumstances changed, Mao Zedong promptly issued decisive directives and readjusted the deployment. Four columns of the CPFA under the direct command of commander Chen Yi and political commissar Deng Xiaoping were to move out of Suxian and cut the Suxian-Bengbu road. Two columns of the ECFA (the third column, the "guang" column) in the Xiaoxian area were to attack toward the Huangkou-Xuzhou line, to link up with the CPFA of Suxian. If the enemy would try a general retreat toward the south, there would be a concentration of six columns to annihilate them. Three columns of our ECFA were to move from north to south, and one column to move from south to north in an all-out attack against the Li Mi Army Group, to gain control of the railway between Xuzhou and the Grand Canal railway station, while the main force east of the Grand Canal would annihilate the Huang Po-t'ao Army Group. That was how Chiang Kai-shek's armies were to be split up and isolated and then destroyed by a concentration of superior forces, ending with the occupation of Xuzhou. Mao Zedong demanded that our two field armies resolutely carry out this plan, and admonished us that the stronger our resolve, the greater our courage, the better our chances of achieving victory.

When Opportunity Was Ripe for Battle, the Central Committee Decided To Set Up a General Front Party Committee With Deng Xiaoping as Secretary

When they saw the time had come for the decisive battle on the southern front, the CPC Central Committee decided to set up a general front party committee, consisting of Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, Su Yu, Chen Yi, and Tan Zhenlin, and with Deng Xiaoping as secretary, for the overall command over the two field armies. On the foundation of the original plan for the Huaihai Battle, a large-scale decisive battle was to be launched against the largest strategic group of Chiang Kai-shek's

forces, taking Xuzhou as central point and preparing to annihilate all the various enemy forces north of the Huai River. They also enjoined the three large liberated regions, the central plains region, east China, and north China, to spare no efforts to give all-out support.

At that time, the military strength of the two sides fighting on the Huaihai battle field was: Although the enemy had five army groups and three "pacification district" armies of a total of about 800,000 men, these military bodies were beset with many problems. They suffered repeated defeats, and their morale was very low. On our side, the ECFA had 16 columns of 36 divisions with about 420,000 men. The CPFA had seven columns of 20 brigades with a total of 130,000 men. In addition there were 210,000 armed men in the military region, scattered in the various localities. We were somewhat inferior in military strength. However, after consolidation of the party organization and up-to-date rectifications carried out within the army, fighting spirit was as high as never before. Not only was there support from the people, but local militia joined the fighting, and the two large field armies, operating under the leadership of Mao Zedong and under the specific organization and direction of the general front party committee, was perfectly capable of assembling superior forces to annihilate the enemy and in the end to win a glorious victory in the Huaihai Battle.

However, we have to admit truthfully that if we would have acted according to our original plan, namely to first occupy Haizhou and Lianyungang to control the eastern end of the Longhai Railway, then to capture Huai'an and Huaiyin, opening up central China's granary to us, and then only to attack the Xuzhou-Bengbu sector, to isolate and in due course capture Xuzhou or in view of the posture then assumed by Huang Po-t'ao's Army Group, encircle and annihilate the enemy with the main objective being Xinanzhen, we would have been able to annihilate only a small portion of Chiang Kai-shek's effective strength and the liberation of Xuzhou would then also have been much delayed. However, Mao Zedong judged the hour and sized up the situation on the basis of the objective conditions, and promptly made other appropriate dispositions. He determined that after destroying the Huang Po-t'ao Army Group in the first battle, the attack should shift to the Xuzhou-Bengbu sector to encircle and destroy the army groups of Huang Wei and Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan. Then, with great military skill and ingenious tactics in the use of the military strength available, he managed to dismember Chiang Kai-shek's huge military body of 800,000 strong, based in Xuzhou, stage by stage, encirclement after encirclement, and to annihilate each section separately after assembling a superior military force to do so. This ensured a development of the battle that was much more favorable than originally planned, and also a much faster and greater victory than originally anticipated. It proved again the flexibility in Mao Zedong's tactical direction of battles. It occurred precisely as Mao Zedong said: "...the war has moved into a new phase, and the strategic plan

has to be changed. Tactics, battle plans, and strategy must be determined and changed according to their scope and according to circumstances. That is the key concern of any battle command as it is concrete realization of battle flexibility, and as it is also adroit utilization of the realities."

With Lightning Speed, Simultaneous Attacks Were Launched From Several Different Directions

As planned by Mao Zedong, the ECFA and the CPFA simultaneously attacked with lightning speed from east, south, west, and north of Xuzhou. Thirteen columns of the ECFA boldly advanced side by side toward the south, coming from Shandong Province and making a clean sweep of enemy positions over a broad area of 300 li to the north of the Longhai Railway. Three columns of the North Jiangsu Army Group attacked from southeast of Xuzhou toward the northwest. By the end of a few days, the enemy forces were split up into several sectors that had no further contacts with each other. Between Xuzhou and Bengbu, the CPFA cut the Jinpu railway line, and here too dealt the enemy a stunning blow. The enemy had expected that we would first try to capture Xuzhou, and still up to the fourth day of the Huaihai Battle, the operations center of Chiang Kai-shek's Ministry of Defense was at a loss to decide its next move, because they tried to hold on to Xuzhou but were also fearful of the encirclement of Huang Po-t'ao's Army Group, and they could not make out the direction of our main thrust. As all the 22 columns of our two large field armies went into action simultaneously, and the KMT army group in Xuzhou came under simultaneous attack from all directions, they soon were to realize their predicament; they were unable to give succor to each other, and while they did not dare to take flight, they were also unable to withstand the onslaught by our forces. On the seventh day of the battle, and only after the Huang Po-t'ao Army Group had been firmly encircled by our forces did the enemy finally give orders to send them reinforcements. At the same time, however, they felt that without beating back the attacks by our forces from the north and the south against Xuzhou, it was impossible to send reinforcements east. It was really a predicament as in the saying: "A Bodhisattva made of mud wading a river—a case of not being able to guarantee one's own survival." On the 11th day of the battle, on 17 November 1948, it was apparent that our encirclement of Zhanzhuang had become extremely tight, indicating our firm resolve that we simply "had to get Huang Po-t'ao." When the Xuzhou "Bandit Suppression Headquarters" wanted to despatch reinforcements to the east, it found even itself under serious pressure and unable to provide the full amount of reinforcements that would have been necessary. They were then still trying to bargain with Chiang Kai-shek, asking him to send an army group by air to participate in the defense of Xuzhou. At that stage, how could Chiang Kai-shek find any troops for transfer? Their request was really nothing else but an attempt to shift responsibilities. From diaries captured at the KMT positions, we can clearly see the sorry plight those people found themselves in.

Huang Pai-t'ao Does Not Meet Our Attack

The Huang Pai-t'ao [7806 4102 7290] Army Group of the East China Sea front was originally thought capable of maneuvering to intercept our army on its move south and of following the Longhai Railroad to support the battle on the East China Sea front; to the west it could throw a protective screen around Xuzhou, control the eastern stretch of the Longhai Railroad, and cut the connection between Shandong Province and central China. Mao Zedong ordered the Front Committee of the East China Front Army to have 10 columns of the front army conduct the main assault on the side of Xin'an Town and first annihilate the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group; and to have three columns pass through the Jiawang area northeast of Xuzhou, and in the direction of Caobaiji, on the eastern side of Xuzhou, conduct an auxiliary assault, cutting Huang's connection with Xuzhou and blocking the enemy's reinforcement of Xuzhou from the east. Once the campaign began, Huang Pai-t'ao fled westward in a panic and did not dare meet our attack. The four armies of the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group, and the 44th Army, originally stationed on the eastern stretch of the Longhai Railroad at Xinpu and Haizhou and commanded by the Ninth Pacification Zone Headquarters, tried to draw close to Xuzhou.

At this time Mao Zedong decided, in the first stage of the campaign, to concentrate his military forces to annihilate Huang Pai-t'ao. On the Huaihai battlefield Huang Pai-t'ao was totally isolated and exposed, and his force deployment was comparatively weak. "First attack the dispersed and isolated enemy; afterward attack the concentrated and strong enemy"—precisely meant to first set about annihilating Huang Pai-t'ao. More important was that by annihilating Huang Pai-t'ao the connection between Shandong and Central China could be achieved, a connection that would be advantageous for the next step in carrying out operations along the Xuzhou-Pukou line. Therefore, when Huang Pai-t'ao began to flee westward, the Front Committee of the East China Front Army immediately reaffirmed Mao Zedong's determination to completely annihilate Huang Pai-t'ao, ordering the main assault group to overcome all difficulties in boldly and powerfully pursuing and attacking, and ordering the auxiliary assault group to swiftly interpose at the side of Xuzhou to intercept and attack Huang Pai-t'ao as he fled westward, while blocking the enemy in Xuzhou from moving eastward to reinforce Huang. It also instructed the entire force not to be pinned down by small enemy detachments, but rather to move swiftly day and night, advance rapidly, and "pursue the enemy wherever he flees."

Crossing Longhai Railroad, We Pursue and Attack Along Its Southern Side

Our main assault group—the First Column, Sixth Column, Ninth Column, as well as the Central-South Shandong Column and the Central Plains Field Army's 11th Column—from Xin'an Town and the area west of it, crossed the Longhai Railroad and pursued and

attacked along its southern side. The Fourth Column and Eighth Column pursued and attacked along its northern side. Everybody itched to catch the enemy and give him a good thrashing. Some of them said: "Tighten the belt and tie the shoelaces—Pursue!" Others said: "The enemy's legs are not as long as our feet are fast. Even if he ducks into a rathole we will get him." Except for spending an extremely small amount of time in finding guides, our troops advanced rapidly without stopping, crossing mountains and rivers, fearing neither hunger nor cold, and now shrinking from arduous conditions. The men did not stop moving their feet, and the horses did not stop moving their hooves. Some units pursued the fleeing enemy at a rapid march rate of 120 to 140 *li* a night.

When Weixian County, Shandong, was attacked in April 1948, the 79th Regiment of the 27th Division in the Ninth Column, because of its indomitable fighting spirit, won the honorary title "Weixian County Regiment." When this regiment from Shandong made a long-range pursuit and reached Yantou Town, 80 *li* northeast of Jiangsu's Suqian, a three *zhang*-wide [10 meter-wide] river blocked its way. One or more regiments of the 63d Army in the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group was surrounded in Yantou Town. The Second Company of the "Weixian County Regiment" was ordered to attack Yantou Town. In the swift current of the river, a bridge built with wooden pontoons would be unstable. Time was urgent. Under the enemy's intensive firepower blocking line, First Platoon Deputy Leader Fan of this company ordered nine fighters, disregarding the bone-and flesh-freezing waters of the river, to jump into the water and use their shoulders, hands, and feet to prop up a "10-man bridge." The "10-man bridge" ensured that an entire battalion was able to make a timely crossing to the opposite bank, and in coordination with fraternal units, annihilate the enemy in Yantou Town.

Displaying the fighting style of fierce attack and hot pursuit, our army continued to fiercely pursue and attack the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group, which was dispersed and fleeing westward. In the villages that they passed on their way, remnant enemies used shutters, baskets, and red laquer cabinets that they had removed from civilian homes to erect temporary defense works, and used tree branches around the villages to put up crude abatis barriers. Some defense works and barricades were only half finished before their "owners" fled in panic. The roads were filled with abandoned official documents, sheets of paper, clothes, food, vehicles, ammunition, insignia, and dead bodies....

Pursued and attacked day and night by the main force of the East China Field Army, parts of the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group on 9 November 1948 in succession fled to the east bank of the Grand Canal. Here there was only one bridge across the canal. Several tens of thousands of troops wanted to cross this bridge, thinking that if they did so they would be safe. They came forward crowded together, striving to be the first to cross and fearing to lag behind. Of those soldiers with little physical strength,

some were squeezed into the canal and others fell on the bridge and were trampled to death. Soldiers coming up from the rear ran over the dead bodies. At the opposite end of the bridge, troops who had crossed set up machineguns and did not allow other troops to cross. In the face of this crowd of fleeing followers, Chiang Kai-shek's so-called "soldierly virtues of military men" became the biggest joke to the soldiers themselves.

Cutting Huang Pai-t'ao's Connection With Xuzhou

Three columns of our Shandong Army Group—the Seventh, 10th, and 13th—in order to cut Huang Pai-t'ao's connection with Xuzhou, boldly thrust deep southward to carve up the enemy. In accord with Mao Zedong's instructions to "make a feint to the east and attack in the west," from the Tengxian area they simultaneously launched an attack on the Feng Public Security Department of the enemy's Third Pacification Zone on the Tai'erzhuang-Hanzhuang line in southern Shandong, and to the northeast of Xuzhou formed a posture for attacking it. The enemies in Xuzhou felt threatened and decided that when they moved eastward to reinforce Huang Pai-t'ao they had to leave a considerable number of troops behind to garrison Xuzhou. At the same time they felt that if they did not drive away our flanking force and did not storm and capture Tai'erzhuang, it would be impossible for them to cross the Grand Canal and send reinforcements eastward.

At dusk on 7 November 1948, our three columns drew close to the Grand Canal line. The 10th Column first annihilated the defenders of Hanzhuang, and the Third Battalion of the 111th Regiment in the Feng Public Security Department revolted. The Seventh Column stormed and captured the Wannianzha bridge on the canal.

Wannianzha was an important key bridge on the canal line between Hanzhuang and Tai'erzhuang. In its first stretch the canal's southern embankment is high and its northern embankment low; the bank is 200 meters wide; the water surface is 70 meters wide and the water depth is three meters. After the Jinan Campaign, the Kuomintang (KMT) armed forces put up defensive works on the canal's bank line, placing at every 200 meters a pillbox and concentrated defense works. They thought that by making use of geographical features they could stop our army from moving south. Blockhouses were erected at the two ends of the Wannianzha Bridge, and a strongpoint was set up on the periphery of the villages, constituting one of several important strongpoints on the Xuzhou defense line.

Wang Ke Plants a Banner on the Blockhouse at One Bridge End

At midnight a company of the Seventh Column, moving into the ditches on the two sides of the Wannianzha Road, mounted an operation against the enemy trenches. Disregarding enemy fire, the fighters of this company drew close to the enemy and suddenly attacked the enemy blockhouses on the bridge ends. Abandoning

these blockhouses, the enemy fled in panic to the bridge and began to destroy it. The Second and Third Platoons of this company hotly pursued the enemy, and Wang Ke [3769 0460], leader of the Third Platoon, planted the vanguard's banner on one blockhouse at the bridge end. The fighters of the Second and Third Platoons rushed onto the explosion-cratered bridge. When they had charged across the greater part of the bridge, the enemy, from his position at the other end of the bridge, fired a hail of bullets. At this critical moment, the fighters realized that whoever courageously persisted would in the end be victorious. With submachineguns in their hands they counterattacked the enemy. "Use your handgrenades!" Political Instructor Lu reminded the soldiers, and row upon row of handgrenades immediately flew toward the enemy. Eighth Squad Deputy Leader Yang Junhe [2799 6511 0735] and Sixth Squad Deputy Leader Fu Yong [0265 0516] jumped from craters on the bridge into the canal and fiercely attacked the enemy with handgrenades. Eighth Squad Leader Wei Mingguang [7614 2494 1684] by himself charged the opposite bank and blew up a pillbox near the bridge end. Afterward he selected a piece of good terrain, from which he courageously fought the enemy with his handgrenades and submachinegun to cover the followup force's advance.

Spearhead Directly Attacks Feng Public Security General Department

After the followup force arrived, half of a defending enemy battalion was annihilated and half of it fled helter-skelter. Wannianzha was liberated. The battleline was rapidly pushed to the canal's southern bank. The spearhead of our main force was pointed at a weak part of the KMT's Xuzhou defense line—the Feng Public Security General Department in the Jiawang area north-east of Xuzhou.

Chang K'e-hsia, He Chi-feng Revolt Before Battle

The Feng First Public Security Department was originally stationed in Xuzhou to defend the city. Because Feng was not directly under his control, and he wanted to defend Xuzhou tenaciously, Chiang Kai-shek sent all of Feng's troops to positions outside the city of Xuzhou. Prior to this, through our agents in the Feng Public Security Department—Pacification Zone deputy commanders Chang K'e-hsia [1728 0460 0204] and He Chi-feng [0149 1015 3448]—we worked to undermine the enemy army. Faced with the many victories won by our army, on the 8th the Feng Public Security troops stopped their resistance. Thus, three half-divisions—a little over 23,000 men—of the 59th and 77th armies in the KMT's Third Pacification Zone, under the command of generals Chang K'e-hsia and He Chi-feng, staged a battlefield revolt northeast of Xuzhou on the Jiawang and Tai'erzhuang line. Our Shandong Army Group at once crossed this force's defense sector and thrust deep into Xuzhou's eastern flank. On the 10th, our army came up to the Longhai Railroad's Suyangshan and Caobaji areas, blocking head-on the Huang Pai-t'ao

Army Group, which was fleeing in a dispersed state along the railroad toward Xuzhou.

Moving at the same time to attack Huang Pai-t'ao as the seven columns of the main assault group and the three columns thrusting deep to carve up enemy troops was the Northern Jiangsu Army Group. The three columns under the command of the Northern Jiangsu Army Group moved southward from an area on the eastern side of Linyi in Shandong, passed through east of Xin'an Town, rapidly outflanked the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group on the south, and swiftly advanced from Suqian and Huaining in the direction of Xuzhou. In the middle of November, they reached a point southeast of Xuzhou and southwest of Nianzhuang (Nianzhuang is east of Xuzhou). Between the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group and Xuzhou to the north was our Shandong Army Group and to the south was our Northern Jiangsu Army Group. From different directions they fiercely attacked the enemy, carrying out large-scale mobile warfare. As early as September 1946, Mao Zedong had said: "Our army should make mobile warfare with concentrated military forces primary." Now, the five armies under the command of Huang Pai-t'ao were being boldly pursued and attacked, thrust deep into and carved up, and outflanked and surrounded by our large army; it had fallen into a campaign posture of being isolated and tightly encircled by our 14 columns. In this part of the campaign, our military forces, in a position of absolute superiority, had carried out Mao Zedong's instruction: In every battle concentrate absolutely superior military forces, surround the enemies on all four sides, strive to completely annihilate them and do not let any of them escape the net. It was already impossible for Huang Pai-t'ao to extricate himself from the fate of being annihilated.

Sun Liang-ch'eng Surrenders

The Second, 11th, and 12th columns of the Northern Jiangsu Army Group, together with the 11th Column of the Central Plains Field Army originally stationed in the Suqian area—totaling four columns of military forces—while coordinating with the Shandong Army Group in breaking apart and pincering Huang Pai-t'ao, constantly attacked the airfield southwest of Xuzhou, causing the enemy in Xuzhou to feel that if he did not drive away the Northern Jiangsu Army Group it would be impossible to get reinforcements from the east, because the Northern Jiangsu Army Group not only directly threatened Xuzhou, but also was about to cut and attack the route of the enemy reinforcements coming from the east. The Northern Jiangsu Army Group positioned itself on the eastern flank of Xuzhou and also closely coordinated with units of the Central Plains Field Army. From the northeast direction it threatened Wabu, causing the enemy units defending Wabu to not dare leave, and it pinned down the KMT military forces on the Xuzhou-Wabu line of the Jinpu Railroad. This deployment of Mao Zedong's made the Northern Jiangsu Army Group "a knife thrust in the enemy's back."

Stationed in the Suining area southeast of Xuzhou were two divisions of Sun Liang-ch'eng's [1327 5328 6134], deputy commander of the KMT's First Pacification Zone concurrently commander of its 107th Army, viz., the 260th and 261st divisions. On 12 November 1948, the enemy troops saw our large army drawing close and they fled in panic in the direction of Xuzhou. The 260th Division, which was bringing up the rear in its flight, was intercepted by our Jiang-Huai Military District units and a unit of the Northern Jiangsu Army Group. Our command post ordered the surrounded enemy troops to lay down their arms before 1130 am on the 13th. After this order was issued, Sun Liang-ch'eng came to our command post and expressed his willingness to obey this order, and he affixed his signature to an order to all units under his command to lay down their arms. At noon, after all units of the 107th Army and all personnel of the 260th Division had laid down their arms at the designated place, they received lenient treatment from our army. At this time, the 261st Division, which was fleeing in the front, was caught by us at a place 40 *li* southeast of Xuzhou. When Sun Yu-t'ien [1327 3768 1131], the enemy division's commander, ordered a further flight, the division was immediately wiped out by us.

At 3 am on the 16th, after a regiment of the Second Column was ordered to thrust deep into the flank of the southern-route main force of the enemy's army group reinforcing from the east, it boldly, vigorously, and swiftly seized Lizhuang, which was less than three *li* from the headquarters of the 74th Army of the Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan [6726 3237 3123] Army Group. Troops of one enemy division, under the cover of aircraft, tanks, and cannon, from 7 am in succession for nine hours made three fierce attacks, but could not pull out this "nail" sticking in Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan's right rear.

During three days of being pursued and attacked, 200,000 fleeing enemy troops were annihilated by us. The 25th, 64th, and 100th armies commanded by Huang Pai-t'ao and the 44th Army of the Ninth Pacification Zone fled to the west bank of the canal. Still badly shaken, they prepared to continue to flee westward. They little imagined that the road to Xuzhou had been cut by our Shandong Army Group. Their vanguard, the 44th Division of the 100th Army, was wiped out by our 13th Column at Caobaji on the south side of the railroad. At this time our pursuing units swiftly crossed the canal, and finally, on 11 November, blocking in the front and pursuing in the rear, completely surrounded several tens of thousands of Huang Pai-t'ao's fleeing troops in the Nianzhuang area east of Xuzhou. The 63d Army, which was assigned to cover their left flank, did not have time to cross the canal, and on the same day it was completely annihilated on the east bank of the canal by our First Column.

Assault on Nianzhuang

Because each of our units had completed its operational plan, crafty Huang Pai-t'ao was like a turtle who had gone into a jar: he had to wait to be annihilated.

On 11 November 1948, the assault on Nianzhuang began.

After Huang Pai-t'ao was completely encircled by us, his many attempts to break out failed. On the basis of the village's improved original defense works, and depending on air force cover, he stubbornly resisted hamlet by hamlet and prepared to hold out until reinforcements arrived. Our army changed its posture from fierce attacks and charges to an assault on a village. At the beginning, some of our units, because they took the enemy lightly, did not bother to find out his characteristics on garrison. Under the circumstances in which the enemy occupied defense works, these units still fought in line in accord with the characteristics of mobile warfare, and the enemy pressed close together and could not be cut apart. Our units, which had achieved the encirclement from a deployment of pursuing and attacking, did not regulate and control their deployment and did not organize a unified command. The first to arrive was the first to attack, and they attacked in a hasty manner, as a result of which they took many casualties and made little progress. This made us profoundly understand Mao Zedong's guiding ideology of regularly instructing us to apply strategy and tactics flexibly. The main problem now was to timely switch from the operational mode of mobile warfare to the operational mode of positional warfare, and some units had not yet made this switch. On the evening of the 14th, the senior officers of the Central Plains Field Army called together the commanders of the six columns for a meeting, which readjusted the deployment, unified the organizational command, reviewed the experiences and lessons of the several days of attacking operations, and put forward a series of measures for assaulting a strongly defended position in line with the enemy's characteristics. Five columns, under the unified command of the Shandong Army Group Commander concurrently Political Commissar Tan Zhenlin and Deputy Commander Wang Jian'an [3769 1696 1344], were assigned to encircle and annihilate Huang Pai-t'ao. The main force of the Central Plains Field Army, under the direct command of the senior officers of the Central Plains Field Army, were assigned to block the enemy troops trying to reinforce Xuzhou from the east. This stage of the initial battle proved to us that the truth of what Mao Zedong taught us—following changes in the battlefield situation, our army's tactics must be changed correspondingly—should never be forgotten.

After the 14th the ring of encirclement on Nianzhuang was gradually tightened and the enemy was compressed in a long and narrow belt less than 10 *li* from east to west and less than six *li* from north to south. In this belt were crowded four enemy armies—the army group's headquarters was in the ruins of Nianzhuang, with the 44th Army to the south, the 100th Army to the west, the 25th Army to the north, and the 64th Army to the east. Nianzhuang is on the Longhai line, and on both sides of the railroad is a stretch of sandy ground and level ground; the streets are wide, and the village is dense;

most of the village perimeter is open ground and graveyard ground, the greater part of which is encircled by ditches. Here Huang Pai-t'ao made use of hastily set-up defense works left behind by the Eighth Army of the Li Mi [2021 1736] Army Group. He rebuilt and strengthened them, intending to resist until the Ch'iu and Li Army Groups reinforced him.

In line with the changes in the enemy's situation, after our units attacking Nianzhuang readjusted their deployment, they changed their tactics. The Ninth Column was in the north, the Sixth Column in the southwest, the 13th Column in the northwest, the Fourth Column in the north, and the Eighth Column in the east; the column of special forces took up a position of readiness. In tactics, in line with Chairman Mao's instruction "We must strive to outmaneuver the enemy by waging mobile warfare, but at the same time we must put a lot of emphasis on studying the tactics of positional attack," we adopted the tactic of "first attacking the weak and then attacking the strong, attacking the enemy's head and disrupting his deployment." Displaying our army's strong points in night warfare, we made use of nighttime to carry out approach-trench operations, in a concealed manner drew close to the enemy, thrust deep between hamlets, strengthened reconnaissance, made full preparations, concentrated troops and weapons, seized points one at a time, and assaulted the enemy units one at a time.

The fighting capability of the enemy's 100th Army located in the southern part of the ring of encirclement and of his 44th Army located in the western part of the ring of encirclement was fairly weak. In a battle that lasted from the 15th to the 18th, they were completely annihilated. Yang Shih-yun [2799 6108 7189], deputy commander of the 100th Army, and Wang Tse-chun [3769 3419 3182], commander of the 44th Army, were taken prisoner. Chao Pi-kuang [6392 3880 0342], commander of the 150th Division, who only commanded a little over 2,000 remaining troops, was forced to surrender. In these four days, the 25th and 64th armies were badly battered by us, with over half of them becoming casualties. The narrower the ring of encirclement, the more the enemy's transport aircraft paraded materiel, food, and ammunition were blown by the north wind into our positions. Sometimes our artillery bombarded the enemy's in-depth positions, and sometimes the enemy fired artillery shells from his in-depth positions. All day and night, everybody's ears were filled with the sound of rifle fire, the sound of explosions, and the roar of motors.

At dusk on the 19th, we launched a general attack on the enemy army group's units in the ruins of Nianzhuang: the Fourth Column moved to the north gate, the Sixth Column attacked the west gate, the Eighth Column attacked from the southeast, and the Ninth Column attacked from the south. At precisely 10 pm, the Eighth and Ninth columns respectively fiercely attacked the southeastern and southern ruins of Nianzhuang. The ruins were divided into an outer part and an inner part,

between which were two moats each with a ruined wall. The ruined walls were steep; the moats were more than one meter deep and seven meters wide. Between the moats the enemy had built a complex spiderweb position on the basis of several courtyards. Depending on a dense covering of pillboxes and bunkers, as well as criss-crossing communication trenches, the enemy's army group headquarters and his 25th Army continued to resist. When our units made forced crossings of the moats, enemy fire came ferociously from three sides—left, right, and front, and handgrenades fell like hail into the moats. After a quarter of an hour, we breached the first moat. In front of our troops were no enemy effectives. A little after 10 o'clock, our Eighth and Ninth columns respectively charged into the core position of Nianzhuang from the southeast and the south. The air was full of smoke and dust, stray bullets danced in the air, and artillery fire roared in the gloomy night sky. After one night of fierce battle, at a little after 5 a.m. on the 20th the entire ruins of Nianzhuang had been stormed and captured. The enemy's army group headquarters and his 25th Army headquarters had been completely annihilated with a little over 10,000 enemy troops taken prisoner. Huang Pai-t'ao fled eastward to a large courtyard, from where he commanded the 64th Army and a division of the 25th Army and continued to put up a desperate struggle.

Huang Pai-t'ao Shot Dead, Liu Chen-hsiang Taken Prisoner

On the eve of the 21st, our army, concentrating its troops and firepower, attacked the large courtyard where the 64th Army headquarters was located; while the Ninth Column attacked the large courtyard, the Eighth Column attacked a small courtyard on the headquarters' eastern flank. At dawn on the 22d the final attack on Huang Pai-t'ao was launched. On this day there was a heavy fog and mist, and fairly few enemy aircraft were aloft, so the weather was in our favor. At 6 a.m. the Ninth Column charged into the large courtyard, and by 10 a.m. the battle was over. The remnant enemy troops fled to several hamlets north of the large and small courtyards. That evening Huang Pai-t'ao, leading the 64th Army commander and others, broke out of the encirclement and fled toward the northwest, but in the end they were all annihilated. Huang Pai-t'ao, wearing the insignia "Strike Number One," was shot dead, and Liu Chen-hsiang [0491 6966 3276], commander of the 64th Army, was taken prisoner.

After several days of mobile warfare and positional warfare, the complete destruction of the units under Chiang Kai-shek's direct control—Huang Pai-t'ao's four armies and one army of the Ninth Pacification Zone under his command, totaling 10 divisions and nearly 100,000 men—was achieved.

To ensure the complete annihilation of Huang Pai-t'ao in the Nianzhuang area, our powerful units east and southeast of Xuzhou that were delaying and ambushing

enemy reinforcements carried out courageous, indomitable positional defense. Eight columns took part in a defensive battle on Xuzhou's flank.

From documents captured after the engagements, we saw how anxious Chiang Kai-shek was to relieve and rescue Huang Pai-t'ao! Time and again he ordered Liu Shih [0491 1492], commander in chief, and Tu Yu-ming [2629 5124 2494], deputy commander in chief, of the Xuzhou "Bandit Suppression General Headquarters," to rush to the rescue with all of their forces by advancing eastward at the double. In a telegram Chiang Kai-shek, both beseeching and trying to intimidate, said: "The Seventh Army Group is still besieged by the enemy (meaning our army), the situation is dangerous, and I am extremely anxious about it. If by any change the Seventh Army Group would be wiped out by the enemy, the overall war situation would be adversely affected. I beseech you to use all your forces, without regard for sacrifices and losses, and to strictly supervise and direct your units to advance eastward on the double." He set a time limit for raising the enemy's siege on the Seventh Army Group. What would happen if this mission were not completed? Chiang Kai-shek said: "If there is a delay in completing this mission, you will be strictly punished according to military law without the slightest leniency!"

"The arm cannot be twisted around the thigh." Therefore, the Xuzhou "Bandit Suppression Headquarters," with its so-called main force—the Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'ing Army Group—together with the Li Mi Army Group—totaling five armies—with Li's Army Group in the north and Ch'iu's Army Group in the south, under the cover of and in coordination with 12 aircraft, a little over 100 tanks, and a little over 100 cannon, moved eastward along the Longhai Railroad to rescue the Seventh Army Group. With the Sun Yuan-liang [1327 0337 5328] Army Group adding to the defense of Xuzhou, the Huang Wei [7806 4850] Army Group on the Pinghan Railroad was ordered to advance swiftly on the Xuzhou-Suxian line.

Of our units on the eastern side of Xuzhou that were delaying enemy reinforcements, three columns were blocking to the front and five columns were making an attack that threatened Xuzhou's flank. To ensure the successful, complete annihilation of Huang Pai-t'ao, the units charged with delaying and ambushing enemy reinforcements called on their officers and men: "Don't be afraid of fatigue, don't be afraid of cold, and strengthen the defense works!" "Defend every inch of ground, don't yield an inch of ground, and resolutely hold your position!" and "Get a tight grip on the opportunity for battle, courageously launch attacks, and annihilate the enemy!"

Antitank Blocking Warfare

The East China Field Army's Seventh, 10th, and 11th columns had the mission of blocking to the front.

The Seventh Column defended a line a little over 30 *li* long on two sides of the railroad that was a little over 20 *li* east of Xuzhou. On 11 November two regiments of the

Ninth Army of the Li Mi Army Group, under cover of six tanks, attacked the Si Mountain Pass 25 *li* on the eastern side of Xuzhou. This was a vital communication line between Tongshan and Pixian, and was defended by one regiment of our 10th Column. From early morning until dusk, the enemy's whole force charged the mountain. By the time that the enemy made the last charge, our troops had run out of bullets and handgrenades, and so they charged back with gleaming bayonets. After our 10th counterattack, a small contingent of the remnants of the two enemy regiments coweringly scattered and turned back, leaving the commanding height of the mountain ridge in our hands. On the 12th, at each position of this division, a session of military democracy began, a session in which antitank tactics were studied. In the early morning of the 14th, with 23 tanks forming a single-line battle array, the enemy invaded Mazhuang and Yaozhuang southeast of our Si Mountain Pass. When they came within range, a fierce salvo from our artillery hit the enemy's two lead tanks. At this time, all the commanders, fighters, and service workers jumped out of the defense works and fired a volley with all kinds of weapons, destroying another tank. Rocket launcher Zhang Xing [1728 5281] charged close to another enemy tank and fired one round that destroyed it. Seeing this, the remaining tanks hastily fled. On the 15th and 16th the enemy, under tank cover, continued his offensive against us. From the 11th to the 16th, this division of our 10th Column, while conducting blocking warfare, destroyed 20-odd tanks, thereby setting an outstanding battle example.

The Second, Third, and 12th columns commanded by the northern Jiangsu Army Group, the South-Central Shandong Column, and the 11th Column of the Central Plains Field Army delayed and ambushed reinforcements southeast of Xuzhou. Tu Yu-ming's crack main force—Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan's Fifth Army—on the 13th with one regiment, under aircraft and tank cover, invaded the position held at Hanlou by the 17th Regiment of the Sixth Division in our Second Column, and for half a day launched four group charges against it. At our position were exterior trenches, pits, and other defense works to deal with tanks. When the enemy tanks reached our forward position, we flexibly pushed part of our force out of the defense works to open fire with close-quarter weapons on the infantry at the flanks and rear of the tanks. When the enemy came up he did so as a full regiment, but when he fled what was left was only the number of men to make up a battalion. At about 1 a.m. the 14th regiment of the Fifth Division, Second Column, exploited the opening by launching an attack. Under cover of powerful artillery fire, it swiftly crossed 300 meters of open ground and charged into the enemy position. Catching the enemy unprepared, it started tangled fighting with him. Just when the enemy's light and heavy weapons opened up, fighter Song Keqin [1345 0460 0530] of the Ninth Company jumped into an enemy communication trench. He threw a handgrenade at a group of enemies, killing or wounding a number of them who were at the side of U.S.-style heavy

machinegun only a little over 20 meters from him, and immediately capturing the heavy machinegun. In the tangled fighting, First Platoon leader Wang Ying [3769 5391], seeing that the enemy was making a pincer attack from three sides, swiftly mustered firepower and, leading the way in battle, seized the enemy's defense works and repulsed five enemy counterattacks. At the Hanlou position, two regiments of the Second Column annihilated a little over 1,000 enemies, displaying a courageous, indomitable fighting style.

Special Troops Column for First Time Joins in Attack on Nianzhuang

In the Huaihai Campaign period, our East China Field Army had only one special troops column, which had only a small number of tanks, all of which were used in the direction of the attack on Nianzhuang. In a battle east of Xuzhou to delay reinforcements, our blocking units had no tanks and no aircraft. With matchless courage and flexible tactics, they tenaciously resisted the KMT armed forces who were equipped with high-quality U.S. weapons. In war, weapons are extremely important, but facts have proved that the decisive factor in victory or defeat in war is, in the end, the will of the people. The decisive factor is people, not materiel.

Although Chiang Kai-shek time and again sent telegrams urging them to hasten, his crack units—Ch'iu's and Li's Army Groups—still could only advance east at a turtle's speed. The "Division of Honor" in Li Mi's Army Group's main force—the Eighth Army—in seven days, from the 11th to 17th of November, crawled eastward less than five *li*. When Huang Pai-t'ao was completely surrounded and annihilated by us, although Ch'iu's and Li's Army Groups had paid a big price of 10,000-odd men and 30-odd tanks, they were still blocked by us 50-odd *li* from Nianzhuang at the Daxujia line, and on average had advanced less than two *li* per day. Their advance guard, although a little over 40 *li* from the ruins of Nianzhuang, was a short distance away but poles apart, and Nianzhuang was within sight but beyond reach. Chiang Kai-shek had no alternative but to look with open eyes on the destruction of Huang Pai-tao's entire force. He vented his full list of complaints about this affair to Liu Shih and Tu Yu-ming. In a 25 November telegram to Liu and Tu, he said resentfully and angrily: "Examining this decisive battle for Xuzhou, I conclude that the movement of our army groups eastward was slow, and the army groups could not thoroughly pursue their orders, causing the complete collapse of a friendly force. This really showed the loss of the military men's soldierly virtues." With the expenditure of so much capital, Chiang Kai-shek was angry and unsatisfied: "Furthermore, according to statistics, in this operation 120,000-odd artillery rounds were consumed, and the forces' progress per day was less than one kilometer. For our revolutionary armymen, such consumption and waste is a deep disgrace."

Actually, the Ch'iu and Li Army Groups long ago paid no attention to Chiang Kai-shek's clichés "soldierly

virtues" and "deep disgrace." Mao Zedong deployed five columns southeast of Xuzhou, which at any time could cut Ch'iu's and Li's escape route. On 13 and 14 November 1948, Mao Zedong instructed the Front Committee of the East China Field Army that, when Huang Pai-t'ao was close to complete annihilation, they change from delaying reinforcements to encircling and annihilating the reinforcements for Huang, letting Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan move eastward deep along the Dongxujia line, after which the Northern Jiangsu Army Group would cut Ch'iu's line of retreat, complete the encirclement of him, and, luring Ch'iu and Li in deep, first annihilate the 44th, 100th, and 25th armies to the west, south, and north of the Nianzhuang area, temporarily leaving behind the enemy army group headquarters and the 64th Army in the northeastern part of Nianzhuang. Obeying Mao Zedong's instructions, on the 16th our units withdrew eastward. But a dog in fear of a beating will hide in place and not move, and so the enemy indulged in unbridled rumormongering: "The communist army is withdrawing and we are in pursuit." Because we could not lure the enemy out and annihilate him, on the 22d we launched the final general offensive to completely destroy him. In fact, under these circumstances, Ch'iu and Li first of all sought to preserve themselves, so where was their consideration for Chiang Kai-shek's "extreme worry" about the Huang Pai-t'ao "crack army group"? At this critical juncture, the relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and his high-ranking officers was truly that of the adage: "sharing the same bed but dreaming different dreams"—strange bedfellows.

To conceal his intention to first annihilate the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group, Mao Zedong had instructed the Central Plains Field Army before the campaign to make a strategic feint in southern Henan Province with three columns along the Pinghan line, drawing westward the two army groups of Huang Wei and Chang Kan [1728 3227]. When the campaign began, four columns of the Central Plains Field Army and two columns of the East China Field Army switched their operations from eastern Henan and southwestern Shandong to the Xu(zhou)-Wa(bu) line; and the Central Plains Field Army was made responsible for storming and capturing Suxian south of Xuzhou, thereby cutting the Xu-Wa line and completing the strategic encirclement of Xuzhou.

Cutting the Jinpu Railroad, Encircling Xuzhou

On 11 November 1948, the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth columns of the Central Plains Field Army and the Third Column and Guangdong-Guangxi Column of the East China Field Army advanced to an area southwest of Xuzhou, thereby threatening Xuzhou from the west and the south. In line with Mao Zedong's instructions, this became a maneuver area: by moving northeastward we could attack Xuzhou, and by moving southeastward we could attack Suxian. After the units of the Central Plains Field Army and the two columns of the East China Field Army linked up, they could form a blocking zone, becoming a powerful strategic group for delaying and

ambushing reinforcements, blocking the enemy from fleeing southward from Xuzhou and blocking the enemy from sending reinforcements from the south and the west.

On the 13th, the Fourth Column of the Central Plains Field Army and the Third and Guangdong-Guangxi columns of the East China Field Army drew close to Xuzhou and occupied Xiaoxian on its western side. In accordance with the original plan, the units of our Central Plains Field Army on the 15th stormed and captured Suxian in Anhui Province, completely annihilating the one enemy division defending that city and completing the mission of cutting the Jinpu Railroad. At this time the militarily important Xuzhou was completely put in a strategic ring of encirclement by our two field armies.

Not long after the campaign began, Chiang Kai-shek urgently ordered the Huang Wei Army Group, originally under the Wuhan Front, to reinforce Xuzhou. Leading his four armies and one mobile column—totaling 120,000 troops—set out from Duishan in southern Henan and advanced eastward at the double day and night. Obeying Mao Zedong's instructions, in the initial stage of the campaign, two columns of the Central Plains Field Army first spotted the Huang Wei Army Group on the Pinghan line, and shadowed it. When it began to advance eastward to reinforce Xuzhou, the two columns moved in front of the enemy and blocked it. The Sixth Column of our Central Plains Field Army and a unit of the local armed forces undertook this arduous mission. From the Pinghan line they attacked the flanks and tail of the Huang Wei Army Group, delaying its movement. On the 15th they passed the Huang Wei Army Group and reached the area of Guoyang and Mengcheng in northern Anhui, thereby blocking its advance.

To ensure that the East China Field Army completely annihilated Huang Pai-t'ao, after the Central Plains Field Army units attacked and occupied Suxian on the Jinpu line, the columns crossed the Kuai He [River], and on the southern bank of the river fanned out from the east at Guzhen on the Jinpu Railroad and from the west at Mengcheng and Guoyang. On the 19th, when the Huang Wei Army Group made an incursion toward Suxian, the Central Plains Field Army with five columns completed preparations in the Mengcheng and Suxian areas to block the Huang Wei Army Group. At the same time one column, and the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Independent Brigade and two western Henan regiments commanded by it, at the Renqiao area on the eastern side of the Jinpu Railroad blocked two regiments—Liu Ju-ming's and Li Yen-nien's—from attacking north of Wabu.

In order to have a decisive battle with us in the Xuzhou area, the enemy originally wanted the three army groups—Huang Wei, Liu Ju-ming, and Li Yen-nien—to draw close to each other while reinforcing Xuzhou. However, when the entire enemy force in the Nian-zhuang area completely collapsed, under the firm blocking action by our Central Plains Field Army, the

Liu and Li Army Groups up to the 22d were still being blocked in an area south of the lower reaches of the Kuai He, and in four days had only advanced 30 *li*. Therefore, the Liu and Li Army Groups and the Huang Wei Army Group were put in the dilemma of neither being able to move northward nor being able to draw close together. Chiang Kai-shek saw his attempt "to move north and raise the siege, and to save and protect Xuzhou" burst like a soap bubble.

180,000 Troops Annihilated in First Stage

With the close cooperation of the two field armies, the first-stage operations of the Huaihai Campaign were victorious. The East China Field Army [ECFA] and the Central Plains Field Army [CPFA] annihilated a total of 178,000 KMT army effectives, equivalent to 18 whole divisions (including three revolutionary half-divisions), amounting to a fourth of all the enemy effectives on the Huaihai battlefield. They dealt a serious blow to four army groups—those of Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, Li Mi, Sun Yuan-liang, and Liu Ju-ming; liberated a wide area east, south, west, and north of Xuzhou; stormed and captured Suxian; cut the Xu-Wo stretch of the Jinpu Railroad; carved up the forces of the Liu Shih Army Group in three places—Xuzhou, Wabu, and Shuangduiji—and then annihilated the enemies one by one. Thus they created extremely favorable conditions for completely annihilating the enemy defending the area north of the Chang Jiang [Yangtze River].

Following the development of the campaign, our powerful orientation for delaying and annihilating enemy reinforcements changed to an orientation for dealing a main blow.

Food must be eaten one mouthful at a time, and our army adopted the method of annihilating the KMT massive forces in Xuzhou one at a time. The day after victory was won in the first stage of the campaign, Mao Zedong once more instructed us to prepare for consecutive operations: "Given the fact that it is most favorable for us in the current posture to annihilate each enemy facing us, if we can in the second stage annihilate a large number of enemies in the south, we can completely achieve the campaign plan." In line with this objective, Mao Zedong instructed us we "must be prepared to give the entire campaign three to five months' time, and must be prepared in several operational stages (the first operational stage has been completed) to achieve victory in the campaign as a whole." These preparations included: political and ideological preparations; military force deployment, tactical and technical preparations; and food, ammunition, and medical preparations. To prepare for the second stage of the campaign, the Front Committee of the ECFA divided its entire military force into two groups—northern and southern. The northern group was composed of the First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and 12th Columns; the Central-South Shandong Column; the Guangdong-Guangxi Column; and the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Independent Brigade. The Shandong Army Group, under the command of Tan

Zhenlin, commander concurrently political commissar, and Deputy Commander Wang Jian'an, was to safeguard the operations by the CPFA and stop the enemy's withdrawal southward from Xuzhou. On the southern line were the Second, Sixth, Seventh, 10th, 11th, and 13th Columns and the 11th Column of the CPFA. With the exception of the Seventh Column and the 11th Column of the CPFA, all the above were put under the direct command of the ECFA's senior officers and awaited orders to move.

The units had been engaged in continuous fighting for a long time. Some units, after winning a battle, wanted to take a rest. Precisely at this time Mao Zedong issued the call "Do not fear fatigue and casualties, fight continuously, and completely destroy the enemy's Xuzhou main force north of the Chang Jiang," which not only overcame the slack feelings but also stimulated the soldiers' morale. The great number of officers and men eagerly awaited their fighting mission, e.g., the Sixth Column, which had just been withdrawn from the Nianzhuang front, was thrown into the intense blocking warfare on the southern stretch of the Tianpu Railroad.

Spreading a Dragnet and Strategically Encircling the Enemy

At the beginning of the Huaihai Campaign, Chiang Kai-shek said: "The life or death of the party and the state will be decided here." For this reason he concentrated all the military forces he could, under the illusion that in the final struggle he would be victorious. Unexpectedly, in the first battle he lost more than a fourth of his troops in the Xu-Wa area. Therefore, on the one hand he again sought America's direct military participation, and on the other hand he wanted to withdraw the Xu-Wa troops to defend the area south of the Chang Jiang in order to stage a comeback. Mao Zedong had early on foreseen this move by the enemy, and in the first stage of the campaign had spread a dragnet that put the enemy in Xuzhou in our strategic encirclement. At this time the enemy in Xuzhou was in a state of extreme panic, and he quickly concocted a story about a so-called "great victory in the Battle of Xuzhou" and forced the newspaper offices to publish an "extra" about it, in order to cover up an utter rout and stabilize popular morale. Taking precautions against following Huang Pai-t'ao's disastrous road, the enemy swiftly drew back the three army groups—those of Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, Li Mi, and Sun Yuan-liang—in Xuzhou; strengthened its defenses; and was very cautious and did not dare act rashly. At the frontline, after the Li Yen-nien Army Group was dealt a serious blow by us, in fear of being annihilated the army group stalled and did not dare advance northward. At this time the Huang Wei Army Group was put into the "pocket" of our CPFA.

Huang Wei Army Group Put Into Communist Army's "Pocket"

In line with the favorable development of the war situation, Mao Zedong decided to exploit and expand

the victory. He adopted a policy of blocking the north and the south and surrounding and annihilating the middle, and with the CPFA made primary and with the coordination of a unit of the ECFA, surrounding and annihilating the Huang Wei Army Group. In particular Mao Zedong pointed out that, after the Huang Wei Army Group was surrounded, the enemy in Xuzhou would probably flee southward in full strength. Mao Zedong reiterated his determination to annihilate the enemy's main force north of the Chang Jiang, and instructed the General Front Committee and the ECFA to make appropriate deployments for this in order to implement the set policy of carving up the enemy troops, annihilating them one by one, and resolutely not letting them escape.

After the ECFA received this instruction of Mao Zedong's, the operations room of its headquarters got busy. Deputy Commander Su Yu set out to headquarters members several possible actions that the enemy in Xuzhou could take in the future, and had the members discuss and analyze them. He said that if the enemy in Xuzhou defends tenaciously and does not evacuate the city, this will not be harmful for us because, after settling with the Huang Wei Army Group, we will strike him. Of course, if we could induce him to leave his "tortoise shell," there would be nothing better than to destroy him. However, Chiang Kai-shek had no mobile forces in the rear, and it was highly likely that he would abandon Xuzhou. If he abandoned Xuzhou, because most of the land south of Xuzhou and on the western side of the Jinpu Railroad was mountainous, it would be easy for us to block him in depth. Our powerful main force was concentrated on the east flank, so with regard to the enemy's trying to extricate himself from an unfavorable position, there was little possibility that he would move southward along the two sides of the Jinpu Railroad. Thus, the three major directions of the enemy's flight were: The first direction was to move eastward along the Longhai Railroad, and through Lianyungang flee southward by sea transport; the advantage of this direction was that the enemy could swiftly extricate himself from the fate of being annihilated. However, it would be very difficult to solve the problem of mustering the ships and docks for swiftly transporting by sea a little over 200,000 troops; if, hotly pursued by us, the enemy would fall into the plight of conducting operations with his back to the sea, he would be in danger of being completely annihilated and would still not be able to run away. The second direction was to move southeastward to the areas north and south of the Huai He, after which he would go through central-south Jiangsu and, crossing the river, turn toward the Nanjing-Shanghai Railroad. The advantage of this direction was that the enemy could keep clear of our main force and use his main force to defend his den at Nanjing. However, in the areas north and south of the Huai He there are a good number of streams, and except for several trunk streams, they cannot be crossed without boats. The areas were not convenient for the movement of large forces, but this land was our old base; the enemy would be encircled by our local forces and

militia and would be unable to move. The third direction was to move along the Jinpu Railroad, and going around the mountainous area, head south. This region's terrain is open and its roads are level, so it is convenient for the movement of large forces and motorized troops. The enemy would be fairly close to the Huang Wei Army Group; he could work in concert with the Li Yen-nien Army Group and advance in two prongs—northern and southern—thereby both being able to lift the siege on Huang Wei and concentrating all of Chiang Kai-shek's mobile forces that could be concentrated for the defense of the Huai He—what is called “killing two birds with one stone.” The disadvantage of this direction would be that the enemy would be powerfully hit by our two large field armies and could be destroyed. However, the rulers always exaggerated their own strength, and from a look at the plans this direction was the one with the greatest degree of probability.

Everyone began a lively discussion. Some advocated that the main force of the ECFA east of Xuzhou and north and south of the Huai He strike at various points so that the defense could not measure our attack; others proposed that Xuzhou be besieged to the end so that none of the enemy there gets out. After study and discussion, their understanding was unified. They decided that the former proposal would decentralize our forces so that they could not form a “fist,” and that this would be disadvantageous for concentrating our main force to annihilate the enemy; as for the latter proposal, if Xuzhou were to be besieged to the end, the enemy would certainly put up the desperate fight of a cornered beast and thus it would be difficult to attack him, which would not be as good as letting him get out and then striking him. Deputy Commander Su concluded: In the process of annihilating the Huang Wei Army Group, if the enemy in Xuzhou flees eastward he can be blocked by our military district armed forces, and after the situation is clarified we can pursue him eastward; if we let the enemy flee to the areas north and south of the Huai He, this would likewise be convenient for shifting the main force eastward to intercept him, and in particular local forces could engage in guerrilla tactics for suppressing and wearing down the enemy, thereby gaining time to first annihilate the Huang Wei Army Group, and afterward coordinating with the main force of the CPFA to annihilate the enemy—this move would be most advantageous; if the enemy, from the western side of the Jinpu Railroad, goes around the mountainous area and heads south, he will pose a fairly large threat to us, which obviously would adversely affect the concentrated campaign to completely annihilate Huang Wei. Therefore, it was decided to concentrate the “fist” of the ECFA's main force on stopping the possibility of the enemy in Xuzhou fleeing southward, and Mao Zedong and the General Front Committee concurred in this decision. When Huang Pai-t'ao was being annihilated and Huang Wei was being beaten, we spread a wide net for Tu Yu-ming and waited for him to fall into it.

In line with the General Front Committee's instructions, the main force of the ECFA prepared to surround and

annihilate Huang Wei. Except for the 11th Army of the CPFA, which was returned to its original organizational system, in the final phase of the battle to surround and annihilate the Huang Wei Army Group, the Third Column, the Central-South Shandong Column, the Seventh Column, and the 13th Column, which in the earlier phase had been returned to the command of the CPFA, would take part in the operation to annihilate the Huang Wei Army Group. It was also decided that the eight columns located in a mobile position on the two sides of the Jinpu Railroad south of Xuzhou would prepare to intercept the enemy in Xuzhou and not let him flee southward; at the same time they would constitute a reserve force for surrounding and annihilating the Huang Wei Army Group, and five columns would block the Li Yen-nien Army Group from reinforcing from the north.

Smashing the Fond Dream That “To Defend the Jiang the Huai Must Be Strengthened”

On 25 November 1948 the CPFA completed the encirclement of the enemy's Huang Wei Army Group in the areas north and south of the Huai He, and a unit of the ECFA closed in on Renqiao and Guzhen. At this time Chiang Kai-shek mistakenly judged that our army would first try to annihilate *en masse* the Li Yen-nien and Liu Ju-ming Army Groups, so he ordered these two army groups to withdraw on the night of the 26th to Bengbu in order to guard the Huai He, blocking us from continuing to move southward. At the same time he ordered the Huang Wei Army Group to draw close to Wabu and ordered Tu Yu-ming to abandon Xuzhou and flee southward with his full force, supporting Huang by coordination and thereby realizing his fond dream of “to defend the [Chang] Jiang the Huai [He] must be strengthened.”

With the CPFA tightly surrounding him like a ring of iron, Huang Wei “banged his head until blood flowed,” and up the 28th did not dare think of “breaking out of the encirclement. The enemy in Xuzhou fiercely attacked southward for seven days in succession, but was still blocked by us in an area north of Sibao. Another unit of our ECFA pursued the Li Yen-nien and Liu Ju-ming Army Groups, which were fleeing southward, and annihilated one of their units. Seeing that the Huang Wei Army Group was in danger of being completely annihilated, that the Tu units' southward attacks weren't working, and the Li units were battle-shy and moving northward, Chiang Kai-shek summoned Tu Yu-ming to Nanjing for secret talks on keeping clear of our defensive front on the Jinpu Railroad and from Xuzhou going around southwestward and moving south. On the other hand, he ordered Liu Shih, commander of the Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression General Headquarters,” to swiftly return to Bengbu, activate his command post and supervise and direct Li's and Liu's Army Groups to make another incursion northward. The intention was to make separate advances from north and south, attack the flanks and rear of our CPFA, raise the siege on the

Huang Wei Army Group, and afterward "form a partnership" and flee southward in order to preserve their strength.

On the night of 1 December 1948, the sky was covered with dark clouds and the whole earth was in slumber. Tu Yu-ming dispatched the "imperial" Sun Yuan-liang and Li Mi Army Groups to take the lead position, and with the "imperial" Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan Army Group bringing up the rear—a total of 270,000 troops—in abandoning the defense of Xuzhou with the intention of fleeing for their lives. Our 11th Column immediately occupied Xuzhou. From a perusal of this column's reports, we see that afterward, on the Xiao(Xiaoxian)-Yong(cheng) Road motor vehicles, baggage, motorcycles, tanks, cannons, small carts, big carts, troops, and family dependents—in extreme difficulty and a lot of hub-bub, the three army groups of Tu's units converged into an endless turbid stream and tried to flee southwestward. At this time Chiang Kai-shek indulged in wishful thinking. Seeing that Tu Yu-ming, in accordance with the plan, had swiftly abandoned Xuzhou and moved westward to the Qinglongji-Waizikou line, and that on the southern line we had temporarily stopped attacking the Li Yen-nien Army Group, he considered that the situation held grounds for optimism: provided Tu Yu-ming reached Yongcheng and then turned southeastward, he could join up with the Huang Wei Army Group between the Fei He [River] and the Kuai He [River], and effect a counterencirclement of the large forces of our CPFA.

After receiving a telegram from the senior officers of the 12th Column, the senior officers of the ECFA immediately ordered the army groups maneuvering on the southern line to conduct parallel pursuits: have the Third and Ninth Columns thrust directly into Zulaolou; have the First, Fourth, and 12th Columns move south from Xuzhou and then turn and attack and advance northwestward; have the Second, 10th, and 11th columns move along the Xu(xian)-Yong(cheng) line and the Gu(zhen)-Wo(yang) line to intercept. At this time, our pursuing units, paying no heed to the enemy air force's round-the-clock harassment and shrinking from no difficulty or danger, by countless paths pushed over mountains and plains in a direction southwest of Xuzhou. For two days the fighters were so absorbed that they forgot to eat or sleep; they only feared not catching up with the enemy. Baggage, mules and horses were left in the rear, and artillerymen pushed cannons with their shoulders to keep up with the infantry's pursuit. On both sides of the road were countless road signs—it was impossible to know whose units they were—all with their arrowheads pointing west and northwest. The senior officers of each column had to issue orders saying: "The road signs show the route, the sound of gunfire is the objective; and pursuing and catching mean victory." They powerfully encouraged every officer and man: "Don't let the enemy escape back to south of the lower reaches of the Chang Jiang; thoroughly and in a clear-cut fashion wipe him out!" According to a report from the pursuing units,

strewn everywhere on the Xiao-Yong Road were official documents, muster rolls, and KMT party cards abandoned by the enemy. Many supply wagons, fully loaded with all types of ammunition, and U.S.-made trucks in good condition had not started to move before they were captured by our army. We found in many of the enemy's discarded field packs sweet potatoes, *kaoliang*, and steamed dumplings that had just been stolen from civilian houses. Chun Ch'ao-yu, a soldier of the First Cavalry Brigade of the enemy's Fifth Army, who had his leg broken by a tank fleeing in a flurried state, said: "We have had nothing to eat for two days and have been fleeing for our lives!" All along the way the enemy's tanks, motor vehicles, and troops contended for the road as they ran away. Pointing to a corpse at the side of the road, he said: "He was also crushed to death by a tank!" Under the pressure of our tracking and pursuit, the enemy troops in succession laid down their arms and surrendered. At the foot of Mao Shan [Mountain], southwest of Xiaoxian, Zhang Ming, commander of the "Luoyang Battalion," Third Column, led a squad in a meeting engagement with two enemy companies, all members of which on the spot knelt down and submissively laid down their arms.

Xuzhou Stormed and Captured; Mao Zedong Sends Congratulatory Message

In November on the Jiang-Huai Plain, the winter is fairly cold, and the fighters, facing a northwest wind, marched rapidly. Because of the intense marching, their hearts were inspired for victory while their clothes were drenched with sweat. At this time, Xuzhou—the gateway to Nanjing and Chiang Kai-shek's great military base for waging the civil war—was liberated. When the officers and men heard of Mao Zedong's congratulatory message on the liberation of Xuzhou, they became infused with more energy. They walked as if they were flying. One by one they said: "Tu Yu-ming, wherever you flee there we will pursue; if you flee one hundred, we will pursue you two fifty's." Some fighters composed a doggerel: "Tu Yu-ming, Tu Yu-ming/You're no good at 'racing'/We see that you also cannot fly out of the Huai He border." Everybody sang the song "Follow Up the Victory With Hot Pursuit."

The Liberation Army conducted a parallel pursuit of the fleeing enemy; it fired volleys at many levels and conducted roundups in many places. After three days of fierce pursuit, finally before dawn on 4 December 1948 the three brigades of Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, Li Mi, and Sun Yuan-liang were completely surrounded in the area of Chengguanzhuang, 130 li southwest of Xuzhou. In line with Mao Zedong's plan, the enemy had fallen into the trap we had set in the triangular area of Xiaoxian, Yongcheng, and Dangshan. From 2 December to the afternoon of 4 December, 20,000 enemy troops had been annihilated and 14,000 enemy troops had been captured.

On 6 December 1948 the greater part of the Sun Yuan-liang Army Group was annihilated by our Eighth Column and Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District

units at the Huangwafang and Zhanglaowo areas on the Xiao(xian)-Yong(cheng) border. One unit that pushed out had a little over 3,000 men annihilated or captured by our local armed forces. Its vanguard—a little over 1,000 men—had fled to Bozhou, where it was pursued and completely annihilated by the valiant fighters of a cavalry regiment of our field army, and only Sun Yuanliang escaped. At this point, the Tu Yu-ming group had no way out, its morale was shaken, and it was powerless to extricate itself. Therefore, Tu sent many telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek saying: "The enemy is on all four sides," "The enemy to our front is increasing in number," "Please instruct the air force to actively help us in the battle and to airdrop food and ammunition," and "From the beginning there were no food reserves in Xuzhou, and in this advance backward there was a lot of wear and tear; now there is no way to maintain ourselves, so we earnestly beseech you to airdrop supplies." Although Chiang Kai-shek had ordered Tu Yu-ming's entire force to advance southward and link up with Huang Wei, the troops' deployment was disordered and their morale low. At this time the Tu Yu-ming group was still 166 li from the Huang Wei Army Group, and Tu and Huang could only see each other from a long distance away and deliver elegies.

Major Shift of Nanjing Government

Our CPFA and ECFA had each surrounded a large heap of enemies, both of which were crack army groups with a fairly intact organizational system and a large military force. The Huang Wei Army Group, which was directly under Chiang Kai-shek's control, had four armies in its command, one of which was the 18th Army, one of Chiang Kai-shek's five large main forces. Tu Yu-ming was a trusted follower of Chiang's, and in the two army groups was the Fifth Army, also one of Chiang Kai-shek's main forces. Of Chiang Kai-shek's so-called five main forces, the 74th Division of his "Imperial Guard" had been annihilated on the Shandong battlefield, and the New First Army and New Sixth Army had both been annihilated on the northeastern battlefield. Thus only these two remained. Every day Chiang Kai-shek by air gave material assistance to these two large heaps. His air force made bombing raids on us; and the enemies within the rings of encirclement, under cover of the air force and coordinating infantry and tanks, constantly counter-attacked us.

However, inspired by Mao Zedong's calls and the successive victories in the campaign, our army's morale rose even higher. According to foreign news agency reports at the time, the effect of our army's constant victories in the Huaihai Campaign was to frighten the KMT forces in the Nanjing-Shanghai area. The Chiang Kai-shek government did not know how to defend Nanjing, and in less than 20 days made several changes in its "Capital Garrison General Headquarters"; Nanjing's Ministry of National Defense and its subordinate United Services General Headquarters decided to withdraw by waterways military officers and their family dependents to

various provinces in southern China; the 100-odd Legislative Council members would leave Nanjing by themselves; and Chiang Kai-shek considered moving the capital to Guangzhou when Nanjing's defense became impossible. The Nanjing government was at the end of its rope.

Communist Army Concentrates Forces To Annihilate Huang Wei Army Group, To Surround Tu Yu-ming, and To Block Li Yen-nien

Analyzing the situation at that time, Mao Zedong decided, in order to accelerate the campaign's progress, to adopt a policy of concentrating military forces to annihilate the Huang Wei Army Group, to surround Tu Yu-ming, and to block Li Yen-nien. Commander Liu Baicheng clearly pointed out that this was a policy of "eating one, squeezing another, and observing a third." Following this instruction of Mao Zedong's, the senior officers of the ECFA decided to adopt a policy for Tu Yu-ming of attacking in the northeast, garrisoning the southwest, first striking the weak enemies and then annihilating the strong enemies, and gradually weakening the enemies. From the General Front Committee Chen Yi made a telephone call exhorting us to have the ECFA units do a good job of blocking the southwest, as otherwise the operations on the southern line would be adversely affected. I decisively replied: "Please be assured, commander, that we will certainly block them; if you give the order we will wipe out each one." He also exhorted us: "Don't be anxious. First, narrow the ring of encirclement, and then 'lifting all the water by a water-wheel will catch a big fish!'" He then cheerfully hung up the phone. Commander Chen always directed operations in a straightforward manner; he had a large breadth of vision, judged situations correctly, and was good at displaying each unit's characteristics and arousing the enthusiasm of cadres at all levels. In the past, when there was a dispute in the ECFA on an operational issue, if he spoke up everyone would concur and do what he said. Since we had begun to attack on exterior lines, Mao Zedong ordered Comrade Chen Yi to follow the movements of the CPFA in order to unify the command of the ECFA's army groups operating on exterior lines. Thus, for a fairly long time we had only received his instructions by telegram, and now we were receiving them by telephone. How kind he was! We gained even more confidence.

From the evening of 6 December to 15 December 1948, after learning of the event by telephone, the CPFA, with a firm and indomitable spirit, and a spirit of "no sooner had one fallen than another stepped into the breach," and a spirit of incomparable courage, adopted the tactic of tightening the siege and of "storming and capturing one village, and then strengthening it." It mounted successive attacks on the surrounded enemy. Although the enemy was crowded together in a ball, with the village houses as his center and bunkers as his mainstay, he fought like a cornered beast. Several times, under cover of his air force, he tried to break out of the encirclement to the east, but he was powerless to resist

the "iron hammer" of our army's general offensive. After 20-odd days of fierce battle, our army on 15 December 1948 finally buried all of the Huang Wei Army Group in the Shuangduiji area southwest of Suxian.

Su Yu and I Go to Xiangshan To Observe the Military Operation

On the seventh I accompanied Deputy Commander Su Yu to Xiangshan to observe the military operation. In the Spring and Autumn States Period, according to the inhabitants, Duke Xiang of Song made his capital here—hence the name. On this day there was a heavy mist, and one was barely able to see anything at a long distance. Shrouded in mist, the Tu Yu-ming group, tightly encircled by our large army, was gasping for breath, but it still put up a last-ditch struggle. Our columns surrounding Tu continued to attack the enemy; relying on his tanks, the enemy mounted counterattacks on us. Although the armor on the enemy tanks was thick, it could not in the slightest deal with the explosive charges of our soldiers' "homemade cannon." On the night of the seventh, the Eighth Column, which was blocking Tu Yu-ming in the southwest, had just finished repairing its defense works when the east turned white. "Rumble, rumble ..." coming on the eastern side's road were four enemy tanks. They drew close to the Second Battalion's position. Soldier Li Yanren was the first to jump out of the defense works. Shouldering an explosive charge weighing 20 *jin*, he charged forward. The tanks were turning to the southeast, and Li Yanren pursued them from the rear. After getting close to one tank, he carefully observed it and then put his explosive charge on the rear set of the tank's gun turret. After turning and going back several steps, he looked back. There was a tremendous roar as the tank's steel plate lifted and turned over. Then a tank in the rear fired its cannon at Li Yanren and a shell tore off the brim of his cap. Unfazed, he did not withdraw but calmly continued the fight. In the end all the enemy tanks were destroyed by our courageous fighters. Li Yanren was a young fighter who had enlisted in the armed forces during the campaign to liberate Henan less than five months ago. After getting an education in venting grievances against the old society and the reactionaries, he joined the army during the Huai-Yin Rectification. On the occasion of this tank battle, he was approved, on the firing line, for party membership.

The First Company of the First Regiment of Chiang Kai-shek's "Imperial" Central Tanks had suffered a big loss at the hands of our courageous fighters. News of the victory and experiences in this antitank battle quickly spread throughout the ECFA, inspiring all of its officers and men.

Although for seven or eight days the enemy, with the coordination of tanks, used all its main force in counter-attacking us each day three or four times, but after our valiant soldiers put up a stubborn resistance and our crack troops were organized to make brief attacks on the enemy, the Tu Yu-ming group had lost four regiments, among which more than 6,600 men had been taken

prisoner by us, and the size of the place it occupied had shrunk by half. He achieved nothing else. This created very favorable conditions for us to further annihilate *en masse* the Tu group.

On the southern line, the Second Column of our CPFA, the Sixth Column of the ECFA, and joining the campaign in the latter stage, the Bohai Column, and the 11th Division, as well as local units, in the area northwest of Wobu, pitting one against 10, steadily blocked the nine divisions of the Li Yen-nien Army Group, which was trying to reinforce from the north, forcing it to creep along in one day only one or two *li* and wearing down the enemy's effective strength by a great deal. Before the Li Army Group had reached half the distance to where the Huang Wei Army Group was surrounded, the Huang Wei Army Group had already been completely destroyed.

After more than 20 days of fierce fighting, the Huang Wei Army Group had been thoroughly, altogether, and completely annihilated by our CPFA; and the army group's commander, Huang Wei, and its deputy commander, Wu Shao-chou, had been taken prisoner. The annihilation of the Huang Wei Army Group was another deadly blow to Chiang Kai-shek on the Huaihai battlefield after the annihilation of the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group. It not only caused Chiang Kai-shek to lose 120,000 crack troops, including the 18th Army, which was one of the five main forces, but also in the end isolated the Tu Yu-ming group, which was surrounded southwest of Xuzhou, thereby creating an excellent opportunity for us to swiftly and completely annihilate the Tu group. Commander Liu Baicheng said: The battle in which Huang Wei was annihilated was the key link between the past and the future of the Huaihai Campaign. This victory by the CPFA greatly inspired all the officers and men of the ECFA that were surrounding and annihilating the Tu Yu-ming group.

The progress toward victory in the second stage of the Huaihai Campaign once more showed the correctness of Mao Zedong's policy of concentrating superior force to annihilate the enemies one by one.

At the beginning of the second stage, the KMT troops massed in the Xu-Wo area were roughly in a one-to-one ratio with our forces. In quantity of military force, our side did not have an absolute superiority; in the degree of being well equipped, our army was inferior; but in vigorous fighting will the enemy could not compare with us.

At that time Mao Zedong instructed that in the second stage of the Huaihai Campaign we should continue the policy of concentrating superior force to annihilate the enemies one by one, annihilating the enemy's three groups one by one. In line with this instruction and based on the situation in which three columns—those of Tu, Ch'iu, and Li in the north, of Li and Liu in the south, and of Huang Wei in the middle—were advancing on our army, the General Front Committee selected the Huang

Wei Army Group, which was isolated and which also did not yet have a stable footing and had been worn down for a long time, as the operational objective in the second stage, and decided to use about 10 columns. It also decided that the main force of the ECFA would be the general reserve in the surrounding and annihilating of Huang Wei, and to concentrate absolutely superior force in the direction of the main attack for annihilating Huang Wei. Under the premise of ensuring the concentration of absolutely superior force to annihilate the Huang Wei Army Group, with regard to the auxiliary direction, we, under the principle of ensuring the operations on the main front and creating favorable conditions for further operations, adopted a deployment that besieged Tu Yu-ming and blocked Li Yen-nien, and that acted as a north-south protective screen for the CPFA's attack on Huang Wei. At this time Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Li Yen-nien Army Group and the Huang Wei Army Group to invade the north side by side, and with Tu Yu-ming in Xuzhou make a two-pronged advance to open up the Jinpu Railroad. The Li Yen-nien Army Group extended to the Huang Wei Army Group's eastern flank, an extension that was disadvantageous to our encirclement and annihilation of the Huang Wei Army Group; also, our forces were too dispersed to simultaneously annihilate the Li Yen-nien Army Group. Therefore, we applied the principle of "under special circumstances, adopt the method of dealing an annihilating blow to the enemy; i.e., concentrating forces to strike the enemy from his rear and one or two of his flanks, striving to attain the objective of annihilating one of his units and routing another of his units," in order for us to be able to swiftly transfer forces to fight another enemy army, resolutely separating Huang Wei from Li Yen-nien and not letting them get close to each other. After this, the Tu Yu-ming Army Group abandoned Xuzhou and fled southwestward. This was the enemy's largest group. If we were to let it flee south and it got too close to Huang Wei, it would be even more disadvantageous to our encirclement and annihilation of Huang Wei. Therefore, we resolutely drew out three columns from the front blocking the Li and Liu Army Groups and had them advance northward on the double to take part in the blocking of Tu Yu-ming, coordinating with the main force of the ECFA on the northern line to swiftly besiege the Tu group, and relieving the possible threat from the northern flank when the Huang Wei Army Group was annihilated.

For the Li Yen-nien and Liu Ju-ming Army Groups, we adopted the tactic of first blocking, then penetrating and annihilating, and finally with a small unit firmly blocking. This was in line with Mao Zedong's principle "Have a small force of our army pin down the enemy army's remaining brigade (or regiment), so that it cannot swiftly reinforce the brigade (or regiment) being besieged by us, which will be advantageous for our army to first annihilate this brigade (or regiment)." The Li and Liu Army Groups were of inferior quality; their combat effectiveness was low and their movement lethargic. After dealing them a serious blow, we could certainly

switch to a political offensive, exploiting the contradictions between troops directly under their control and troops that were not, and then with part of our force suppress them and begin engaging in courageous blocking warfare. Therefore, the Li Yen-nien Army Group, which was on the northern line, although repeatedly ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, could not again invade the north to try to lift the siege on Huang Wei; because it was in great difficulty itself, it could only make an empty show of strength. Under the courageous, indomitable actions by our blocking troops, in a little over 10 days' time it had crawled less than half the distance to the place where Huang Wei was being surrounded and annihilated, and in the end Huang Wei was wiped out.

Mao Zedong Cast a Long Line To Catch a Big Fish

After the Huang Wei Army Group was annihilated, we had more and more mobile forces, and this move of Tu Yu-ming by Chiang Kai-shek was like four stones becoming "dead" in *weiqi* [Go, or "encirclement chess"], and the so-called two-pronged advance on Xu and Wo became even more uncertain. The Li Yen-nien Army Group, learning Hitler's old trick, practiced elastic defense and drew back, becoming more and more distant from Tu Yu-ming. Under these circumstances, the General Front Committee analyzed the current situation: Chiang Kai-shek is unwilling to let Tu Yu-ming be annihilated, and he will probably sacrifice troops of inferior quality by ordering the Li Yen-nien Army Group to advance northward and reinforce Tu; at the same time Chiang Kai-shek is pinning his hopes on the air force's bombing and on the release of more poison gas to cover Tu Yu-ming's breakout of the encirclement. Then enemy in north China had been encircled by the Northeast Field Army and the North China Field Army, and Chiang Kai-shek had no mobile army groups. Speaking of the situation as a whole, on the Huaihai battlefield the Tu Yu-ming group was a "dead tiger," but Mao Zedong instructed us to still attack it as if it were a "live tiger." Therefore, it decided that the ECFA would concentrate its entire force on finally settling with the Tu Yu-ming group; that the CPFA's main force would mass at Suxian, Mengcheng, and Woyang; and that one unit would garrison the banks of the Fei He. They would have the following missions: First, in order to annihilate the Tu group's general reserve, they were to observe the situation and either join in the besieging battle or wipe out the enemies who break out of the encirclement; second, one unit was to lure the Li Yen-nien Army Group northward and try, while it was moving through the area south of Suxian, to annihilate it; and third, carry out the work of post-campaign reorganization and replenishment, and in accordance with Mao Zedong's instruction, make preparations for the River-Crossing Campaign. The ECFA adjusted its deployment in accordance with this instruction. Commanded by Tan Zhenlin and Wang Jian'an, the First Column, Ninth Column, and Bohai Column vigorously attacked from north to south. Commanded by Song Shilun and Liuu Peishan, the Fourth Column, 10th

Column, and two independent brigades of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District, and commanded by Wei Guoqing and Ji Peng, the Second Column, Eighth Column, and 11th Column would tightly besiege and resolutely beat back or annihilate parts of the Tu group that were trying to break out of the encirclement; and would coordinate with the Third Column, Sixth Column, Seventh Column, 13th Column, Central-South Shandong Column, and the 12th Column and Guangdong-Guangxi Column, which were returning from the victory in annihilating the Huang Wei Army Group on the southern line. They would deploy in the Suixikou, Yongyu, and Xiayi areas, constituting a peripheral blockading line and acting as a second zone of encirclement and annihilation in case the enemy were to break out of the encirclement. At this point the Tu Yu-ming had completely fallen into our army's tight encirclement.

On 17 December 1948, the General Front Committee, following Political Commissar Deng Xiaoping, Commander Liu Baicheng, and Commander Chen Yi to Cai'ao southeast of Xiaoxian, held a meeting there. At the meeting the coming annihilation of the Tu Yu-ming group was not the main topic; the meeting mainly studied suggestions for the post-Huaihai Campaign river-crossing operation and the plan for unit reorganization (rebuilding the army into columns). After the meeting senior officers Liu and Chen went to a party Central Committee meeting and received instructions from the CPC Central Committee and Mao Zedong.

On 22 December 1948 Mao Zedong telegraphed instructions: Provided Tu's troops do not mount a large-scale breakout of the encirclement, it would be appropriate for you to rest until about 5 January and then begin the attack.

Why did Mao Zedong instruct us to encircle but not attack?

At that time many people harbored doubts, because the enemy was "a fish swimming in the bottom of a cauldron"—his fate was sealed—and we could concentrate absolutely superior force and annihilate him with one blow. After carefully thinking it over, everybody came to the same conclusion: it is probably a case of casting a long line to catch a big fish!

This was the actual situation.

At that time, on the Central Plains battlefield, after the complete collapse of the Huang Pai-t'ao Army Group, the Huang Wei Army Group was completely annihilated. On the North China battlefield the Pingjin Campaign had begun, and the more than 600,000 KMT troops commanded by Fu Tso-i were shaken by the victory of the Northeast Front Army in liberating the entire northeast. In addition, the communications between Dagou and Tianjin had been cut. Fu Tso-i hastily drew back his forces and tried to move northeast by sea transport or flee west to Suiyuan. Under these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek, on 20 December 1948, wanting T'ang En-pai, commander in chief of the Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou

Garrison, to complete preparations without delay to defend the Chang Jiang, instructed Liu Chih to move south with all nonessential personnel of the general headquarters and with the heavy baggage, in an attempt to shift the main force to a predesignated position south of the lower reaches of the Chang Jiang and garrison the river's defenses. As for the troops on the North China front, Chiang Kai-shek planned "as a last resort to withdraw them back to the area out of the lower reaches of the Chang Jiang," and to send ships to transport them. At a time when these KMT troops had not finished their withdrawal south, our fraternal units on the Huaihai frontline and the North China battlefield adopted the method of "surrounding but not attacking" and "separating but not surrounding"; their working in concert, postponing attacks, and "relaxing" the situation possessed extremely great strategic significance, because postponing attacks is just like "a pill that reassures people" and could paralyze the enemy. Chiang Kai-shek would postpone sending all of his Pingjin troops south by sea transport, and his illusion about "fighting to the end" north of the Chang Jiang would be promoted. Thus, our army would have ample time to prepare, so that the Huaihai and Pingjin campaigns would be coordinated to achieve the objective of annihilating a large number of the enemy. By temporarily leaving Tu Yu-ming's remaining units alone, we were throwing out a "bait," because it was estimated that at the point when the battle to annihilate Tu Yu-ming became intense, the Li Yen-nien Army Group would again move northward to rescue Tu. When the time came, our units on the central plains defending the southern line could lure the enemy in deep and then surround and annihilate part of him. To strengthen the besieging of the enemy, we could make use of the weather to create further difficulties for him, and we could conserve our strength and store up our energy in order to avoid waiting for the enemy in a state of fatigue.

Clouds, Rain, and Severe Cold Make It Difficult for Enemy Aircraft To Fly

During the time that we besieged the enemy, the weather worsened day by day. On the 19th it began to be overcast and rainy, and for several days in succession there was a heavy mist, making it difficult for the enemy aircraft to fly. On the 23d, snow began to fall, which was disadvantageous for airdrops. Then enemy aircraft vanished, and the difficulties of the besieged Tu Yu-ming group increased day by day. When they had fled westward from Xuzhou, they had discarded most of their cotton-padded clothing and their quilts with cotton wadding. After they were surrounded, trees, door planks, desks and chairs, chests and cabinets, and farm implements were used in the building of defense works. Every night grass was burned for light and heat. Therefore, running out of fuel and food would mean both hunger and cold, and the group would fall into a hopeless abyss.

Second Battlefield of Those Penned In

The penned-in enemy ate up all the grain and killed mules and horses to appease their hunger. To increase weight, it was decreed that "no one is allowed to remove the skin." Nothing was left of the common people's chickens, doggies, cats, cows and donkeys, which long ago had all been grabbed. Thereafter, they could only strip the bark from trees and gnaw on horse bones to appease their hunger. Because of successive days of rain and snow there was even more of a panic for firewood and standing grain. After the penned-in enemy burned down all the trees of several dozen villages, they used as fuel everything from vehicle tires, string and poles, rifle butts, the wooden stems of hand grenades, pieces of cloth sacks, parachutes and bones, on up to coffins from excavated graves. In some villages the enemy even had difficulty getting drinking water. Pond water was drunk dry and although wells still had some, many people jostled around trying to get theirs first and fearing to be last, pushed and shoved so that none could get any. A captive said: "We were like a school of fish jumping and thrashing within a small pond about to dry up who would die after several gulps of water were gone."

The wind and rain continued. Hunger and bitter cold lashed down on the encircled enemy. Their only hope was to wait for better weather and seek air support from Chiang Kai-shek. Tu Yu-ming [2629 5124 2494] built a dropping ground in his "suppression headquarters" at Chenguan Zhuang to receive airdropped goods and materials. He posted thick sentries and stuck up little red and green flags all around bearing the words "death to those who come in to scramble for rice." But at the sound of airplanes each troop dispatched platoons and companies of armed men to scrap for items. First guns were shot from afar to control them, but after they rushed in in a flood, even the high official sent by "suppression headquarters" to resolve the matter could not stop the pushing and pulling, stabbing with knives, digging with two hands, knocking people over and crushing them, all in a tangle. Often several dozen were killed or injured over a small sack of rice. Some called this dropping ground the "second battlefield of the penned-in enemy."

KMT Troops Near Death Still Do Black Market Trading

Approaching death, the enemy army which is greedy by nature did not forget to try to get rich on big black market trade. Officials scrambled to store up airdropped cigarettes, grain and steamed bread to sell at high prices. The "prices of goods" shot up each day. One large biscuit cost five taels of silver and one cigarette cost one tael. Later, there were even black markets near the temporary airports. Stalls covered the ground. It was boisterous for a time with all the coming and going. There was no place to spend the wealth which officials plundered yet they crazily hoarded it. Thus the black market turned into a "gambling den."

The encircled wounded soldiers had no clothing, food, medicine or shelter. Great numbers of them died. Tu Yu-ming, Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan and Li Mi also tragically buried wounded soldiers alive. One day, more than 80 dead were buried in Li-shih Lin Forest while many wounded soldiers cried without ceasing as they were buried alive. A mess cook, Lu Feng-liang [0712 1496 0081], who crossed over to our side denounced this, saying, "After Yu Te-ch'ing [0060 1779 3237], a top soldier of our Third Squad, Forth Company was wounded by an artillery shell, the company commander ordered him to be buried alive. Those who also were captured to be soldiers from his hometown of Laiyang implored piteously but he was not saved." Some soldiers who had surrendered gnashed their teeth, saying, "Li Mi pushed them to the end, wearing them down with butchered donkey to eat."

What about the rulers of this "hell on earth"—Tu Yu-ming, Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan and Li Mi? Every day they shouted, "together in life or death, through thick or thin." But while the soldiers were chewing on tree bark and horse bones and freezing and starving to death in the ice and snow, daily they were eating rice, crackers, milk, foreign candy and American canned goods. At the same time they also organized special superintending troops to watch over the soldiers' activity and compel them to prefer death. Tu Yu-ming lay down all day in a burrow without seeing or speaking to anyone. Li Mi was insane with an unquiet soul, running from one air-raid shelter to another. These rulers jockeyed for position, elbowing each other out: Li Mi cursed that Ch'iu should not seize most of the airdropped rice so that his own troops had to eat tree bark and wheat sprouts. Ch'iu cursed Li for using armed guards to steal grain, leading to harm and death. The two blamed each other and squabbled endlessly.

Some Ate Others, Others Were Eaten

In sum, more than 200,000 of Chiang Kai-shek's men and horses were crowded into an area of 10 or so li to be finished off. Everything there that could be eaten or burned was eaten and burned. No tree bark, food crops or houses could be found. No flying birds or moving animals could be seen, much less could one hear the sound of chickens clucking or dogs barking. The weak ate the strong, destroying each other. Some ate people, others were eaten by people. Tragic moans were heard and corpses scattered everywhere.

Several Million Public Project Laborers Support Front Line

While the encircled to be finished off enemy army was daily nearer to death with neither outside support nor provisions or ammunition inside, the vast majority of the people in liberated areas still supported all campaigns as before. They made nothing of hardship, supported the front line and ensured that our army always had sufficient provisions, strong soldiers and fine horses in the severe winter hit by wind and snow.

Mao Zedong paid full attention to the reserve strength of this decisive battle. In campaigns he repeatedly directed the central plain and east China bureaus to plan as a whole with the north China bureau a three to five month supply of ammunition and provisions for the entire 1.3 million army and laborers on public projects plus medical supplies for the 100,000 to 200,000 wounded. As for civilian participants in the war, there must be a policy of "planting and battles assist each other." According to Mao's instructions, the central plain, east China and north China bureaus relied upon and organized the broad masses to converge as a mighty torrent surging forward with great momentum composed of the human, material and financial power of the three large liberated areas. Thus, thousands upon thousands of stretchers, vehicles large and small, poles and burrows galloped to the Huaihai front line. Among the several million public project laborers, there were Wei Hai guards who traversed more than 2,000 li from Jiaodong. There were laborers from the Fifth Branch of the Hebei, Shantung, and Henan Military Region who ignored wind and rain to grind 10 million jin of grain in nine days; the first group of laborers from the Henan-Anwei Soviet Military Region who brought more than 10,000 stretchers and 100,000 personnel; laborers from newly recaptured and just liberated Hsiao and Su counties, and from the Haimen and Qidong regions of the Sino-Soviet and the Jiang Huai/Chang Jiang-Huaihai Military Regions plus the million laborer troops from the Shandong south central Military Region who put forth the most incalculable effort in this campaign. All cherished a common desire although they came from different areas, wore different clothing and spoke various dialects: to help the liberation army annihilate the KMT army and win total victory in the Huaihai campaign.

Battle slogans broadly supported the front line laborers: "We will support the Liberation Army wherever it fights!" "We will send the front line whatever it needs!"

At the end of December 1948, the northern wind blew stronger. Huge snowflakes fluttered and filled the sky, flattening the bumpy land and evening the filthy mud ditches. To the north and south of the Gansu Hai line, it was vast and hazy. The land was like silver down. On this borderless white plain, a line of endless small vehicled troops rapidly advanced. The laborers gave no regard to the wind, snow, cold or muddy roads. They were sending rice to the Huaihai front line.

Laborers Ignore Wind, Snow and Mud in Bringing Army Provisions and Ammunition to Huaihai Front Line, Looking After Wounded Soldiers

Neither soldiers nor horses moved but the grain went forward. Besides ensuring provisions and ammunition supplies to the front line, 10 million people gave no regard to difficulties. They warmly transported and nursed the wounded. They looked after them in every possible way. Before doing a job, they placed soft grass on the stretchers and covered them with their own blankets. They also learned how to walk with light steps.

They repeatedly tried actual experiments, thinking of all ways and means to alleviate the suffering of the wounded. The project laborers of Zhunan, Shandong province, bought cigarettes and candy for the wounded with spare cash, subsidies and money from home.

At the front line one victory closely followed another. The troops rapidly pushed forward. The rear supply line lagged behind. At times material supplies were rather hard to come by. The project workers in newly liberated areas who experienced difficulties could not gather much grain so some only ate one meal each day. A few even only had one meal every other day yet they dared not touch a bit of the flour, oil or salt on their own vehicles. All of it reached its goal. After the troops knew of the project laborers' situation, they immediately sent them a large volume of rice flour for them to cook with and gave them rooms to stay in while they themselves slept out in the open under shacks made of kaoliang stalks. At times the troops and project laborers stayed in the same villages. PLA officers and men made fires to warm the laborers, and voluntarily sacrificed clothing, shoes and socks to wish them well.

While besieged by enemy, the China field front line committee appealed to the whole army to vigorously develop a political movement of a mass nature urging firing line surrender of the enemy army based on Mao Zedong's principle of "disintegrate the enemy army and be lenient toward prisoners of war" and on the directive "we must carry out fierce, effective political attacks on the enemy army."

Disintegrate Enemy Army, Urge Tu Yu-ming and Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan To Surrender

After our army issued a document urging Tu Yu-ming and Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan to surrender, many huge slogans, propaganda signs and flags were posted in a forward position, such as "preferential treatment for all who drop their weapons" or "defense until death or breaking out of encirclement both are blind alleys, capitulation is the way out." The characters were large and clear. The enemy could see them very clearly. We also shot propaganda bullets deep into enemy lines, dared to send various leaflets and "proof of treatment," and set up road signs in forward positions indicating how and where to capitulate. Some established "hostels for surrendered officials and soldiers" where they were given food and clothing upon arrival. A method of "playing the flute to relieve distress" was adopted at one position, where a firing line music troop was arranged to perform "White Haired Girl" and other pieces for the enemy in the black of night as the wind and snow howled, accompanied by the exclamation: "Why do all you captured poor people suffer cold and hunger? Come over, quickly!" Each time the piece was played there was no sound of crows tittering in the enemy position. In the position of one camp, more than 190 capitulated from the front in three days. At some positions broadcasts

accompanied by music programs pierced various illusions, explaining officer and soldier capitulation instructions and policy to the enemy army plus victory propaganda. The sound could be heard several li around. After Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan knew of it, he hurriedly transferred the enemy guarding the spot and replaced them with troops who swore to "dare to die" although ultimately more than 20 surrendered. In particular, during each of our army's meals, the "click clack" clatter of bowls caused the enemy several meters away to exclaim, "Ah! Ah! Ah! They are eating! Let's go over! The Liberation Army gives you food." Thereupon, many of the starving enemy capitulated.

Each night at dusk our army organized small groups to move to a forward position and shout propaganda to the enemy at the front line. We understood the mental characteristics of the enemy officers and soldiers and shouted different things at different times. In the early evening we mainly directed efforts at enemy army officers and soldiers, explaining the situation to them and propagandizing our Party's policies for prisoners of war. In the late evening, when there was less observation by spies, we concentrated mainly on the rank-and-file soldiers. We told them they were surrounded with no support and continuation meant fighting, freezing or starving to death. We seriously explained how to capitulate: "No firing if a few come over; send a representative over first before many cross over." We also organized propaganda directed toward newly surrendered Chiang army rank-and-file or mentioned names and explained the internal enemy situation, and then many would run over to our side. Spies fired shots or cursed during this. We said, "Brothers, who just fired now? Please take note of his name and when we break in with arms we will nab him. Give him a bit of space!" Then the spies would pull in their tails and be quiet.

"Evening Classes" for the Enemy

Our soldiers termed the propaganda directed to the enemy at the front line "evening classes" because most of the other side listened quietly. At times, to understand the effectiveness of the "evening classes" we would call out, "fire a shot at dawn if you heard." The enemy naturally fired shots at dawn.

To halt the capitulation of his troops, Tu Yu-ming adopted a method of punishing one as a warning to others. He executed Kung Chih-chien [1313 1807 1017], commander of the so-called "ineffective battle making" regiment 759, and another regimental commander plus many rank-and-file, pronouncing: "the company commander will be executed if the platoon leader capitulates; the battalion commander will be executed if the company commander capitulates." He ordered no interchange permitted between companies in the defense sector and supervision between bunkers via firepower. He tricked the subordinates with various strategies, saying, "the Huang Wei Corps will send reinforcements soon! Several 10 thousands of Japanese soldiers have reached the East China Sea and will soon join forces at

Xuzhou." Sometimes he wanted the rank-and-file to light incense and kowtow before images of Kuan Kung, Yue Fei [legendary warriors], Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and swear, "may heaven strike me down with a red artillery piece piercing my heart and the brown earth cover me if I lay down arms and surrender." Some said this aloud while drawing the word "no" on the ground with their toes. Sometime they shouted "break out of encirclement" to boost morale. Always the snow fell postponing clear skies; clear skies postponed until the next day. Ultimately, no one in the company believed what they heard.

Year End Attack

Despite Tu Yu-ming's brain-racking schemes, he could not stop his subordinates' ceaseless search for a way out. Blockaded by machine gun fire, enemy company 1, regiment 287, division 96, rank-and-file Li Chin-sheng [2621 6855 3932] and three others defied death and ran over, shouting, "death is death, whether by fighting, starving or freezing." Some lay down on the graves of dead corpses in the day time and waited until the darkness of night to creep across. Others painted blood on their faces and bodies to be mistaken for wounded. Some dashed out of the encirclement without knowing exactly where our troops were, just crawling to where there were many trees and villages with the clucking of chickens.

New Years Day 1949 arrived. White, downy snowflakes danced in the sky like angels scattering dandelion seeds. Our east China field army which thickly hemmed in Tu Yu-ming's group, welcomed the new year with incomparable fighting ardour and belief in victory. The China field army chief issued new years greetings to all PLA officers and men with six appeals calling on the entire army to firmly implement the strategic policies of Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee of the CPC to "advance the troops" and "carry the revolution through to the end." At this beginning of the year all PLA officers and men reflected upon past victories and looked ahead to a bright future. Each was terribly excited. Revolutionary courage multiplied.

In the early morning, our army's forward sentry post turned the enemy's "microphone" propaganda around to its own positions and broadcast light and happy new years songs. The soldiers smiled and laughed to hear: "fresh and new, really fresh and new, the bunkers and trenches celebrate the new year...do the yangge dance, sing allegro, we wish happy new year to our comrades...valiant fighters pose as heroes, the Huaihai will broadcast victory tidings...in front the enemy does not surrender, firmly exterminate every last one!" Each position and those fighting shoulder to shoulder wished each other happy new years. Everyone unanimously expressed: ensure that the first battle of 1949 be fought well as a gift to the new year. Cultural entertainment at new years mess time was very lively. There was a holiday spirit on the battlefield looking ahead to a happy new year's scene.

Our "first attack of the year" shook the enemy army. Our new year's joy enticed them. An air of death hung heavily in the foggy grey smoke of the enemy's army positions. Without any anger at all, some of the enemy in bunkers looked at our army's positions weeping with joy.

Under our powerful and mighty political attacks, capitulators from the enemy army increased continuously, from a scattered few to huge numbers, from rank-and-file to officers, from the front lines to the deepest depths, from stealthy runners in the dark of night to those who publically fought across in the daytime. Some informed our army in advance that they would give firepower support. Some officers who killed spies threw down their weapons and came across. Thus, in 20 days between 16 December 1948 and 5 January 1949, more than 14,000 enemy troops surrendered to our side, approximately equivalent to the manpower of two enemy divisions. We disintegrated the enemy army not only in numerical terms but even more importantly we created beneficial conditions to totally annihilate the enemy before us by severely attacking their morale and desire to continue war with us.

Expand Three Investigations of Grievances, Rectify Organizational Discipline

During battlefield rest and reorganization, besides vigorously launching "psychological attacks" on the enemy, our army carried out movements to vent grievances, had the three investigations, reorganized discipline, transferred and trained new soldiers, and incorporated prisoners of war with a new spirit of rectifying the military besides continuing to implement the spirit of holding rectification meetings, and have situational teachings for all PLA officers and men. Political organization cadres went deeply to every corner to understand conditions and mobilize the masses. They did powerful political and ideological work with very abundant content such as firing line victories, joining the Party at the firing line, small-scale grievance venting in battle, "family meetings" (where old soldiers teach new and newly liberated soldiers) and salute exchanges between the front and rear. Cultural and artistic work at the firing line, bunker entertainment and other such teaching the troops all played a big role in boosting morale and made everyone fully understand why there was a war and who is was against. All maintained a vigorous will to battle and prepared to destroy the enemy thoroughly.

At the same time, our army practiced military democracy and trained soldiers in front of the enemy according to actual needs. We mainly used contemporary enemy conditions and tasks as live training materials for the PLA officers and men to study so that each fighter was prepared and ready to fight. In some troops, the PLA officers and nien and fighters improved methods of warfare after summing up experience and teachings and through criticisms and self-criticisms of past fighting situations. Some troops studied how to complete future tasks they might have to undertake and formulated concrete plans. Others used their work at the firing line

to train fighters in small and large bunker and trench warfare. Individual companies had scattered or joint trial storms of heavily fortified positions and street fighting. When enemy planes arrived they studied air defense. When the enemy shot flares at night they studied how to continue and complete artillery demolition assignments. Fire power units studied how to take advantage of the light and accurately locate targets and tightly shield demolition work. Assault units studied how to boldly and powerfully assault. The content was rich and the methods flexible: from techniques to tactics, from the acts of individual soldiers to small fighting groups, from practice by small fighting groups to squad trials. This was "...mutual teaching between officers and soldiers and between soldier and soldier under training: various large and small company meetings in battle and at the firing line. Under the company commander's direction, mobilize soldiers and the masses to discuss how to attack and overcome enemy lines and how to complete battle assignments..." All these activities greatly aroused the revolutionary zeal of all officers and men, developed the wisdom of the masses, improved the talents of the masses and enhanced unity.

On 28 December 1948, the senior China field officer considered the suggestions of all company commanders and decided that launching an attack required overall coordination to be able to annihilate the enemy and lesson the wounded on our side. If only a few attacks were made the enemy would repeatedly grapple with us for a long time with little battle fruits but many wounded. Considered overall, if it was inadvisable to attack then we would bombard them to increase the enemy's wounded and shake their army's morale while enhancing our army's artillery technology and then undertaking political attacks. Thus, based on the spirit of Mao Zedong's directives, the senior China field officer synthesized the aforementioned opinions of the troops and decided to organize an immediate assault. He informed each troop to undertake it at 17:00 on 29 December 1948, in coordination with political attacks to further disintegrate the enemy. Our army was of one mind from top to bottom, millions of people unanimous in high spirits to fight.

We improved our skills through practice in front of the enemy. We understood them thoroughly. According to the spirit of Mao Zedong's directives regarding tenaciously observing the enemy in battle, we had to separate and sap them and concentrate coordinated military strength, firepower, infantry and artillery before we could resolve this and prepare to do a good job of sure fire powerful attacks. Each company undertook formidable work seeking to attack positions and oppress the enemy at all predetermined places of attack in villages.

In the daytime there was dense enemy firepower. Bullets continuously flew by, "whiz whiz," overhead. The enemy lit flares. The land was like a white sheet. At times the enemy scrambled up defense works, aiming to destroy our trench operations but all were beat back by our security forces. Our brave officers and men did not

care about fatigue. They were not afraid of sacrifice. They crept forward holding shovels and pickaxes, digging the earth out bit by bit, pressing forward in trenches toward the enemy's positions, 200 meters, 100 meters, 50 meters...until finally innumerable interconnected trenches together surrounded the enemy's flanks such that many enemy villages were entirely encircled by trenches. From start to finish everyone cherished common convictions: dig into the enemy's heart, entirely eradicate Ch'iu's and Li's formations and capture alive the war criminal Du Yu-ming!

Tu Yu-ming Plans BreakOut

Tu Yu-ming was very crafty. Although that was the case, he was not extraordinarily smart. According to observation reports, in recent days the enemy troops were repeatedly transferred. Some went west. Others came east. Airdrops were increasingly scarce.

The China field operations headquarters immediately got busy. All the leading officers came to the battle office to make analyses and studies. From the enemy's original deployments, it was very possible that Ch'iu's and Li's formations would give mutual defense. Since Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan moved west from his current position, it was reckoned that: first, Tu Yu-ming might sacrifice other inferiors and bring Ch'iu's formation to break out of the encirclement. Second, have our 8th column on the west attack several times, scatter apart Sun Yuan-liang's [1327 0337 5328] formation and make a hole to rather substantially threaten him, desiring Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan to go patch it up. Third, concentrate reserves. But in the end this possibility was rather small because we turned up the pressure everywhere. The enemy moaned and groaned all day. How could they concentrate reserves? In the end, Deputy Commander Su Yu [4725 5940] summed it up, saying, "Tu Yu-ming has no provisions inside and is under fire every day. Outside there are no assisting soldiers. They are losing men daily. Heaven is against him. The planes can only fly empty. Thus, the enemy sees that the hope of aid from heaven or earth is increasingly slim, and may attempt risking death by breaking out. Although the enemy is a tiger in a net, we must prepare to fight him when he flees the net." We followed the leading officers' directives and prepared two plans. Plan one: Select some troops to organize a second defensive line to the east and northeast of Yungch'eng who will arrange a sack. Be prepared that after Ch'iu breaks through the first defensive line to use the second to take advantage of his escape through defensive works to destroy him. Plan two: Do not allow the enemy to escape but take advantage of their redeployment and when soldiers and horses are in disarray, launch an attack. At that time the leading officers of each column must order a total attack. In reality, the encirclement already is like an impregnable fortress. Chiang Kai-shek had boasted his last "king card" which long was not worth a penny. With our army gaining he could not imagine that he could break out. The leading China field officer made a report to Mao Zedong according to the second plan. After approval, he announced orders to

attack, instructing the entire army to unify in beginning to tighten the noose around Tu Yu-ming who was putting up a desperate struggle and refusing to come to his senses.

Under the advantageous conditions of powerful backing by the central plain field army and a strong southern line safeguard, for more than one month each column of the east China field army repeatedly grappled with the enemy, making the encirclement increasingly small. All our attacks forced innumerable enemy counterattacks to retreat. Some troops were fighting with only officers, no more soldiers. Strategically, the northeast and north China field armies' task to encircle the Fu Tso-yi troops "to not allow Chiang Kai-shek to rapidly make policy and transport all south of Beiping and Tienjin into his hands" was completed. On this basis, Mao Zedong ordered our army to make a full attack in the face of the enemy. Thus at 15:30 on 6 January 1949, fierce artillery preparations were made against Tu Yu-ming's formation.

Booms roared like enormous thunder. Some 10,000 rounds all aimed at the enemy army's positions flew by. For a time, there was such firepower on the enemy's ground defense works and commanding elevations that all was obliterated by our gunfire. In succession the enemy army which bore underground begged for their lives. "Their highest wish" was to be safely taken prisoner by our army.

Our valiant China field fighters, who had conserved their strength and stored up energy, heard the joyous gunfire and concentrated all their attention on waiting for the signal to attack. One after another in threes and fours and hiding under the smoke and fog of gunfire, the artillery hands of all major encirclement attack troops ran from the defense works, and resourcefully and skillfully went toward the artillery destruction sites chosen long ago. No sooner had one fallen than another stepped into the breach. They advanced bravely, rapidly blowing up one obstruction after another in the way of our footsoldiers' advance. At 16:00, the PLA officers and men gave the signal for a full attack—several smoke bombs lit in front of position. The assault troops were just like a sharp knife. From all different directions they courageously cut deeply into the enemy, destroying about 10 enemy units the same day.

Under our forceful attack, the enemy was alarmed and lost their heads. They immediately drew back and reorganized, planning to break out of the encirclement.

After our China field commander studied things, he prepared to move columns 6 and 13 to the west near Baishanji to join with the central southern Shandong columns in order to annihilate the enemy in this movement.

The battle line gradually approached the heart of the enemy. Firepower became increasingly strong. The enemy launched more counteroffensives to retrieve lost

ground, and used myriad methods to gain fighting positions. At the time, the enemy's internal communications trenches were fewer and only a few were still controlled by their firepower. The communications trenches which we dug during rest and reorganization were long ago in the rear. If we wanted to advance, we had to do earth works before being able to reduce the wounded and divide the enemy. But the sky was cold and the earth frozen. We dug on with pickaxes, as though hitting rock. Our army advanced slowly in this way. By 8 January 1949 we had only destroyed 14 enemy units. The head of Chiang's 70th army, Kao Chi-jen [7559 0679 0086] was attacked and wounded by our men. Chiang sent an airplane to fetch him which we knocked down. Even Tu Yu-ming's Chenguan Zhuang Airport command post was controlled by our firepower.

Fighting was the fiercest on 9 January. The enemy fiercely launched counteroffensives to retrieve lost ground with the aid of more than 20 airplanes, in an attempt to seize roads to the west to break out of encirclement. They were driven back by our army. From that morning, for days the enemy dropped large quantities of poison gas on innocent civilians at our army's positions and rear. Our army repeatedly gave severe warnings but they did not cease. Some of our people also were contaminated; all recovered because of timely aid. This inhuman act of the enemy was to no avail besides arousing the full anger of our army and the people to kill the enemy even more heroically.

Fierce Attacks, Fighting and Assault To Plug Into Enemy's Central Positions

In the afternoon, our army fiercely fought, attacked and assaulted the enemy, steadfastly and swiftly plugging into their central positions and compelling them to a state of confusion.

Towards evening, dusk gradually covered the battlefield. A half moon slowly emerged through gossamer clouds. To the northeast of Yongcheng, the fight to the finish had developed to a head. Like fierce tigers, each column was on offense toward Tu Yu-ming's piteous central positions. Battalion Two, Company 10, took advantage of the enemy's final line of resistance breaking on the eastern bank of the Lu River to head rapidly towards the enemy's direction of retreat and fiercely move in from east to west and take offense on Tu's command center, Chenguan Zhuang. Two companies of the enemy's 72d special agent battalion were entirely destroyed. The enemy's entire defense line to the west of the river collapsed. Thick gunfire resounded in the direction of Chenguan Zhuang.

Enemy Cut to Shreds

At 3:00 on 10 January, Commander Song Shilun [1345 2314 6544] told me on the telephone: facing the enemy, the 10th column was permitted to move west, reckoning that the enemy was concentrating troops in preparation to break out of encirclement. He reserved the manpower of five units for a simultaneous attack on the enemy. The

troops of the 4th Column bravely and fiercely attacked. At the time, the enemy and we were mixed together. Most of the enemy had stopped resisting and put down their weapons. It really was like mountains toppling as the soldiers lost. The situation quickly turned around. I hurriedly reported to Deputy Commander Su Yu. Then calls came from each column hailing the joining of forces far and near. The enemy was basically annihilated and we were sweeping the battlefield. Starlight gradually disappeared. The east lightened. The bullets from each column of our army heroes swept the enemy clear away. They were accepting large groups of war prisoners and handling victory gifts. On the field at Chenguan Zhuang thousands upon thousands of the enemy were jumbled. Twelve field cannon's rubber tires broken by the enemy army were burning. Broken vehicles were overturned every which way. Innumerable troops of our army were shuttling back and forth and carving them up, carving the enemy to shreds.

Officials' Wives Cut Sorry Figures

At the same time, three walkie-talkies and two wirelasses of the enemy unit's headquarters were still giving reports in a remaining shelter. When they discovered the people were the Liberation Army, they unexpectedly still thought to destroy the equipment. Our soldier ordered, "Break what? Come out and fall in!" The group could only obediently come out of its shelter. There was a group of officers' wives in another shelter. When our army men ordered them to come out to assemble, they still thought it was their own side. All talked at once, saying, "Where should we go? The Liberation Army is all around." "We are the Liberation Army!" This hit them like a lightning bolt. They immediately were terrified and turned pale, cowering together, wringing their hands, saying, "Women have no guns!" Upon seeing the sorry figure these officers' wives cut, some soldiers could not help laughing, "It really is the nature of the KMT army: men and women both clap their hands and surrender." All the soldiers burst out laughing.

The battle at Chenguan Zhuang, the headquarters of Tu Yu-ming and Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, was quickly ended under the fierce attacks of each route of the Liberation Army. Each unit of the enemy army lost command centers for the entire battlefield. They knew that the situation was lost. Entire forces and units put down their weapons and capitulated.

Tu Yu-ming Captured Alive by Medical Troop of 11th Force, 4th Column

In the afternoon of 10 January, several stalwart remaining enemy gathered on the west flank of Chenguan Zhuang, Liuji, where they had retreated from far and near. They planned a final attack. At 2:30 p.m., our powerful firepower against this final isolated spot fiercely bombarded Liuji. It was brought down in only 30 minutes, finally thoroughly entirely eradicating the

remainder of Tu's troops. Here, all of Tu Yu-ming's New Fifth Army, including the "kings" of the "southern troops," were annihilated.

After the combat ended, we immediately combed for Tu Yu-ming and Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan but did not find them. During the search, the Fourth Column called saying Tu Yu-ming was imprisoned by the medical troop of the 11th Force.

How happy it made people that the call to "capture Tu Yu-ming alive" which had been out for more than a month was now reality! Here was how it happened: On 10 January 1949, the sky had just become light. There still was combat in Chenguan Zhuang and Liuji. Fourteen of the enemy army holding weapons hurriedly ran to the Zhanglao Zhuang on the left side of Liuji but dared not enter. Later an old villager was met and asked whether there were troops. He said, "the Liberation Army is all around for several dozen li." At this these people were seized with terror. The fellow who asked sneakily took from his pocket a gold ring and gave it to the old villager, asking him not to tell the Liberation Army, and quietly left. The old villager felt that there was something queer about these people and became alarmed, quickly reporting them to our medical team of the 11th force, 4th Column in the village. At the time the entire medical team had only one gun. What would happen if those fellows had several dozen guns? One of the team members recalled a story about the Red Army capturing guns from scratch, and thought: Do you mean to say that several remnants of a routed army cannot be handled? The team leader decided to chase them. Just as the informant, Fan Cheng-jen [2868 2973 0086], and Ts'ui Hsiao-kuang [1508 1420 0342] set out from the village carrying one gun, they saw a group of people headed east wearing clothing that was neither that of an official nor a soldier. When they saw the two team members coming, they immediately crouched on the ground, preparing to resist. Little Fan charged forward and Little Ts'ui adopted a posture to take aim at the group with his gun. As Little Fan shouted, "Who are you?" one of the 14 called himself "captain" and asked him who he belonged to. "11th Force, 4th Column. And you?" "I'm with the 11th Force, 4th Column too. We used to be in the same division." Little Fan saw that this was an enemy trick. He focused himself, and pointing at an item the enemy was bearing, he said, "Sorry, but please hand me that. This is an order from our superiors. I can return it to you if you really are one of us." Little Fan smoothly pulled his gun and loaded it aiming at the pit of his stomach. Faced with this hero, the rest obediently put down their weapons.

However, more problems arose: There was no way the two of them could lead this group of many guns and people away. Then Little Fan had a brainwave. He shouted to the rear, "Inform the squad to come!" A company of slightly wounded soldiers was recuperating 200 meters away. They came upon hearing the news and

cooperated in detaining the 14 back at Zhanglao Zhuang and transferring them to the division political department.

At a glance at the clothing the head of the political department reckoned that this was a high officer of the enemy army who ran out under the protection of bodyguards. He asked the "prisoner official" with a sunken nose bridge wearing soldier's clothing what he was up to. He replied that he was the quartermaster of formation 13 named Kao Wenming [7559 2429 2494]. The political department head asked him to write the name of the formation head. He brought out a brand new Parker pen from his clothing but could not write anything for a long time. When he extended his hand to get the pen, his wrist revealed a waterproof watch. Noting the circumstances, the political department head also saw his color change, so he pursued him with a look: "What kind of officer are you after all? It is best to say it quickly, you cannot conceal it! Were not Huang Wei [7806 4850] and Wu Shao-chou [0702 4801 0719] both found out?"

Hearing this, the "officer prisoner" asked quickly, "Where is Huang Wei now?"

"You will soon find out."

Next, this "Kao Wen-ming" asked, babbling like an idiot, "Are you Commander Chen Yi? Are you the column commander?" Finally, he hemmed and hawed, vindicated, "I really am a quartermaster. You will discover it later."

"Kao Wen-ming" was detained in a room. After eating he fished out a small, exquisite lighter and smoked a pack of cigarettes, dejectedly heaved a deep sigh. Taking advantage of being alone, he lifted a large brick in the room and knocked it to his head, breaking the skin. With blood trickling out he closed his eyes and silently feigned being dead on the ground. He said nothing and only groaned while the doctor bound him up. However, could the sly enemy use this scoundrelish means to fool the people? When Tu Yu-ming's photo was compared with this "Kao Wen-ming" by the political department, they discovered that except for Tu lacking a small mustache, everything else was identical. That evening, from the mouth of Xuzhou's imprisoned "suppression headquarters" deputy official, it was proven that this "Kao" who feigned death was Tu Yu-ming, the chief war criminal and deputy commander of the KMT's Xuzhou "suppression headquarters."

Because there was proof, plus our announced policies for prisoners of war, "Kao Wen-ming" finally acknowledged there was no way to deny it. Only then did he lower his head in despair, saying timidly, "I...I am Tu Yu-ming."

Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan Shot Dead on Spot by Our 9th Column

The next day I saw the dispirited war criminal Tu Yu-ming at the field political department with his head

wrapped in white cloth. He was then transferred to the prisoner of war office to await judgment by the people.

Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan, that worshipper of Hitler, the KMT's 2d Formation commander, had on his back an American-made Tommy submachine gun. He fled to Zhangjiatang nearby, three li to the northwest of Chen Zhuang, in southwest Xiao county. Valiant fighters of our 9th Column shot him dead on the spot. Li Mi alone got away dressed as a soldier.

In 96 hours, four days and nights, from 16:00 on 6 January 1949, fierce fighting entirely mopped up 88 villages guarded by Ch'iu and Li's troops of Tu Yu-ming plus the remainder of Sun's in Chenguan Zhuang and the Chinglongji area in southwest Xuzhou.

Tu Yu-ming's commanding battle zone, two units of troops, eight armies, 20 formations, and approximately 200,000 people were all exterminated. This includes Ch'iu Ch'ing-ch'uan's 5th Army, said to be one of Chiang Kai-shek's five chief forces. On the average 50,000 were exterminated daily. A huge war of extermination is characterized by steadfastness, speed, cleanliness, thoroughness, entirety and great size.

The Huaihai Campaign began on 6 November 1948 and ended on 10 January 1949, a total of 65 days. According to Mao Zedong's plan, our Central Plain Field A Army and the east China field army and local troops exterminated 22 armies of the KMT's picked troops and 56 formations (including four half-formation uprisings) for a total of 555,000 people, and repulsed the units of Li Yen-nien and Liu Ju-ming who came in support from Nanjing, thoroughly smashing the enemy's defense plan to "seize north China, guard the central plain, and manage south China." Thereby, east China, the central plain and north China, our three liberated areas, became one unit. The Huaihai Campaign's victory, together with the two big victories of the Liaoning-Shenyang and Beijing-Tianjin campaigns, fundamentally shook Chiang Kai-shek's continuing confidence to stay behind on the mainland. For our army it set a foundation of victories to liberate all of China by crossing the river and heading south.

Crossing the River and Heading South, East China Field Army Changed To 3d Field Army

Following this, Nanjing was in total confusion. On 21 January 1949, Chiang Kai-shek announced his "resignation." His "braintrust", Ch'en Pu-Lei [7115 1580 7191] claimed that his "mental power had dried up" and committed suicide with sleeping pills. Kung Hsiang-hsi [1313 4382 3556] and Sun Ko [1327 4430] were busy investing in the Philippines, preparing a way of escape. The Nanjing Train Station became a madhouse. Fleeing people climbed on top of trains they could not board. As a result, when the trains began to move, some fell and lost their lives. In Shanghai, the surging rush to buy gold was insane. Many people were crushed alive on bank stairs...the rain and snow were near. A cold wind was

sweeping away the wilderness, and in Nanjing the KMT's control clique was falling into a state of collapse.

According to Mao Zedong's new instructions, the East China and Central Plain Field Armies began to rest and reorganize. On 21 January 1949, the East China Field Army convened the party's front committee and discussed troop training and consolidation plans and future work foci, immediate troop reorganization, unifying establishment, adhering military committee orders, changing the East China Field Army into the 3d Field Army, divisions into several formations, and turning formations under troop columns into armies. Then under the direct control of the front committee, they methodically entered preparations for the Campaign to cross the Chang Jiang River.

Zhang Wannian's Rise to Chief of General Staff

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[Article: "Zhang Wannian, the 11th Chief of General Staff of the People's Republic of China"]

[Text] During the leadership reshuffle of the General Staff Department [GSD] of the PLA after the 14th National Party Congress in October 1992, Zhang Wannian, 64, was appointed chief of General Staff. This news immediately attracted world-wide attention.

Since the founding of Communist China, the position of the chief of General Staff has been held by: Xu Xiang-qian [1776 0686 0467] (October, 1949 to 1954), Nie Rongzhen [5119 2837 5271] (acting, 1950 to 1953), Li Yu [2698 5940] (November 1954 to October 1958), Huang Kecheng [7806 0344 6134] (October 1958 to September 1959), Luo Ruiqing [5012 3843 0615] (September 1959 to December 1965), Yang Chengwu [2799 2052 2976] (acting, December 1965 to March 1968), Huang Yongsheng [7806 3057 0524] (March 1968 to September 1971), Deng Xiaoping [6772 1420 1627] (concurrent, January 1975 to April 1976 and July 1977 to March 1980), Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807] (March 1980 to November 1987), and Chi Haotian [6688 3185 3944] (November 1987 to October 1992). Zhang Wannian is the 11th General Chief of Staff.

Joining the Eighth Army in Shandong in 1944

Zhang Wannian was born in 1928 in a farmer's house in Huang County of Shandong (Huang County was renamed as Longkou City in 1990). It is adjacent to Zhaoyuan County which is the hometown of last chief of General Staff, Chi Haotian. Huang County is located in the northern part of Jiaodong Peninsula by Bohai Bay. In January 1938, Zhong Xidong [0112 2569 2639], a communist party member of Huang County (who became major general in 1955 and later became vice minister of foreign affairs) and others, founded anti-Japanese armed guerrilla forces here. At the end of the same year, the

CPC established the Jiaodong Anti-Japanese Base and the Fifth Branch of the Shandong Column of the Eighth Army, centering around Penglai, Huang County, and Ye County. Xu Shiyu [6079 0013 0645], Lin Hao [2651 3185] (1916—), and others fought difficult battles in the Jiaodong Peninsula with stubborn puppet Japanese armies. In August 1944, Zhang Wannian joined the Eighth Army and plunged into the Autumn Offensive of the Jiaodong Military Region. In late August 1945, Huang County was liberated. In the same year, Zhang Wannian also joined the Communist Party of China.

Zhang Wannian Worked in Wu Kehua's Army During the Three Years of Civil War

After winning the War Against Japan, the CPC sent over 130,000 troops from nine liberated areas—central China; northern Hebei; the Hebei, Rehe, and Liaoning area; the Gansu, Ningxia, and Shaanxi area; central Hebei; the Hebei, Shandong, and Henan area; the Shanxi, Chahaer, and Hebei area; the Suiyuan area of Shanxi; and the Taiyue area—to boldly drive into northeast China. In October 1945, under the command of Wu Kehua, vice commander of the Jiaodong Military Region, about 6,000 soldiers of the Sixth and Fifth Division of the Shandong Military Region crossed the ocean from the Jiaodong Peninsula and arrived at Yingkou of the Liaodong Peninsula. Zhang Wannian arrived among the troops. Originally Wu's troops were formed into the Second Column of the People's Autonomous Army of Northeast China. In February 1946, they were formed into the Fourth Column of the Democratic United Army of Northeast China. In January 1948, they were renamed as the Fourth Column of the People's Liberation Army of Northeast China. In November of the same year, they became the 41st Army of the Northeast Field Troops of the People's Liberation Army of China. Zhang Wannian served in the Wu Kehua unit during the entire period of the 3-year civil war. His titles included platoon leader under the 36th Regiment of the 12th Division of the Fourth Column of the Democratic United Army of Northeast China, deputy company political instructor, and chief of the communications section of the Northeast Field Army Command. He fought in the Benxi Defense Battle (March 1946), the Xinkailing Campaign (October 1946), and the Summer, Autumn, and Winter offensives of Northeast China (May to November 1974).

His Unit Won the Title of "Tashan Heroes' Regiment" in Liaoshen Campaign

In October 1948, during the world-famous Liaoshen Campaign, Zhang Wannian joined the Tashan Blocking Action. His unit, the 34th Regiment of the 12th Division of the Fourth Column of Northeast China, won the honorable title of "Tashan Heroes' Regiment." He himself too was cited for meritorious service and became a combat hero.

Guarding Beiping and Fighting Numerous Battles

In January 1949, the Pingjin Battle broke out, and Zhang Wannian fought in such battles as the Pingsui Blocking Action and the Zhangjiakou Battle. After the Pingjin Battle, the 41st Army, charged with the responsibility of entering and guarding Beiping, won the honorable title of "troops of justice." In August 1949, the 41st Army was incorporated into the 12th Army of the Fourth Field Forces which was under the command of General Xiao Jinguang [5618 0513 0342]. In October, this army fought in the Hengbao Campaign.

Holding Major Positions in Wuhan, Guangzhou, and Jinan Military Regions

After liberation, Zhang Wannian was stationed permanently in southern China with the 41st Army. He served as a combat section chief of a regiment in the 41st Army, a combat staff officer of the army command headquarters, a vice regimental commander, and chief of staff. In the mid 1950's, when the Liberation Army first adopted the system of military ranks, Zhang Wannian was awarded the military rank of major and a third-class liberation medal.

In 1961, after graduating from the basic course of the Nanjing Military Academy, Zhang Wannian was promoted to regimental commander at the 41st Army and the military rank of lieutenant colonel. In the 1970's, he served as a combat departmental chief and a division commander at the headquarters of the Guangzhou Military Region. In the early 1980's he served as vice army commander and then army commander. Later he was promoted to vice commander of the Wuhan Military Region. In June 1985, he returned to the Guangzhou Military Region to serve as vice commander. In November 1987, he filled the vacancy left by You Taizhong [1429 1132 1813], to become the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region.

Counterattack Against Vietnam, Direct From Guangxi to Liangshan

During the period between 1970 and early 1971, on the eve of its coup, the Lin Biao clique tried by hook or by crook to rope in the 43rd Army. As a result, Guan Guanglie [7070 0342 3525], commissar of the 43rd Army, was drawn in, but Zhang Wannian, army commissar, had been tested and withstood the temptation.

In 1975, when Deng Xiaoping was the chief of General Staff and presided over the day-to-day work of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the CPC, a large-scale army and air force exercise was conducted in Luoyang, Henan. The division headquarters, then led by Zhang Wannian, distinguished itself during the exercise and won the praise of Deng Xiaoping. It left a deep impression on Deng.

In the early 1970's, during the Vietnam war, Zhang Wannian once served as an advisor for the Vietnamese army and was fairly familiar with the situation of the Vietnamese army.

In the spring of 1979, China waged a self-defense counterattack against Vietnam. Zhang Wannian was responsible for the left flank offensive from Guangxi directly to Liangshan.

Around the 4 June Event in 1989, Zhang Wannian was admitted to the main hospital of the Guangzhou Military Region for high blood pressure. Zhang is a calm and level-headed person. Officers and soldiers of the Guangzhou and Jinan Military Region all support him. This is also a favorable factor for him to be promoted to chief of General Staff.

Zhang Wannian's wife is from a military family. She is now retired. They have two daughters, both working. One of them is employed at Sanyu Hotel in Guangzhou City.

In September 1988, after the military of the CPC adopted for the second time the system of military ranks, Zhang Wannian was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general. In May 1990, he was transferred to serve as commander of the Jinan Military Region.

Zhang Wannian was a delegate to the Ninth National Party Congress and an alternate member of the 12th and 13th CPC Central Committees. In October 1992, he was elected a member of the 14th CPC Central Committee at the 14th National Party Congress. He was elected to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at the First Plenary Session of the 14th National Party Congress. In early November 1992, he was officially appointed as the chief of General Staff of the PLA.

Li Jing: From Naval Aviator to Deputy COGS

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[Article: "Deputy Chief of the General Staff Li Jing"]

[Text] Vice Admiral Li Jing Was Promoted Twice in Two Months

In October 1992, Vice Admiral Li Jing (2621 2529) was elected member of the CPC Central Committee at the 14th CPC Congress.

In November 1992, Li Jing was appointed deputy chief of the General Staff [COGS] of the People's Liberation Army [PLA]. Before that, Li Jing, 62 years old, was deputy commander of the Navy, and was given the rank of vice admiral in 1988.

Joined the PLA in Shandong in 1946, Enrolled in the Air Force Academy in 1950

In 1930, Li Jing was born in Tengxian, Shandong Province.

In 1946, when the KMT forces were launching a large offensive against the CPC-occupied areas in Shandong, Li Jing joined the PLA; he joined the CPC in 1949. After serving in the army for four years, in the early 1950s, Li Jing, as one of a select group, enrolled in the Chinese Air Force Academy in the northeast to learn how to fly aircraft. He flew the L-9, L-11, Mig-15, J-5, J-6, and other fighter planes. In 1952, Li Jing graduated with high marks, thereby becoming one of the PRC's early fighter pilots.

Familiar With Coordinated Sea-Air Operations, Has Comprehensive Battle Experience

Li Jing worked for five years in China's air force, serving for a time as commander of an aviation group. He was later transferred to the Navy, and worked first in the Naval Aviation Corps. He was successively deputy group commander, group commander, air battle director, regiment commander, deputy division commander, division commander in the Naval Aviation Corps, and deputy chief of staff of the Navy.

Li Jing made outstanding contributions to the development of the PRC's Naval Aviation Corps. He was promoted to the position of deputy chief of staff of the Navy in 1973. Nine years later, in 1982, he was promoted to the position of deputy commander of the Naval Aviation Corps. Following that, he was promoted to the position of deputy commander of the Navy in August 1983, while holding the concurrent position of commander of the Naval Aviation Corps. Only in 1990, was he relieved of his post as commander of the Naval Aviation Corps. Li Jing's being promoted twice in 1992 shows that the CPC was giving great emphasis to modernized warfare and navy and air force affairs, and that China was placing great emphasis on future air force development.

Li Jing is an experienced military leader with seniority as well as competence in aviation and battle directing techniques. In addition, it is also worth mentioning that he was once commander of the Naval Aviation Corps division stationed in Shanhaiguan (Shanhaiguan, like Beidaihe, is also under the jurisdiction of Qinhuangdao City, and is a place of strategic importance, controlling the passageway to the Northeast) which was responsible for the security of the CPC Central Committee. In March 1979, after the Sino-Vietnamese border war broke out, Li Jing became commander of an aviation division of the South Sea Aviation Corps. That unit did a good job of cooperating with those engaged in operations in battlefields on land and with Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807] and Zhang Wannian [1728 8001 1628] in their southward operations.

Endeavored To Develop Aircraft Carrier, Formulate Blue-Water Strategy

After becoming deputy commander of the Navy, Li Jing repeatedly emphasized the importance of the Air Force. In 1987, he delivered a speech entitled "There Will Be No Sea Domination Without Air Domination" in which he systematically expounded the important role that the Air Force now plays in sea warfare. He said: "How effectively the naval aviation force plays its role in battle not only influences how effectively the Navy can make use of its overall combat capability, but can sometimes even determine who will win an entire sea battle." As the CPC is now very interested in developing an aircraft carrier and a blue-water strategies, Li Jing has joined the General Staff and will cooperate with Liu Huaqing [0491 5478 3237] and Zhang Wannian in planning the enhancement of military forces in the future. It can thus be predicted that the PRC's navy and air force will undergo substantial development.

Large-Scale Military Reorganization, Restoration of System of Assistants to COGS

Besides Vice Admiral Li Jing, another new deputy COGS appointed by the Military Commission after the 14th CPC Congress is Major General Cao Gangchuan [2580 0474 1557]. Cao Gangchuan worked at the General Staff headquarters for a long time. In the mid-1980s, he was deputy director of the Equipment Department of the General Staff when He Pengfei was director. He then became director of the Military Management Department on 15 August 1990. The Military Management Department is in charge of administrative work for the entire PLA, and is one of the General Staff departments with the largest real power. Its responsibilities include: overall PLA organizational planning as well as the establishment, disbanding, or adjustment of all units in the PLA; working out plans on war-time expansion and reinforcement of the entire PLA; handling the transfer and retirement of servicemen; routine administrative work; compiling statistics on military strength; together with the Equipment Department, working out support guarantee plans on weapons and equipments, ascertaining the munition and equipment availability and consumption targets, and organizing wartime requisitioning work. In the absence of an Equipment Department, the Military Management Department is also in charge of equipment work.

The General Staff has restored the system of "assistants to the COGS," which was abolished eight years ago. When Deng Xiaoping was chairman of the Military Commission and chief of the General Staff, General Xu Xin [1776 0207] and Lieutenant General Han Huaizhi [7281 2037 2535] were assistants to the COGS; later, they were both promoted to the position of deputy COGS.

The newly appointed assistants to the COGS include: Wu Quanxu, Kui Fulin, and Xiong Guangkai.

Wu Quanxu, now 55 years old, became commander of the First Army Group under the Nanjing Military Region on 23 November 1991. Fu Quanyou [0265 0356 2589], currently director of the General Logistics Department, was once commander of the First Army.

Kui Fulin became director of the Operation Department of the General Staff on 19 January 1985, and assumed the concurrent position of director of the general office of the National Air Defense Commission on 15 July 1990. The Operation Department of the General Staff is an important department of the General Staff, and is responsible for making operational battle plans. Zhang Zhen [1729 7201], vice chairman of the Military Commission, once assumed this important position in the early 1950s.

Xiong Guangkai is a CPC expert on military intelligence and international security affairs, and has long been director of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff. He was elected alternate member of the Central Committee at the 14th CPC Congress.

Fu Quanyou: From Shanxi Army to Head of Logistics

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CHUN-FANG CHIANG-LING [CPC MILITARY
LEADERS] in Chinese Vol 4, Apr 93 pp 49-55

[Article: "General Logistics Department Director Fu Quanyou"]

[Text] Ninth Director of General Logistics Department After Establishment of the Chinese Communist State

After the 14th National CPC Congress, leaders of the PLA General Staff Headquarters, the two PLA general departments and various major military districts have greatly changed, and 62-year old Fu Quanyou has been appointed director of the PLA General Logistics Department [GLD].

Since the founding of the Chinese Communist state, those who assumed the directorship of the GLD were Yang Lisan (June 1949 to October 1952), Huang Kecheng (October 1952 to December 1956), Hong Xuezhi (December 1956 to October 1959), Qiu Huizuo (October 1959 to September 1971), Chang Zongxun (Jun 1973 to February 1978), Chang Zhen (February 1978 to January 1980), Hong Xuezhi (January 1980 to November 1987) and Zhao Nanqi (November 1987 to October 1992). Those who assumed the post of General Logistics Department Political Commissar were Huang Kecheng (who held this post concurrently from October 1954 to December 1956), Yu Qiuli (November 1957 to March 1958), Li Jukui (March 1958 to July 1967), Chang Chiming (July 1967 to August 1975), Guo Linxiang (August 1973 to August 1975), Wang Ping (December 1977 to March 1985), Hong Xuezhi (concurrent, March 1985 to January 1987), Liu Anyuan (November 1987 to April 1990) and Zhou Keyu (May 1990 to present).

Fu Quanyou Joined the PLA at Sixteen Years of Age

Fu Quanyou was born into a peasant family in 1930 in Guoxian County (name changed to Yuanping County in 1958) in Shanxi Province. He was a fellow villager of Zhao Erlu, who earned the rank of full general in 1955. During the War of Resistance against Japan, Guoxian County was placed under the command of the Third Military Sub-Command of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region, where the 358th Brigade of the 120th Division and other units of the Eighth Route Army carried out their activities.

After the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the Chinese Communists established the Shanxi-Suiyuan Field Army (Commander He Long who also held the post of political commissar concurrently, Deputy Commander Chang Zongxun, Deputy Political Commissar Li Jinquan, Chief of General Staff Chang Jingwu and Political Department Director Sun Zhiyuan), consisting of the 358th Brigade and the First, Second and Third Independent Brigades.

Awarded Merit of First Class in Yanchuan-Qingjian Campaign

After the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists broke out, Fu Quanyou joined the Shanxi-Suiyuan Field Army as a soldier in the Second Independent Brigade (Brigade Commander Xu Guangda and Political Commissar Sun Zhiyuan) in October 1946. In November 1946, the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee decided to abolish the official designation of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Field Army. The No 2 Independent Brigade was incorporated into the Third Column of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region (Commander Xu Guangda and Political Commissar Sun Zhiyuan). The commander of the Second Independent Brigade was Tang Jinlong and its political commissar was Luo Zhimin. In August 1947, the Third Column of the Shanxi-Suiyuan Military Region was placed under the command of the PLA Northwest Field Army (Commander Peng Dehuai who also held the post of political commissar concurrently, Deputy Commander Chang Zongxun, Deputy Political Commissar Xi Zhongxun, Chief of General Staff Chang Wenzhou and Political Department Director Xu Liqing). In August 1947, Fu Quanyou joined the Chinese Communist Party. Between 1 and 11 October 1947, the Northwest Army's Third Column with its training brigade captured Yanchuan and Yanchang. The First Column and Third Column then captured Qingjian and wiped out a total of 8,080 men of the Kuomintang's 76th Reorganized Division Headquarters and the 24th Brigade. They also captured Lt. Gen. Liao Ang, Commander of the Kuomintang 76th Division. In this Yanchuan-Qingjian Campaign, Fu Quanyou won a Merit of First Class. During that year, he served as a squad and platoon leader.

Under Peng Dehuai's Leadership, Participated in Yichuan, Lanzhou and Other Campaigns

In February 1948, Fu Quanyou, who was serving in the Second Independent Brigade, participated in the Yichuan Campaign in which the headquarters of the Kuomintang's Reorganized 29th Army, 27th Division and 90th Division and the headquarters of the 24th Division, 47th Division, 53rd Division, 61st Division and 31st Division and another regiment were destroyed and a total of 29,480 men were captured. A Kuomintang army commander Lt. Gen. Liu Kan was killed, while the Chinese Communist army only suffered 5,252 casualties. The Yichuan Campaign was a resounding victory for the Northwest Field Army since it launched its strategic offense. In February 1949, the Northwest Field Army was renamed the PLA First Field Army (Commander Peng Dehuai who also held the post of political commissar concurrently, Deputy Commanders Chang Zongxun and Zhao Shoushan, Chief of General Staff Yan Kuiyao, and Political Department Director Gan Siqi). The former Third Column was renamed the Third Corps (Corps Commander Xu Guangda, Political Commissar Sun Zhiyuan and Chief of General Staff Li Wenqing). The former Second Independent Brigade was renamed the 7th Division (Division Commander Tang Jinlong and Political Commissar Liang Renjie). At that time, Fu Quanyou was a deputy battalion commander in the 21st Regiment of the 7th Division of the First Field Army. Later, he participated in various well-known campaigns including the Fumei Campaign (July 1949) which liberated the great Northwestern region, the Lanzhou Campaign (August 1949) and the Hexi Corridor Battle of Pursuing and Annihilating the enemy (September 1949).

In June 1949, the First Field Army had officially established the First and Second Army Groups. Xu Guangda was promoted from the Third Corps Commander to the commander of the Second Army Group. Huang Xinting succeeded Xu to become the commander of the Third Corps, while the Corps' Political Commissar Zhu Ming, Deputy Commander Tang Jinlong and Chief of General Staff Li Wenqing remained on their posts in the corps. In the 7th Division of the Third Corps where Fu Quanyou served, Tang Jinlong held the post concurrently as the division commander. Soon after that Chang Kaiji replaced Tang as the division commander, while Liang Renjie still held the post as the divisional political commissar.

Stayed in the Army in Gansu's Hexi Corridor for Four Years

After the establishment of Communist China, Fu Quanyou served as company commander and then battalion staff chief of the Third Corps stationed in the Changye District in Gansu's Hexi Corridor. In June 1952, the Third Corps was merged into the First Corps, consisting of the First, Second and Seventh Divisions. The official designation of the Third Corps was canceled.

Participated in the Korean War

In early February 1953, Fu Quanyou participated in the Korean War, serving as the battalion chief of staff of the 21st Regiment of the 7th Division (Division Commander Wu Zijie and Political Commissar Dai Jinchuan) of the First Corps of the PLA Volunteer Force (Commander Huang Xinting, Deputy Commander Xu Guoxian, Chief of General Staff Yang Wenan and Political Department Director Wu Rongfeng). He plunged into preparations against enemy landing operations in Spring 1953 and the summer offensive campaign. He served as a battalion commander of the 21st Regiment and as deputy commander and commander of the Training Battalion of the 7th Division. After the Korea War ended, he remained stationed in North Korea with the Army until 1958.

Studied in Military Academy of Higher Learning

In October 1958, Fu Quanyou withdrew back to China along with the volunteer force's headquarters. After that he enrolled in the PLA Military Academy of Higher Learning for further studies.

After graduated from the military academy, he served as a regiment chief of general staff, deputy regiment commander, deputy and chief of staff at the divisional level, deputy division commander, division commander, army corps deputy chief of staff, army corps chief of staff and army corps commander.

Army Corps Commander in 1985

In June 1985, Fu Quanyou became the commander of the Chengdu Military District. In September 1985, he was elected additional member of the 12th CPC Central Committee at the National Party Congress. In November 1987, he was selected member of the 13th CPC Central Committee. The Chinese Communists restored the system of military ranks in September 1988. Fu Quanyou earned the rank of Lieutenant General (he earned the rank of captain in the 1950's). In May 1990, he was transferred to commander of the Lanzhou Military District.

Serves as Central Military Commission Member After 14th CPC Congress

At the 14th National CPC Congress held in October 1992, Fu Quanyou was elected member of the 14th CPC Central Committee. At the First Plenary Session of the 14th National CPC Congress, he was appointed member of the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. Soon after that he was appointed director of the PLA General Logistics Department.

The General Logistics Department is an organization of the Central Military Commission that handles logistics affairs. The Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee leads the logistics work of the whole army through the GLD. With the approval of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee on 11 October 1954, the

"General Logistics Department of the People's Military and Revolutionary Committee of the Central People's Government" was renamed the "General Rear-Services Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army." In April 1960, it was once again renamed the General Logistics Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, which it remains to date.

Zhu Dunfa's Path to NDU Commandant Traced

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[Article: "National Defense University Commandant Zhu Dunfa"]

[Text] Zhu Dunfa Takes Over as National Defense University Commandant

In October 1992, at the First Plenary Session of the 14th CPC Central Committee, 78-year-old Zhang Zhen [1728 7201] was elected as a vice chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission [CMC], with his key post as commandant of the PLA's National Defense University [NDU] being taken over by Lieutenant General Zhu Dunfa [2612 2415 3127], former commander of the Guangzhou Military Region.

Zhu Dunfa Joined the Eighth Route Army at Age 12

Zhu Dunfa, now 65 years old, was born in 1927 in northwestern Jiangsu's Peixian County. The CPC began to conduct underground revolutionary activities in Peixian in 1928, in which year CPC member Meng Zhaopei [1322 2507 0160] set up the first party branch in Peixian. After the "7 July 1937 Lugouqiao Incident," CPC member Zhang Guangzhong [1728 0342 0022] resumed the establishment of the Peixian Party Committee. In 1938 Zhang Guangzhong organized the Hu-Xi Anti-Japanese Armed Force, and in 1939 the Jiangsu-Shandong-Henan Detachment of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, commanded by Peng Mingzhi [1756 2494 3112] and Wu Faxian [0702 3127 2009], pushed forward into this area, joining up with the Hu-Xi Anti-Japanese Armed Force to establish the Hu(Weishan Lake)-Xi Anti-Japanese Base Area centered in Fengxian and Peixian counties. It was in 1939 that Zhu Dunfa joined the Eighth Route Army at the age of only 12.

After October 1942, the Hu-Xi Military Subdistrict was incorporated into the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District, becoming the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Sixth Military Subdistrict (later renamed the 11th Military Subdistrict), and in 1945 Zhu Dunfa joined the CPC.

Zhu Dunfa Repeatedly Won High PLA Honors

After the Japanese surrender, the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military District troops were reorganized into the First Brigade of the First Column of the

Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army, commanded by Liu Bocheng [0491 0130 2110] and Deng Xiaoping, and in 1947 Zhu Dunfa became a deputy reconnaissance company commander in the First Brigade. He won high honors in the Northern Henan Campaign, winning the title of Class 3 Combat Hero in the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army. In the winter of 1948, in the Huaihai Campaign, Zhu Dunfa won high honors again as a deputy reconnaissance company commander in the First Brigade of the First Column of the Central Plains Field Army, being promoted to deputy battalion commander. In February 1949 the Central Plains Field Army was renamed the Second Field Army, in which Zhu Dunfa served as detachment and battalion commander of the Fifth Corps, 16th Army, 46th Division, Reconnaissance Detachment. During the revolutionary war, he took part in battles such as the Handan, Longhai, Northern Henan, Southwestern Shandong, Eastern Anhui, Huaihai, Dadu River Crossing, and Southwestern campaigns, as well as driving forward in the Dabie Mountain Battle.

Zhu Dunfa Fought in Korea with the 16th Army

After liberation, Zhu Dunfa served as reconnaissance unit commander of the 46th Division of the 16th Army, and 37th Regiment deputy commander and chief of staff in that division. The 16th Army's predecessor was the 28th Regiment of the Red Army's Fourth Army, set up by Zhu De and Mao Zedong during the Jinggangshan period, with the 28th Regiment's earliest base having been the independent regiment of Ye Ting [0673 2185], established in the Fall of 1925 in Guangdong; this was the CPC's first armed force. During the four years of the War of Liberation, the 16th Army fought successively in north, central, east, south-central, and southwest China, at which time it was the Second Field Army's main force, commanded in succession by the famous generals Yang Dezhi [2799 1779 1807] and Yang Yong [1799 0516]. From January to July 1953, the 16th Army fought in Korea, where its commander was Yin Xianbing [1438 0341 3521], its political commissar was Chen Kaiyun [7115 7030 0061], and its deputy commander was Yang Junsheng [2799 0193 3932]. Zhu Dunfa served as the 16th Army, 46th Division, 136th Regiment commander, later becoming the 46th Division acting chief of staff, and winning Korea's Class 2 Freedom and Independence Medal.

After the Korean ceasefire, the 16th Army was stationed in Korea for more than three years. After the first military-rank system was instituted, Zhu Dunfa was made a lieutenant colonel and was awarded the Independence-and-Freedom and Class-3-Liberation medals. In April 1958, he left Korea with the withdrawal of the army back to China, and was selected and sent to the Nanjing Military Academy for advanced studies.

In 1960, after Zhu Dunfa graduated from the Nanjing Military Academy's Combined Arms Command Department, he was made the deputy commander of the 46th

Division of the 16th Army of the Shenyang Military Region. In 1963, he was promoted to full colonel.

From 40th Army Commander to Guangzhou Military Region Commander

In the 1970s, Zhu Dunfa served successively as 46th Division commander and then chief of staff and deputy commander of the 16th Army. In the 1980s, he was promoted to Shenyang Military Region 40th Army commander.

After June 1985, he served successively as Shenyang Military Region deputy commander and first deputy commander. In September 1988, when the PLA resumed its military-rank system, he was made a lieutenant general. In May 1990 he was promoted to Guangzhou Military Region commander, serving concurrently as Guangzhou Military Region Party Committee deputy secretary and Civil Air Defense Commission director, and replacing Zhang Wannian [1728 8001 1628] who was transferred to Jinan Military Region commander.

Beginning in 1983, Zhu Dunfa was successively elected as delegate to the Sixth and Seventh NPCs.

At the 14th CPC Congress in October 1992, Zhu Dunfa was made a Central Committee member, as well as National Defense University commandant.

Li Wenqing Is NDU Commissar; Rejoins Zhu Dunfa

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[Article: "National Defense University Political Commissar Li Wenqing"]

[Text] National Defense University: The Supreme School for Training Senior Military Command Talent

In the reorganization of the PLA leadership at the end of 1992, Zhu Dunfa was made the new National Defense University commandant, and Li Wenqing [2621 2429 0615] was made its political commissar.

The National Defense University [NDU] was officially established on 24 December 1985. This senior military academy, composed through a merger of the three large military affairs, politics, and logistics universities, can be traced back to the wartime Red Army University and Anti-Japanese Army Political University that was so well-known both in China and abroad.

In the more than seven years since the NDU was organized to train senior PLA command talent, 37 lieutenant generals, 518 major generals, and up to a thousand senior colonels and field-grade officers have studied there, including newly appointed Central Military Commission [CMC] member and PLA General Logistics Department [GLD] Director Fu Quanyou

[0265 0356 2589], as well as most high-ranking military leaders above the level of army commander in all groups.

The NDU Has Accomplished Six Major Tasks in the Last Seven Years

On 2 December 1992, in a work report to the CMC, Li Wenqing pointed out that the NDU has accomplished six major tasks:

It has accomplished the basic mission of developing talent and resourcefulness assigned to it by the CMC. The NDU has graduated nearly 3,000 students in the last seven years, training a large group of command officers, senior staff officers, and military theory researchers above the level of army commander, throughout the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As the "braintrust" for military commissions and the three general commands, the NDU has also conducted studies in the fields of tactics and national defense modernization, supplying the leadership with up to a thousand valuable advisory reports. In addition, it has published 326 monographs, completed over 3,000 research papers, and won national and military awards for 65 scientific research achievements.

It has unified its educational guiding ideology, by setting up a new teaching materials system. While the whole senior military training mission used to be undertaken by the three academies of military affairs, politics, and logistics, the NDU set forth after its establishment a guiding ideology of "fully implementing State Council and CMC Document No. 139 (1985) on training politically-correct senior military talent suited to national defense modernization and future warfare, by adhering to the cultivation of versatility, sticking to teaching substance that is high-tech, innovative, broad-based, and deep-level, persisting mostly in self-study, and practicing research- and enlightenment-oriented teaching methods," in order to unify its teaching and administrative staff ideology. In the last 7 years, the university has compiled over 140 types of teaching materials in 13 primary disciplines and 450 types in secondary disciplines, developing a discipline-coordinated teaching-material system.

It has selected leading academics to set up a high-level teaching and research corps. Based on requirements set forth by Zhang Zhen (the former NDU commandant) on "knowledge being broad and profound, specialties being comprehensive, study cycles being short, and teaching methods being flexible," it has gradually equipped the whole university's 19 departments, academies, and teaching and research sections with a professional leading group. At the same time, it has adopted diverse forms to strengthen its teaching and research ranks. On the one hand, it has sent them to regional universities or overseas to advanced studies and academic research concerns. On the other hand, it has set up three-phase teacher-qualification classes, first selecting military technical-academy graduates with undergraduate training,

then giving them three years of study at primary, mid-level, and senior command academies, and finally putting them in teaching posts after six months of acting military service, having now acquired 210 young instructors in this way. In its current teaching and research ranks, 94.6 percent have graduate training, 56.4 percent are under 45 years of age, and of its 454 in professional technical posts, 182 are associate professors and 200 are lecturers.

It has emphasized reform of teaching methods and educational content. It first paid attention to developing and using modern teaching means by developing a computer-assisted combat-simulation training system, being the first in the whole PLA to employ a contract-combination battle-simulation system. In teaching practice, it has set up on-site teaching sites from Jinggang Mountain and Yanan to the sites of the "three major campaigns" (Liaoxi-Shenyang, Ping-Jin, and Huaihai). It uses an open school system, having received 2,108 visits from 64 countries, invited overseas and foreign military leaders and famous expert scholars to nearly 200 lectures and forums, and sent 137 people to 13 countries for observation and exchange. Its teaching content reform can be seen in: High—giving priority to battles in studying tactics, by setting high minimum courses; New—studying new countermeasures for the general trends in the world tactical order and the most recent military developments, by enriching the curriculum steadily; Broad—providing all-round knowledge in overall leadership of military affairs, politics, and logistics; Deep—digging deeply into priority courses and key research topics.

It has done a good job of educational research and providing material guarantees. It has invested 9 million RMB to build an electronic simulated-battle building and has installed electronic teaching facilities worth over 10 million yuan. Its campus library has systems such as a computerized book data bank, audio-video data reception, and microfilm reading. It has built two new dormitories for senior instructors. It has renovated its cultural activities center and is building a new history building.

Focused on devotion to the national defense education cause, it has emphasized political and ideological indoctrination. Its teaching and research ranks have been quite stable in recent years, much of them having been the cream of the military crop selected for reassignment to the university. While certain comrades-in-arms or subordinates in rank have long since surpassed them, they still value their pupils throughout the military camps working in the cause of national defense education.

NDU's Three Senior Leadership Training Departments

The NDU's National Defense Studies Department takes commanding officers above the regular military appointment level for 100-day training each semester; its Advanced Studies Department takes commanding officers above the deputy military appointment level for

about six-month semesters; and its Fundamentals Department takes division (brigade) officers for training in military command for a period of one year. As these three key departments train senior leaders, NDU has decisive standing and plays a decisive role in the PLA. General Zhang Zhen, now CMC vice chairman, was NDU's first commandant and its second concurrent commandant and political commissar. Former Central Advisory Commission Standing Committee member Li Desheng [2621 1795 3932] was its first political commissar. The two lieutenant generals who have succeeded General Zhang Zhen as commandant and political commissar are naturally the focus of attention.

Before being reassigned as NDU commandant, Zhu Dunfa was the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, having accompanied Deng Xiaoping on inspections of places such as Shenzhen. When Liu Huaqing introduced Zhu Dunfa to Deng Xiaoping, saying that he had been a company commander in the Huaihai Campaign, Deng Xiaoping laughed and said: "He must've just been a child at that time."

Li Wenqing Joined the War of Resistance Against Japan at the Age of 15

The NDU's new political commissar, Liu Wenqing, admits that he never went to military school; so he is a "layman."

Li Wenqing was born in 1930 in Mouping County, Shandong. In the latter part of the War of Resistance Against Japan, in his birthplace on the Jiaodong Peninsula, he joined the local War of Resistance against Japan at the age of only 15, serving as a secretary in the Youth Save-The-Nation Society in the Leqian County district. After the Japanese surrender, most of the key forces in the Jiaodong Military District went to the Northeast with high-ranking military officers, such as Luo Ronghuan [5012 2837 2719], Xiao Hua [5618 5478] and Wu Kehua [0702 0344 5478], with the generals left behind for garrison duty, such as Xu Shiyu [6079 0013 0645] and Nie Fengzhi [5119 7685 2535], later reorganizing the Jiaodong Military District's key forces into the 5th and 6th divisions.

Li Wenqing Took Part in the Huaihai and Dadu River Crossing Campaigns in East China

After the KMT-CPC civil war broke out again, Li Wenqing joined the CPC in 1947. In 1948, at the age of 18, Li Wenqing joined the PLA in East China, passing the test of battles such as the Huaihai and the Dadu River Crossing.

From Military Region to the National Defense University

After the founding of the PRC, Li Wenqing was promoted from platoon leader, company political instructor, and Nanjing Military Region [MR] Political Department assistant to Nanjing MR Headquarters Office deputy director. He worked at the time with

General Xu Shiyu, later serving as Nanjing MR division and army political commissar. In June 1985, he was promoted to Shenyang MR Political Department director. In 1988 he was promoted to Shenyang MR-region deputy political commissar and, after the PLA resumed a military-rank system in September 1988, he was made a lieutenant general along with Zhu Dunfa. The two served together in the Shenyang MR for 5 years, and in April 1990, when Li Wenqing was assigned as NDU deputy political commissar, Zhu Dunfa was promoted to commander of the Guangzhou MR, and the two are now working together once again.

Li Wenqing was elected beginning in 1983 as a delegate to the Sixth and Seventh NPCs. In October 1990 at the 14th CPC Congress, he was elected a member of the 14th CPC Central Committee.

Li Wenqing Has Made Five Breakthroughs Suited to Modern Combat

How to adapt to the evolution in the current world battle order and modern warfare is a key mission of the NDU. Zhu Dunfa and Li Wenqing hold that based on Deng Xiaoping's southern-tour speeches and General Zhang Zhen's requirements, new "breakthroughs" must be made in the following five areas: 1) As the U.S.-Soviet confrontation is over, breakthroughs need to be made in studying countermeasures in areas such as tactical thinking, tactical theory, and political, economic, and military affairs; 2) as high-tech operations have brought a qualitative change to combat style, new breakthroughs need to be made in combat style, method, and command under modern warfare conditions; 3) due to high-tech information developments, new breakthroughs need to be made in reforming teaching means; 4) in light of the need for teaching substance to be high-tech, innovative, broad-based, and deep-level, new breakthroughs need to be made in establishing a teaching-materials system with distinct Marxist-Leninist and Mao Zedong Thought characteristics; 5) in light of the many new issues encountered in new-age military establishments, and the fact that military education and training is developing faster, new breakthroughs need to be made in bringing the guiding role of academic research into full play in the military establishment.

Liu Shaoqi's Son Liu Yuan Now PAP Major General

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[Article: "People's Armed Police Major General Liu Yuan"]

[Text] In August 1992, Liu Yuan [0491 3293] was appointed as the second political commissar of the Hydropower Unit Command of the PRC People's Armed Police [PAP], and was awarded the rank of major general.

From Provincial Vice Governor to PAP Major General

Despite the major-general's stars that he wears on his shoulders, who would have guessed that PAP Hydropower Unit military historians would declare that "Liu Yuan joined the service ranks from the official stratum."

The PAP Hydropower Unit, along with the Transportation Unit and the Gold Unit, are called the PAP's three units directly engaged in economic construction, being the successors to the PLA's Capital Construction Project Corps, with the Hydropower Unit's work being the hardest.

Three Administrative Experiences

Since his appointment in the Fall of 1992, Liu Yuan spent plenty of time at military construction sites in all areas throughout China. In reference to his departure from Henan (as vice governor) in August 1992, Liu Yuan says that: "After I received my transfer orders, I went to call on the folks in Xinxiang County where I had worked first after graduating from college. On my departure, the village elders and folks all came out to see me off, with no need to mention the state we mourned ourselves into. Oh, the unforgettable emotions of those central plains elders!"

Liu Yuan had served as Xinxiang County magistrate, Zhengzhou mayor, and Henan vice governor. In recalling his local administrative experiences, Liu Yuan says that: "We must 'be considerate of' cadres who act in the objective interests of the people, remain uncorrupted, and reform wholeheartedly."

Liu Yuan explains that: "The people do not want cadres who will not act in their objective interests. In the time of Chu Yuan-chang (first emperor of the Ming Dynasty), corrupt officials were skinned alive, with their stripped off skin being hung on the wall as a warning to their successors. This was the case not only in feudal times, as it goes without saying that Communist cadres had to be honest too. As to cadres who dare to reform, as long as they do not 'take the wrong road, fill their pockets wrongly, or take to the wrong beds'; i.e., do not oppose the party, act unscientifically, or violate objective laws, line their pockets with people's money, or engage in illicit sexual relationships, they can act boldly. While reform required exploration, which sometimes led to mistakes requiring criticism of teaching, it was necessary to enthusiastically help, care for, and protect the people."

Holding Out a Little Sunshine

In reference to the PAP Hydropower Unit, Liu Yuan says that: "This is a unit that contributes quietly to the nation and holds out with both hands a little sunshine to the people."

Liu Yuan says that: "One day in the early 1930s, Mao Zedong said, while looking at the rolling Gan Jiang

(Jiangxi River), that once the revolution was successful he wanted to present the people of Jinggang Mountain with a little sunshine'; i.e., a hydropower station. Through eight years of difficult construction by the Hydropower Unit, the 400,000-kw Wan'an Hydropower Station now stretches across the Gan Jiang mainstream in Jiangxi Province, with its four generating units having gone into full operation in 1992. We have fulfilled the promise of the older generation."

In early 1993, on his return from the worksite of the over 4,400-m high Xizang (Tibet) Yangzhuoyong Lake Power Station, Liu Yuan said that: "The Yang Lake Power Station's natural and geological conditions are amazingly awful, with its warriors' spirit of endurance moving me deeply. We had to dig a 7,500-m long water-diversion tunnel where in the winter the oxygen deficiency was 50 percent outside but 60 percent inside the tunnel. The medical experts estimate that a soldier laying inside the tunnel without moving works as hard as one carrying a full gunnysack in Shanghai. So the soldiers are working under difficult conditions of uneven heartbeats, headaches, ears ringing, and crushed fingernails. The Yang Lake Power Station will be a gift from the Central Committee to the people of Tibet."

I Will Send My Son To Experience the Hardships of Service, as a Person Needs To Acquire a Spirit of Dedication and Self-Sacrifice

The two-stage Tiansheng Bridge Hydropower Station that began to generate electricity at the end of 1992 is located on the Nanpan Jiang on the border of Guizhou and Guangxi. When speaking of the building of this large hydropower project with a capacity of 1.32 million kw and of the 110 soldiers who dedicated their lives to digging its 30-km long water-diversion tunnel in an exceptionally complex geological zone, Liu Yuan says that: "Being a soldier means devotion and self-sacrifice. I am going to send my son to experience the hardships of such service, as a person needs to acquire a spirit of dedication and self-sacrifice."

Liu Shaoqi's first wife, He Baozhen [0149 1405 3791], was executed by the KMT in 1932 at Nanjing's Yuhua-tai, with two successive wives, Xie Fei [6200 7378] and Wang Qian [3769 0467], both unfortunately passing away. In 1948, Liu Shaoqi married Wang Guangmei [3769 0342 5019], who bore him three daughters and a son, the three daughters being Liu Pingping [0491 1627 1627], Liu Tingting [0491 0080 0080], and Liu Xiaoxiao [0491 3469 3469], and the son being former Henan vice governor and currently PAP Hydropower Unit political commissar Liu Yuan.

A Key Step Toward the Power Center

Liu Yuan was born in 1951 in Ningxiang County, Hunan. He joined the CPC in 1982, the same year in which he graduated from the History Department of Beijing Teachers College.

In light of his only 11 years of party membership, his surmounting of a hundred battles and going through fire and water to enter the annals as a general, become PAP Hydropower Unit political commissar, show his talent in a military generalship system that has emphasized seniority, become a major general in one step, and become a public relations leader, must be said to make him an oddity in PRC PAP history. However, in light of his bumpy training, illustrious lot, and post-administrative public praise and official career achievements, Liu Yuan's promotion can also be said to be a bold move by the PRC in elevating a young person to high office.

Liu Yuan was a very bright and sensible youth.

Liu Shaoqi brought up his son very strictly. Once during Liu Yuan's youth when his school cafeteria served steamed date bread, he dug out and ate the dates but threw the bread on the floor. The teacher recorded this incident in his "family contact book," which when seen by Liu Shaoqi, resulted in him calling his son for a strict dressing down, including writing on the spot in his "family contact book" that "he must be made to share the hardships and difficulties of the working people without privileges." Liu Yuan still remembers white-haired Liu Shaoqi's stern expression as he wrote this line with a writing brush stroke by stroke, having learned from his father's conscientious act Liu Shaoqi's hopes and aspirations for his son.

So Liu Yuan returned to school and took the initiative to admit his mistake by picking up the now dried-up bread that he had thrown in the corner, brushing off the dirt, and bravely eating it down.

In the early 1960s, during the three-year famine due to crop failure, Liu Yuan and his sisters wanted to return to Zhongnanhai for lunch due to the poor school cafeteria food, which Liu Shaoqi put a stop to immediately, telling Wang Guangmei that: "We are responsible for the people not having enough to eat. If we make our children experience this too, they will have better absorbed this lesson by the time they go to work for the people, so they will not let the people go hungry again."

Liu Yuan Gets Paddled

The tale of "Liu Yuan getting paddled" still circulates in Zhongnanhai. Once as a child Liu Yuan snuck off to the Huairan Hall to see a performance. On his return, Liu Shaoqi was so mad at him that he turned him over a eucalyptus bench and paddled him severely until he cried, showing what strict demands Liu Shaoqi made on his children. An eyewitness of that event in Zhongnanhai says that without Liu Shaoqi's "paddling" of his son that day, we would not have had today's "Political Commissar Liu."

The data that has been released shows that the death of Liu Yuan's father, former CPC Chairman and PRC Vice President Liu Shaoqi, was exceptionally tragic. In September 1967, Liu Shaoqi was thrown into prison where

he was subjected to inhuman "treatment," leaving him severely ill after two years. In October 1969, a hardly-breathing Liu Shaoqi was forced out of Beijing, being flown in a military aircraft to "isolation" in Kaifeng, Henan. On his departure from Beijing, Liu Shaoqi's naked body wrapped in a blanket was carried onto the airplane. A month later on 12 November 1969, Liu Shaoqi died in Kaifeng, just 12 days short of his 71st birthday.

Hiding Out and Extreme Suffering During the Cultural Revolution

On 5 August 1969, Liu Shaoqi's family was criticized and denounced in their Zhongnanhai courtyard. Not long afterwards, Liu Yuan was returned to his school, where he was investigated and criticized. He, along with the sons of others, such as Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, and Yang Shangkun, became the "sons of female dogs" about whom everyone was shouting: "Down with them."

During the cultural revolution, Liu Yuan had to run for his life to keep from being arrested and beaten up. For a time, he even sold his blood to keep body and soul together. During the darkest days, it is said that many of Liu Shaoqi's former colleagues and subordinates did everything they could to shield him and provide material assistance, which was all that kept him alive as the sole male offspring of the Liu family. Once when he was about to give up all hope, an elderly Red Army warrior dressed him down, saying that: "If you want to be Shaoqi's son, you are going to have to tenaciously live on!" The elder generation's glare finally kept him from committing suicide.

After Liu Shaoqi's name was exonerated, Liu Yuan got into college through determined self-study, and after graduation asked to be sent to the place where his father had worked and finally died—Henan Province.

Being Chosen Vice Governor of Henan

The great bend of the tempestuous Huang He (Yellow River) in the Henan region was subject to flooding, bringing utter desolation and starvation. This province with a population of nearly 90 million was an infamous Chinese poverty area.

When Liu Yuan was first sent to Henan, he did not stay in the cities, but went straight down to the rural areas to start with the most basic-level work. Due to his diligence, conscientious service, and good judgement, he was made successively Xinxiang County deputy commune chairman, township chief, and county deputy magistrate and magistrate. Wherever he served, he achieved splendid results and won high public praise. He was later promoted to the Henan provincial capital to serve as Zhengzhou deputy mayor.

During his tenure in Zhengzhou, he was bold and resolute in rooting out corruption, with his new enlightened policies winning much support. Some say that the main

character in the sensational mainland Chinese TV series *New Star*—County Party Committee Secretary Li Xiangnan [2621 0686 0589], was modeled on Liu Yuan. Of course, leaving the reliability of this rumor aside, the deep public trust that Liu Yuan enjoyed was certainly a fact.

At the end of 1987, when the Henan People's Congress was holding its succession elections, while the provincial government leadership candidate list did not include Liu Yuan's name, once the various election groups discovered this, they immediately signed a petition to recommend Liu Yuan as a candidate for vice governor. On election day in January 1988, the "latecomer" Liu Yuan was unexpectedly elected Henan vice governor with the highest voting plurality, making him one of the youngest vice governors in China at the time.

All say that Liu Yuan is the very likeness of his father Liu Shaoqi, having inherited even his traits, such as his early grey hair and slightly hoarse manner of speech. Of course, faced with today's new open situation and complex armed police work in the 1990s, with corruption and lax discipline among some public security armed police, Liu Yuan may be faced with "as great" difficulties as Liu Shaoqi was in his years of secret underground work, the Long March, and tenure as PRC president. So we will have to wait and see how he goes about rectifying PAP workstyle to create an honest and effective order.

Zhao Nanqi: Military Sciences Academy Commandant

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[Article: "Academy of Military Sciences Commandant Zhao Nanqi"]

[Text] General Zhao Nanqi Is Made Academy of Military Sciences Commandant

The opening ceremonies of the Forum on Military Theory were held in Beijing on 3 December 1992 to commemorate the centennial of the birth of Marshal Liu Bocheng [0491 0130 2110], with the forum being jointly sponsored by the Academy of Military Sciences, the National Defense University, and the China Military Sciences Institute. Leaders such as Jiang Zemin, Qin Jiwei, Zhang Wannian, Yu Yongbo, and Fu Quanyou attended the opening ceremonies. The opening ceremonies were presided over by General Zhao Nanqi [6392 0589 6386], the newly appointed commandant of the Academy of Military Sciences, with National Defense University Commandant Zhu Dunfa giving the opening address. This was the first news out of mainland China, since the 14th CPC Congress, about Zhao Nanqi's change of position.

The Academy of Military Sciences Is Under the Direct Leadership of the Central Military Commission

The Academy of Military Sciences was formally established on 15 March 1958. It is responsible for the key missions of military theory and army-wide military affairs academic research planning and coordination. It is under the direct leadership of the CPC Central Committee Military Commission and is a center of army-wide military affairs scientific research located in Beijing. Its commandants have been Marshal Ye Jianying, General Song Shilun, Lieutenant General Zheng Wenhuan, and Lieutenant General Jiang Shunxue, with its political commissars having been Ye Jianying, General Su Yu, General Wang Shusheng, General Wang Xinting, Lieutenant General Liao Hansheng, General Xiao Hua, Lieutenant General Liu Zhijian, Lieutenant General Yuan Shengping, Lieutenant General Liang Biye, General Wang Chenghan, and Lieutenant General Yang Yongbin.

The Academy of Military Sciences has research departments such as Tactics, Battle Strategy, Military Regulations, Military History, Foreign Military Affairs, Military Command Strategy Analysis, Mao Zedong Military Thought, Army Political Work, and Military Encyclopedic Knowledge. In the last three decades, the academy has made great scientific research achievements as well as compiling and publishing many military academic publications.

Zhao Nanqi Joined the Northeast Army of Volunteers in 1945

General Zhao Nanqi is of Korean ancestry, having been born on 15 April 1926 in Jilin Province's Yongji County (formerly called Jilin County), and working as a salesclerk in his youth. In September 1945 he joined the CPC-led Youth League in Yongji, and in December 1945 joined the Northeast Army of Volunteers Huadian Seventh Detachment, taking part in the struggle to clear out the Japanese-puppet remnants. Then he was a student and class monitor at the Jilin branch of the Northeast Army and Government University. In the winter of 1946, he became a member of the Jilin Province work team for army propaganda and organizational work among civilians, going down to the countryside to mobilize the masses for land reform. In February 1947 he joined the CPC, serving as a document clerk in the CPC Yanbian Prefectural Party Committee Organization Department, and concurrently as general affairs section chief, and then in 1948 was promoted to deputy director of the general affairs department there. After the northeast was liberated, he served as Prefectural Party Committee Secretary in 1949, in the same year becoming a researcher in the PRC Jilin Party Committee's Policy Studies Office.

Zhao Nanqi Went to War in Korea in 1950

After the founding of the PRC, Zhao Nanqi returned to military work in 1950, serving as a staff officer in the intelligence office of the Northeast Military Region

headquarters. In October 1950 he took part in the Korean War, serving as a combat staff officer in the combat office of the Volunteer Army headquarters. In July 1951 he was made a civilian war service staff officer in the staff office of the Volunteer Army Logistics headquarters, where the Volunteer Army Logistics Commander was Hong Xuezhong [3163 1331 2535]. When the Volunteer Army left China, it had no logistics department, with its logistics work being done for it by the Northeast Military Region's Logistics Department, and the region's logistics director, Li Jukui [2621 5112 1145], going straight to the frontlines to take charge of this work. It was only in the summer of 1951 that the Volunteer Army established its own logistics command. In 1952 Zhao Nanqi was made deputy director of the Transportation Department of the Volunteer Army Logistics Command, being promoted to director in 1953, and later serving as deputy director of the Planning Department. He took part in the first through fifth campaigns, the anti-U.S. Air Force "Strangulation Campaign," and the Summer 1953 Offensive, working in the military transport organization, and winning the PRC Class-2 and DPRK Class-3 medals.

Zhao Nanqi Began Work in the Jilin Military District in 1959

Zhao Nanqi went in 1955 to study at the PLA Logistics Academy's Command Department, and when the PRC first put a military-rank system into effect, was made a lieutenant colonel and given a liberation medal.

In 1957, he went to Korea again, serving as director of the Volunteer Army Logistics Command Organization and Planning Department. In October 1958 he accompanied the Volunteer Army Headquarters on its withdrawal back to China. In 1959 he was made deputy director of the Political Department of the Yanbian Military Area in the PLA's Jilin Military District, where he was promoted to director in 1963, in 1964 being promoted to Yanbian Military Area deputy political commissar and made a colonel. In 1966 he was made second political commissar in the Yanbian Military Area, and PRC Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Party Committee deputy secretary.

Zhao Nanqi Was Promoted to PLA General Logistics Department Director in November 1987

During the Cultural Revolution, Zhao Nanqi was framed, being dismissed in 1968. In 1973 he was reinstated as political commissar of the Tonghua Military Area of the Jilin Military District.

After the Gang of Four was smashed in 1977, Zhao Nanqi served successively as Jilin Military District Political Department director, Jilin Military District deputy political commissar and Yanbian Military Area first political commissar, PRC Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Party Committee first secretary, Autonomous Prefecture Revolutionary Committee chairman, and Autonomous Prefecture People's Congress Standing Committee chairman.

From March 1980 to April 1983 he served as Jilin vice governor, from 1982 to March 1983 as PRC Jilin Party Committee deputy secretary, and from March 1983 to May 1985 as PRC Jilin Party Committee secretary. From April 1984 to August 1985 he served as Jilin Military District political commissar. From June 1985, he served successively as PLA General Logistics Department [GLD] deputy director, GLD first deputy director and first deputy political commissar, and GLD Party Committee deputy secretary.

From November 1987 to October 1992 he served as GLD director and party committee secretary. When the PLA resumed a military-rank system in September 1988, he was made a general. In October 1992 he was made commandant of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences.

Zhao Nanqi was elected beginning in 1978 as a delegate to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh NPCs. In April 1988, at the First Session of the Seventh NPC, he was nominated by Deng Xiaoping as a member of the CPC Central Military Commission.

At the 12th, 13th, and 14th CPC Congresses, Zhao Nanqi was elected as a Central Committee member. He has also served as Army-Wide Patriotic Health Committee director, Army-Wide Greening Committee director, and Army-Wide Real Estate Inventory and Reorganization Work Leadership Group director.

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